407 U.S. 67 (1972)
Margarita Fuentes, a Florida resident, purchased a gas stove and a stereophonic phonograph from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under conditional sales contracts calling for monthly payments over time, with Firestone retaining title until full payment.1 After making payments for more than a year, about two hundred dollars remained due.2 A dispute developed between Fuentes and Firestone over servicing of the stove.3 Firestone then instituted an action in small claims court for repossession.4 It obtained a writ of replevin from the court clerk by submitting form documents and posting a bond in double the value of the property.5 A deputy sheriff and Firestone agent seized the stove and stereo from Fuentes's home the same day.6
Fuentes subsequently brought an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures. A three-judge district court was convened and upheld the statute.7
In the consolidated Pennsylvania case, several residents purchased household goods such as beds, tables, and other items under similar installment contracts.8 After claimed defaults, sellers obtained writs of replevin from a prothonotary upon ex parte applications and posting of bonds.9 County sheriffs seized the goods from the buyers' homes without prior notice.10 This included one instance where a former deputy sheriff obtained a writ for his son's clothes, furniture, and toys.11 The Pennsylvania appellants filed suit in federal district court, where a three-judge court upheld the statute. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals from both district court decisions.12
Whether the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorizing the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person's possession under a writ of replevin upon ex parte application violate the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that a person be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of any significant property interest.14 This right must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, meaning before the deprivation occurs, except in extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.15
Yes. The statutes allow seizure without prior notice or hearing.16 The Florida statute permits a creditor to obtain a writ by filing a complaint and bond with the clerk, who issues it summarily, and the sheriff seizes the property immediately.17 In the established facts, this occurred to Margarita Fuentes when Firestone obtained the writ and seized the stove and stereo the same day without any prior opportunity for her to be heard.
The Pennsylvania statute similarly allows ex parte application to a prothonotary with a bond, leading to seizure without prior hearing, as happened to the appellants who had household goods taken from their homes.18 These deprivations involve possessory interests in household goods that qualify as property under the Fourteenth Amendment, and no extraordinary situation justifying postponement is present because the seizures serve only private gain rather than important governmental interests.19
The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard before the seizure of property.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Burger, C.j., And Blackmun, J.
Justice White dissented on the ground that the majority opinion improvidently calls into question important aspects of state statutes governing secured transactions.21 He argued that the procedure is constitutional because it balances the antagonistic interests of buyer and seller during the interim period by immobilizing the property and requiring bonds from both sides.22 White viewed the likelihood of mistaken claims of default as not sufficiently real or recurring to justify a broad constitutional requirement for a prior hearing, noting that sellers have incentives not to make false claims.23
He also suggested that the cases should be reconsidered under the principles of Younger v. Harris because state court proceedings were pending when the federal actions were filed.24
Whether the contractual provisions in the installment sales agreements constituted a waiver of any right to prior notice and hearing before seizure?25
A waiver of constitutional rights must, at the very least, be clear, and contractual language that merely states the seller's right to repossession upon default does not amount to a waiver of the right to a preseizure hearing.26
No. The contracts provided that upon default the seller may take back the merchandise. This language did not indicate how or through what process the seller could take back the goods. It also did not mention waiver of a prior hearing.27 In the established facts, the contracts signed by Fuentes and the Pennsylvania appellants were printed form contracts.
There was no bargaining over terms. There was no showing that the appellants were aware of any significance of the provisions as a waiver of constitutional rights.28 The provisions were not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly made in the sense required for waiver of due process rights.29
The contractual provisions did not constitute a waiver of the right to prior notice and hearing before seizure.30