547 U.S. 410 (2006)
Richard Ceballos has been employed since 1989 as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.1 During the period relevant to this case, Ceballos was a calendar deputy in the office’s Pomona branch, and in this capacity he exercised supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers.2
In February 2000, a defense attorney contacted Ceballos about a pending criminal case.3 The defense attorney said there were inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a critical search warrant.4 The attorney informed Ceballos that he had filed a motion to traverse, or challenge, the warrant, but he also wanted Ceballos to review the case.5 After examining the affidavit and visiting the location it described, Ceballos determined the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations.6 The affidavit called a long driveway what Ceballos thought should have been referred to as a separate roadway.7 Ceballos also questioned the affidavit’s statement that tire tracks led from a stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the warrant.8
Ceballos spoke on the telephone to the warrant affiant, a deputy sheriff from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, but he did not receive a satisfactory explanation for the perceived inaccuracies.9 He relayed his findings to his supervisors, petitioners Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt, and followed up by preparing a disposition memorandum.10 The memo explained Ceballos’ concerns and recommended dismissal of the case.11 On March 2, 2000, Ceballos submitted the memo to Sundstedt for his review.12 A few days later, Ceballos presented Sundstedt with another memo, this one describing a second telephone conversation between Ceballos and the warrant affiant.13
Based on Ceballos’ statements, a meeting was held to discuss the affidavit.14 Attendees included Ceballos, Sundstedt, and Najera, as well as the warrant affiant and other employees from the sheriff’s department.15 The meeting allegedly became heated, with one lieutenant sharply criticizing Ceballos for his handling of the case.16 Despite Ceballos’ concerns, Sundstedt decided to proceed with the prosecution, pending disposition of the defense motion to traverse.17 The trial court held a hearing on the motion.18 Ceballos was called by the defense and recounted his observations about the affidavit, but the trial court rejected the challenge to the warrant.19
Ceballos claims that in the aftermath of these events he was subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions.20 The actions included reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.21 Ceballos initiated an employment grievance, but the grievance was denied based on a finding that he had not suffered any retaliation.22 Unsatisfied, Ceballos sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting, as relevant here, a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983.23 He alleged petitioners violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by retaliating against him based on his memo of March 2.24
Petitioners moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted their motion.25 Noting that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to his employment duties, the court concluded he was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the memo’s contents.26 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.28
Whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties?29
When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.30
No. The established facts demonstrate that Richard Ceballos served as a calendar deputy district attorney exercising supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.31 In February 2000 a defense attorney contacted Ceballos regarding inaccuracies in an affidavit supporting a search warrant in a pending criminal case.32 After examining the affidavit and visiting the location it described, Ceballos determined the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations. He relayed his findings to his supervisors, petitioners Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt, and followed up by preparing a disposition memorandum recommending dismissal of the case.33 These actions occurred because Ceballos was fulfilling his official responsibilities as a prosecutor assigned to the matter.34 The memo therefore receives no First Amendment protection against the subsequent alleged retaliatory actions of reassignment, transfer, and denial of promotion.35
The District Court granted summary judgment on the ground that the memo was written pursuant to employment duties.36 The Ninth Circuit reversed after applying Pickering and Connick balancing.37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether speech made pursuant to official duties enjoys constitutional protection.38
Application of the rule to these facts confirms that Ceballos acted as an employee rather than a citizen when he investigated the affidavit, consulted the affiant, and submitted the memorandum to his superiors.39 Because the speech owed its existence to Ceballos’s professional responsibilities, the employer retained authority to evaluate and discipline the employee for its content without triggering First Amendment scrutiny.40
The First Amendment does not protect Ceballos from discipline based on the disposition memorandum he prepared pursuant to his official duties as a calendar deputy.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the proper answer is sometimes rather than never.42 He emphasized that the categorical distinction between speech as a citizen and speech in the course of employment is mistaken.43 Stevens noted that Givhan protected a teacher who raised concerns privately to a principal without inquiring whether the speech fell within job duties.44
He observed that the same words should not receive or lose protection depending on whether they appear in a formal job description.45 Stevens warned that the new rule creates an incentive for employees to voice concerns publicly before speaking frankly to superiors.46
Joined by Justices Stevens And Ginsburg
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented because Pickering balancing should remain available when an employee speaks on matters of public concern even if the speech occurs in the course of official duties.47 He argued that the individual and public value of such speech is no less, and may be greater, when the employee addresses subjects he knows intimately through his job.48 Souter rejected the majority’s line as lacking adequate justification.49
He noted that government employers already possess substantial authority to insist on honesty, accuracy, and judgment without a categorical exclusion from constitutional review.50
Justice Breyer dissented separately.51 He concluded that Pickering balancing is appropriate when professional and constitutional obligations coincide in the speech at issue.52 Breyer highlighted that Ceballos’s speech involved a prosecutor’s obligations under Brady v. Maryland to disclose exculpatory evidence.53
Those obligations are independently regulated by professional canons and constitutional requirements.54 He maintained that these special circumstances augment the need for constitutional protection.55 At the same time, they diminish the government’s interest in unfettered control over the speech.56
Breyer argued that such circumstances supply administrable standards, ensuring that judicial review under Pickering does not unduly interfere with managerial functions.57