49 Wash. 2d 499, 304 P.2d 681 (1956)
Brian Dailey (age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, likewise an adult, in the backyard of the plaintiff’s home, on July 16, 1951.1 Brian was visiting with Ruth's adult sister, Naomi Garratt, when Ruth came out of her house into the backyard.2 Brian picked up a wood and canvas lawn chair, moved it a few feet, and sat down in it.3 Upon seeing Ruth about to sit where the chair had been, Brian stood up and tried to reposition the chair under her, but she fell to the ground anyway.4
The fall caused Ruth to suffer a fractured hip and other serious injuries, for which damages were determined to be eleven thousand dollars if liability were established.5 At trial, the court credited Brian's account over Naomi's testimony that Brian had deliberately pulled the chair out from under Ruth.6 The trial court found that Brian acted without any willful or unlawful purpose and without intent to injure Ruth or cause offensive contact.7
The trial court dismissed Ruth's battery claim, leading to this appeal in which she sought either a judgment for the stipulated damages or a new trial.8 Additional procedural matters arose concerning the scope of cross-examination of Brian and the denial of a pretrial deposition.9
Whether the defendant child committed a battery by moving the lawn chair?10
A battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact upon another.11 Liability requires that the act be done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof, that the contact is not consented to, and that the contact is not otherwise privileged.12 Intent exists when the actor acts for the purpose of causing the contact or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to result.13
No. The trial court credited Brian Dailey's version of events over Naomi Garratt's testimony that he deliberately pulled the chair.14 The findings establish that Brian moved the chair without any willful purpose or intent to cause offensive contact with Ruth Garratt.15 Because the findings do not include a determination that Brian knew with substantial assurance that Ruth would attempt to sit where the chair had been, the intent element for battery is not satisfied.16
The defendant did not commit a battery on the facts as found by the trial court.17
Whether the trial court's findings on the defendant's purpose and intent were sufficient without a specific determination on his knowledge that the plaintiff would attempt to sit where the chair had been?18
Intent for battery requires that the actor know with substantial assurance that the harmful or offensive contact will result.19 The mere absence of intent to injure or to play a prank does not absolve liability if the actor possesses such knowledge.20 A finding that the actor lacked the requisite knowledge can be inferred from existing findings, but the trial court must expressly pass upon the knowledge issue before dismissal.21
No. The trial court's findings addressed Brian's lack of willful purpose and lack of intent to injure or cause offensive contact.22 Those findings do not expressly determine whether Brian knew with substantial assurance that Ruth Garratt would attempt to sit where the chair had been.23 Because intent can be inferred from knowledge of substantial assurance, the existing findings on purpose and motivation are insufficient without a direct determination on the knowledge element.24
The trial court's findings on purpose and intent were not sufficient without a specific determination on Brian's knowledge.25
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for eleven thousand dollars or a new trial on the existing record?26
No. The record does not establish that Brian possessed the knowledge required for battery intent.29 Entry of judgment for the stipulated damages of eleven thousand dollars is therefore not warranted.30 No change of theory or restriction on cross-examination prejudiced the plaintiff.31 The denial of a pretrial deposition and limitations on cross-examination did not constitute prejudicial error.32
The plaintiff is not entitled to entry of judgment for eleven thousand dollars or a new trial on the existing record.33
Whether the trial court erred by restricting cross-examination of the defendant or by denying a pretrial deposition?34
No. The trial court permitted substantial cross-examination of Brian Dailey.37 The single restriction on questions about kindergarten incidents did not prevent the underlying facts from entering the record through direct questioning.38 The denial of a pretrial deposition occurred under the court's discretion to protect the child.39 No prejudice resulted because the child testified at trial and the facts sought were otherwise developed.40
The trial court did not err by restricting cross-examination or denying a pretrial deposition.41