540 U.S. 581 (2004)
In 1997, General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the United Auto Workers that eliminated the company's obligation to provide health benefits to subsequently retired employees, except as to then-current workers at least 50 years old.1 Respondents, a group of employees collectively referred to as Cline, were at least 40 years old but under 50 at the time of the agreement, so they fell within the age range protected by federal statute yet received no promise of benefits under the new terms.2 Some respondents retired before the change to obtain the prior advantage, some retired afterward with no benefit, and some continued working while knowing the contract would provide them no health coverage upon retirement.3
The respondents filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming the agreement discriminated against them with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of their age.4 The Commission agreed with the charges and invited General Dynamics and the union to settle informally, but those efforts failed.5 The respondents then brought suit against General Dynamics in federal district court, combining claims under the federal age statute and state law.6
The District Court dismissed the federal claim, describing it as one of reverse age discrimination and relying on Seventh Circuit precedent that the statute does not protect the younger against the older.7 A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits.9
Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits an employer from favoring older employees over younger employees who are both within the protected class of individuals at least 40 years old?10
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 forbids discriminatory preference for the young over the old but does not prohibit favoring the old over the young.11
No.12 The collective bargaining agreement eliminated health benefits for subsequently retired employees except for those at least 50 years old.13 This favored older workers over the respondents who were between 40 and 49 years old.14 This practice does not violate the ADEA because the statute was enacted to address discrimination that disadvantages older workers in favor of younger ones.15 The legislative findings emphasize impediments faced by older workers.16
There is an absence of any indication that Congress intended to protect younger workers from preferences for their seniors.17
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 does not prohibit an employer from favoring older employees over younger employees within the protected class.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia dissented on the ground that the EEOC regulation should receive deference.19 The regulation states that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate by giving preference because of age between individuals 40 and over.20 Scalia concluded that the statute does not unambiguously require a different interpretation.21
He found the EEOC's regulation to be an entirely reasonable interpretation of the text.22 Scalia would defer to the agency's authoritative conclusion rather than reject it as clearly wrong.23
Joined by Justice Kennedy
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the plain language of the ADEA permits suits by relatively younger workers.24 The phrase discriminate because of such individual's age is not restricted to discrimination because of relatively older age.25 Thomas argued that the majority improperly created a new tool of statutory interpretation by relying on social history.26
This approach is inconsistent with prior cases such as McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.27 He would affirm the Court of Appeals because the statute clearly prohibits discrimination because of an individual's age whether the individual is too old or too young.28