429 U.S. 125
General Electric Company maintained a Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan that paid weekly nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits equal to 60 percent of an employee's normal straight-time weekly earnings.1
Benefit payments began on the eighth day of total disability or immediately upon hospital confinement as a bed patient and continued for a maximum of 26 weeks for any one continuous period of disability.2 The plan expressly excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy.3
The individual named respondents were hourly paid production employees at General Electric's Salem, Virginia plant.4 Each became pregnant during 1971 or 1972, submitted a claim for disability benefits covering the period of absence due to pregnancy, and had the claim denied on the ground that the plan provided no coverage for pregnancy-related absences.5 Each respondent thereafter filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that the denial constituted sex discrimination.6
After the required waiting period, the respondents, together with their union, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of a class of women employees denied benefits since September 14, 1971.7 The complaint sought a declaration that the exclusion violated Title VII, an injunction requiring coverage of pregnancy disabilities on the same terms as other disabilities, and damages.8
Following a trial on the merits, the District Court found that normal pregnancy is disabling for six to eight weeks, that approximately ten percent of pregnancies terminate by miscarriage which is disabling, and that approximately ten percent involve complications leading to additional disability.9 The court also considered stipulated evidence showing that, even with pregnancy-related disabilities excluded, the cost of the plan per female employee was at least as high as or substantially higher than the cost per male employee.10 The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining continuation of the exclusion and providing for future monetary relief.11
General Electric appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed by a divided vote.12 Between the District Court judgment and the Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the application of that decision and related questions under Title VII.14
Whether General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its employee disability plan violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?15
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).16 A disability plan that excludes pregnancy does not discriminate on the basis of sex when the plan covers the same categories of risk for men and women and the exclusion is not shown to be a pretext for invidious discrimination against women.17
No. The established facts show that General Electric's Weekly Sickness and Accident Insurance Plan paid 60 percent of normal straight-time weekly earnings for nonoccupational disabilities up to 26 weeks but expressly excluded pregnancy-related disabilities.18 The named respondents, hourly production employees at the Salem plant, each had claims denied after becoming pregnant in 1971 or 1972.19 The District Court found normal pregnancy disabling for six to eight weeks and noted that even without pregnancy coverage the per-employee cost for women was at least as high as for men.20 Because the plan divides potential recipients into pregnant women and nonpregnant persons rather than on the basis of gender as such, and because no evidence demonstrated that the exclusion operated as a pretext, the exclusion does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.21
General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its employee disability plan does not violate Title VII.22
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Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the exclusion of the single most prevalent female-specific disability from an otherwise comprehensive plan could not be viewed as the product of a gender-neutral risk-assignment process.23 He emphasized the historical record of General Electric's employment practices, including forced maternity leave and wage differentials, and the District Court's undisturbed finding that a discriminatory attitude toward women was a motivating factor in the policy.24 Brennan concluded that the EEOC guideline correctly interpreted Title VII to require equal treatment of pregnancy disabilities.25
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the company's rule places the risk of absence caused by pregnancy in a class by itself.26 By definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex because it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male.27 The analysis is the same whether the rule relates to hiring, promotion, or an exclusion from a disability insurance plan.28
Stevens concluded that the language of the statute plainly requires the result reached unanimously by the Courts of Appeals, without needing to reach questions of motive or effect.29
Whether the Supreme Court's analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello of pregnancy exclusions in disability plans controls the interpretation of Title VII?30
Although Geduldig arose under the Equal Protection Clause, its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-benefits plan is not gender-based discrimination is relevant to Title VII.31 Both provisions address the meaning of discrimination.32 A finding of sex-based discrimination is required to trigger liability under § 703(a)(1).33
Yes. The facts establish that General Electric's plan is functionally identical to the California program upheld in Geduldig.34 The plans are similar in relevant respects.35 Both are funded through contributions or self-insurance.36 Because the statutory definition of discrimination incorporates the same conceptual framework, Geduldig directly controls and requires reversal.37
The Supreme Court's analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello controls the interpretation of Title VII in this context.38
Whether the 1972 EEOC guidelines requiring that pregnancy disabilities be treated like other temporary disabilities under employer plans are entitled to deference in construing Title VII?39
EEOC guidelines are entitled to consideration but receive less weight than regulations possessing the force of law.40 Their persuasiveness depends on factors including contemporaneity with the statute, consistency with earlier agency pronouncements, thoroughness of consideration, and validity of reasoning, as set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.41
No. The 1972 guideline was issued eight years after Title VII's enactment and directly contradicted the EEOC's own 1966 opinion letters stating that an employer could exclude maternity from coverage without violating the statute.42 The guideline also conflicted with the Wage and Hour Administrator's regulation under the Equal Pay Act, incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett Amendment, which permits equal benefits even when costs differ by sex.43 These inconsistencies deprive the guideline of the deference that would otherwise be due.44
The 1972 EEOC guidelines are not entitled to deference in construing Title VII on this issue.45
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan maintained that the eight-year interval between enactment and the 1972 guideline reflected careful study and deliberation rather than indecision or inconsistency.46 The guideline represented the agency's first systematic statement on pregnancy and childbirth after thorough investigation and review of its case decisions.47 He pointed to subsequent actions by Congress and the executive branch adopting similar pregnancy-inclusive rules under other statutes.48
Brennan concluded that the guideline was a sufficiently reasonable construction of Title VII to merit great deference under the standards set forth in prior precedents such as Griggs and Albemarle.49
Whether a showing of discriminatory effect from a facially neutral disability plan is necessary or sufficient to establish a Title VII violation when pregnancy is excluded?50
Yes. The facts show that respondents introduced evidence of relative costs and the District Court found the cost per female employee at least as high as per male employee even without pregnancy coverage.53 No finding or evidence established that the financial benefits of the plan worked to discriminate against women in the aggregate risk protection derived.54 Because pregnancy constitutes an additional risk unique to women and the plan covers exactly the same categories of risk for both sexes, the exclusion does not produce a gender-based discriminatory effect sufficient to establish a violation.55
A showing of discriminatory effect is necessary to establish a Title VII violation in this context, and respondents failed to make that showing.56
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Justice Stewart joined the opinion of the Court holding that General Electric's exclusion of benefits for disability during pregnancy is not a per se violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, and that the respondents have failed to prove a discriminatory effect.57 Unlike his Brother Blackmun, Justice Stewart did not understand the opinion to question either Griggs v. Duke Power Co. specifically or the significance generally of proving a discriminatory effect in a Title VII case.58
Justice Blackmun joined the judgment of the Court and concurred in its opinion insofar as it holds that General Electric's exclusion of disability due to pregnancy is not per se a violation of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, that the plaintiffs therefore had at least the burden of proving discriminatory effect, and that they failed in that proof. Justice Blackmun did not join any inference or suggestion that effect may never be a controlling factor in a Title VII case or that Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is no longer good law.59