457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982)
In 1969 petitioner General Telephone Co. of Southwest initiated a special recruitment and training program for minorities. Through that program, respondent Falcon was hired in July 1969 as a groundman. Within a year he was twice promoted, first to lineman and then to lineman-in-charge. He subsequently refused a promotion to installer-repairman. In October 1972 he applied for the job of field inspector. His application was denied even though the promotion was granted to several white employees with less seniority.1
Falcon thereupon filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.2 He stated his belief that he had been passed over for promotion because of his national origin and that petitioner's promotion policy operated against Mexican-Americans as a class.3 In due course he received a right-to-sue letter from the Commission. In April 1975 he commenced this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.4 His complaint alleged that petitioner maintained a policy, practice, custom, or usage of discriminating against Mexican-Americans because of national origin and with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, and subjecting Mexican-Americans to continuous employment discrimination. The complaint contained no factual allegations concerning petitioner's hiring practices.5
Respondent brought the action on his own behalf and on behalf of other persons similarly situated. The class identified in the complaint was composed of Mexican-American persons who are employed, or who might be employed, by GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY at its place of business located in Irving, Texas, who have been and who continue to be or might be adversely affected by the practices complained of herein.6 After responding to petitioner's written interrogatories, respondent filed a memorandum in favor of certification of the class of all hourly Mexican American employees who have been employed, are employed, or may in the future be employed and all those Mexican Americans who have applied or would have applied for employment had the Defendant not practiced racial discrimination in its employment practices.7 Without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District Court certified a class including Mexican-American employees and Mexican-American applicants for employment who had not been hired.8
Following trial of the liability issues, the District Court entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect first to respondent and then to the class. The District Court found that petitioner had not discriminated against respondent in hiring, but that it did discriminate against him in its promotion practices. The court reached converse conclusions about the class, finding no discrimination in promotion practices, but concluding that petitioner had discriminated against Mexican-Americans at its Irving facility in its hiring practices.9 After post-trial proceedings, the District Court ordered petitioner to furnish respondent with a list of all Mexican-Americans who had applied for employment at the Irving facility during the period between January 1, 1973, and October 18, 1976. Evidence was taken concerning the applicants who responded to the notice, and backpay was ultimately awarded to 13 persons, in addition to respondent Falcon. The total recovery by respondent and the entire class amounted to $67,925.49, plus costs and interest.10
Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals rejected respondent's contention that the class should have encompassed all of petitioner's operations in Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that the class had been defined too broadly.11 On the merits, the Court of Appeals upheld respondent's claim of disparate treatment in promotion, but held that the District Court's findings relating to disparate impact in hiring were insufficient to support recovery on behalf of the class. After this Court decided Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and directed further consideration in the light of that opinion. The Fifth Circuit thereupon vacated the portion of its opinion addressing respondent's promotion claim but reinstated the portions of its opinion approving the District Court's class certification.12 With the merits of both respondent's promotion claim and the class hiring claims remaining open for reconsideration in the District Court on remand, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants who were denied employment.13
Whether respondent Falcon, who complained that petitioner did not promote him because he is a Mexican-American, was properly permitted to maintain a class action on behalf of Mexican-American applicants for employment whom petitioner did not hire?14
Title VII contains no special authorization for class suits maintained by private parties.15 An individual litigant seeking to maintain a class action under Title VII must meet the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation specified in Rule 23(a).16 A class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.17 Conceptually, there is a wide gap between an individual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination.18 There is also a gap between that claim and the existence of a class of persons who have suffered the same injury.19 Under that gap the individual's claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact and the individual's claim will be typical of the class claims.20
No. Falcon's complaint alleged discrimination in promotion but contained no factual allegations concerning petitioner's hiring practices.21 The District Court certified a class including Mexican-American employees and Mexican-American applicants for employment who had not been hired without conducting an evidentiary hearing.22 At trial Falcon attempted to sustain his individual claim by proving intentional discrimination in promotion while he tried to prove the class claims through statistical evidence of disparate impact in hiring.23 The District Court found that petitioner had not discriminated against respondent in hiring, but that it did discriminate against him in its promotion practices. The court reached converse conclusions about the class, finding no discrimination in promotion practices, but concluding that petitioner had discriminated against Mexican-Americans at its Irving facility in its hiring practices.
These bifurcated findings demonstrate that the individual and class claims lacked commonality and typicality and might as well have been tried separately.24
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the general principles stated by the Court for determining whether a class should be certified under Rule 23. However, he concluded that it is entirely clear on the record that no class should have been certified.28 He noted that respondent's individual claim of disparate treatment in promotion depends on evaluation of comparative qualifications and credibility of promotion decisions. The class claim of adverse impact in hiring depends on analysis of statistics concerning hiring patterns.29 Burger observed that the only commonality is that respondent is a Mexican-American and he seeks to represent a class of Mexican-Americans. This is insufficient under precedent.30
He would simply reverse the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the class claim rather than remand for further proceedings.31