547 U.S. 103 (2006)
In late May 2001, respondent Scott Randolph and his wife Janet separated when Janet left their marital residence in Americus, Georgia, and went to stay with her parents in Canada, taking their son and some belongings.1 In July 2001, Janet returned to the Americus house with the child.2
On the morning of July 6, 2001, Janet complained to the police that after a domestic dispute her husband had taken their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles.3 Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returned and explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor's house out of concern that his wife might take the boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol.4
One of the officers asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused.5 The sergeant then turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave.6 She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott's, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine.7
Sergeant Murray left to get an evidence bag and called the district attorney's office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant.8 When he returned, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent.9 The police took the straw to the police station along with the Randolphs.10 After obtaining a search warrant, they returned and seized further evidence of drug use, leading to Scott Randolph's indictment for possession of cocaine.11
He moved to suppress the evidence as the product of a warrantless search unauthorized by his wife's consent over his express refusal.12 The trial court denied the motion.13 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether a physically present co-occupant's express refusal of consent to a police search of a shared dwelling renders the search unreasonable and invalid as to him despite the consent of another co-occupant?16
The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area.17 This rule rests on the common understanding that co-inhabitants assume the risk that one of them may permit a search.18 When a physically present co-occupant expressly refuses consent, however, there is no common understanding that one occupant may prevail over the express will of another, so the refusal is dispositive and the search is unreasonable and invalid as to the objecting occupant.19
Yes. Scott Randolph was physically present at the marital residence when police arrived on the morning of July 6, 2001, and he unequivocally refused permission to search the house.20 Janet Randolph, his wife and co-occupant, gave consent and led the officer upstairs to a bedroom where a drinking straw with powdery residue was observed.21 The search proceeded over Scott Randolph's express objection, and the social expectations that underpin the consent rule provide no basis for one co-tenant to override the other's refusal when both are present at the threshold.22
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a warrantless search over the express objection of a physically present resident is unreasonable.23 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed that judgment.24
A physically present co-occupant's express refusal of consent renders the search unreasonable and invalid as to him despite the consent of another co-occupant.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion because it is consistent with the centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home embodied in the Fourth Amendment.26 He explained that when two people share a dwelling, each assumes the risk that the other might invite a guest into the common areas, but neither assumes the risk that the other will invite a guest to conduct a search over the express objection of the first occupant.27 In today's world each partner has a constitutional right that he or she may independently assert or waive, and neither is a master possessing the power to override the other's right to deny entry.28
Joined by Justice Scalia
Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the decision is inconsistent with United States v. Matlock and undermines the law-enforcement interests the consent rule was designed to serve.29 He maintained that when one co-occupant consents and the other objects, police should be permitted to rely on the consent of the co-occupant who is present.30 The majority's rule creates confusion for officers and protects privacy on a random, happenstance basis, shielding a co-occupant only when he happens to be at the door while leaving unprotected one who is asleep or in another room.31
Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice's dissent and added that the Fourth Amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant when one co-occupant consents to a search.32 He viewed the majority's holding as a departure from established precedent that will hamper legitimate investigations.33 Responding to Justice Stevens, he noted that changes in property law after the founding do not alter the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which referred to bodies of law that themselves may evolve.34
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the decision elevates the interests of the objecting co-occupant over those of the consenting co-occupant in a manner unsupported by the text or history of the Fourth Amendment.35 He argued that Mrs. Randolph's voluntary action in leading Sergeant Murray to the straw did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because she was not acting as a government agent.36 Consistent with this principle, the Court held in Coolidge v. New Hampshire that no Fourth Amendment search occurs where the spouse of an accused voluntarily leads the police to potential evidence of wrongdoing by the accused.37
Because Coolidge squarely controls this case, the Court should have reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia.38
Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion while stressing that the Fourth Amendment does not insist on bright-line rules and that reasonableness is measured by the totality of the circumstances.39 The search at issue was a search solely for evidence.40 The objecting party was present and made his objection known clearly and directly to the officers seeking to enter the house.41
The officers might easily have secured the premises and sought a warrant permitting them to enter.42 Thus, the totality of the circumstances present here do not suffice to justify abandoning the Fourth Amendment's traditional hostility to police entry into a home without a warrant.43