420 U.S. 103 (1975)
In March 1971 respondents Pugh and Henderson were arrested in Dade County, Florida. Each was charged with several offenses under a prosecutor's information. Pugh was denied bail because one of the charges against him carried a potential life sentence. Henderson remained in custody because he was unable to post a $4,500 bond.1
In Florida, indictments are required only for prosecution of capital offenses. Prosecutors may charge all other crimes by information without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. At the time respondents were arrested, a Florida rule seemed to authorize adversary preliminary hearings to test probable cause for detention in all cases. The Florida courts had held that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. They had also held that habeas corpus could not be used, except perhaps in exceptional circumstances, to test the probable cause for detention under an information. The only possible methods for obtaining a judicial determination of probable cause were a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 days. Arraignment was often delayed a month or more after arrest, as the District Court found.2
Respondents Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials in the Federal District Court claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Respondents Turner and Faulk, also in custody under informations, subsequently intervened. Petitioner Gerstein, the State Attorney for Dade County, was one of several defendants.3
After an initial delay while the Florida Legislature considered a bill that would have afforded preliminary hearings to persons charged by information, the District Court granted the relief sought. The court certified the case as a class action under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(2) and ordered the Dade County defendants to give the named plaintiffs an immediate preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for further detention. It also ordered them to submit a plan providing preliminary hearings in all cases instituted by information.4
The defendants submitted a plan prepared by Sheriff E. Wilson Purdy and the District Court adopted it with modifications. The final order prescribed a detailed post-arrest procedure. Upon arrest the accused would be taken before a magistrate for a first appearance hearing. The magistrate would explain the charges, advise the accused of his rights, appoint counsel if he was indigent, and proceed with a probable cause determination unless either the prosecutor or the accused was unprepared. If either requested more time, the magistrate would set the date for a preliminary hearing. The hearing was to be held within four days if the accused was in custody and within 10 days if he had been released pending trial.5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the District Court's order pending appeal. While the case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. Upon learning of this development, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new Dade County system. Before the District Court issued its findings, however, the Florida Supreme Court amended the procedural rules governing preliminary hearings statewide, and the parties agreed that the District Court should direct its inquiry to the new rules rather than the Dade County procedures.6
Under the amended rules every arrested person must be taken before a judicial officer within 24 hours. This first appearance is similar to the first appearance hearing ordered by the District Court in all respects but the crucial one: the magistrate does not make a determination of probable cause. The rule amendments also changed the procedure for preliminary hearings, restricting them to felony charges and codifying the rule that no hearings are available to persons charged by information or indictment.7
In a supplemental opinion the District Court held that the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection since a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without a judicial determination of probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed, modifying the District Court's decree in minor particulars and suggesting that the form of preliminary hearing provided by the amended Florida rules would be acceptable as long as it was provided to all defendants in custody pending trial. State Attorney Gerstein petitioned for review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the issue.89
Whether a person arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty?10
The Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.11 After the initial arrest the reasons for dispensing with a neutral magistrate's judgment no longer apply and the suspect's need for such a determination increases significantly.12
Yes. In the established facts respondents Pugh and Henderson were arrested in March 1971 and charged by information. Yet they remained in custody for a substantial period solely on the prosecutor's decision.13 Florida procedures foreclosed preliminary hearings after an information was filed and limited habeas corpus review.
This practice violates the rule since the facts show detention could extend a month or more without neutral judicial review of probable cause. The prosecutor's assessment alone does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of a detached magistrate.14
A person arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurs in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion. The Constitution clearly requires at least a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to pretrial detention.16
Because Florida does not provide all defendants in custody pending trial with a fair and reliable determination of probable cause for their detention, the respondents and the members of the class they represent are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.17 He would not attempt in the abstract to specify those procedural protections that constitutionally need not be accorded.18
The constitutionality of any particular method for determining probable cause can be properly decided only by evaluating a State’s pretrial procedures as a whole.19
Whether the adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals is required by the Constitution?20
The probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment need not be accompanied by the full panoply of adversary safeguards such as counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process for witnesses. The issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing on hearsay and written testimony.21
No. The established facts demonstrate that a defendant charged by information still could be detained pending trial without a judicial determination of probable cause.22 The rule permits informal nonadversary proceedings because the standard is the same as for arrest, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial. Thus, the adversary safeguards ordered below exceed what the Fourth Amendment demands.23
The adversary hearing ordered by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals is not required by the Constitution.24