372 U.S. 539 (1963)
The petitioner served as president of the Miami branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.1 In 1956 a committee of the Florida Legislature commenced an investigation of the NAACP.2 Upon expiration of that committee's authority a new committee was established in 1957 to continue the inquiry.3
That committee sought the entire membership list of the Miami branch.4 The Florida Supreme Court limited its authority to requiring the custodian to bring the records and refer to them to check specific individuals suspected of being Communists.5 Because of the impending expiration of the 1957 committee's authority the Florida Legislature in 1959 established the respondent Legislative Investigation Committee.6
The authorizing statute directed the committee to investigate organizations whose activities might constitute violence, violate state laws, or prove inimical to the well-being of citizens.7 On November 4, 1959, the petitioner was ordered to appear before the respondent Committee and to bring the membership records of the Miami and state NAACP organizations.8
At the hearing the petitioner testified that the local group had about 1,000 members and that he was custodian of the current membership lists.9 He refused to produce the records but volunteered to answer questions from his personal knowledge.10 When shown photographs and given names of fourteen persons previously identified as Communists or members of Communist front organizations, the petitioner stated that he could associate none of them with the NAACP.11
He was thereupon adjudged in contempt by a state court and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine of $1,200.12 The Florida Supreme Court sustained the contempt judgment in 126 So. 2d 129.13 This Court granted certiorari, 366 U.S. 917.14 The case was argued during the 1961 Term, restored to the calendar for reargument, 369 U.S. 834, and decided on March 25, 1963.15
Whether the Florida Legislative Investigation Committee's subpoena for the membership records of the Miami branch of the NAACP violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of the organization's members?16
Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.17 Compelled disclosure of membership lists constitutes an unconstitutional restraint upon the right of free association unless the state shows a sufficient connection between the organization and subversive activities to justify the disclosure.18
Yes. The subpoena issued to the petitioner required production of the membership records of the Miami branch of the NAACP, a legitimate organization engaged in protected activities.19 The established facts show that the petitioner appeared but refused to produce the records, claiming violation of associational rights.20 The Committee had only evidence of 14 individuals who may have attended meetings or been members in the past, with no showing of successful infiltration or influence on the organization.21
The record lacks any demonstration of a substantial connection between the NAACP and subversive activities that would justify the disclosure.22
The Florida Legislative Investigation Committee's subpoena violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights of the organization's members.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the opinion of the Court.24 He would add only that in his view the First Amendment prohibits any State from compelling any person to disclose his membership in any organization, whether that organization is the NAACP or the Communist Party, unless the State can show that such disclosure is necessary to protect a compelling state interest.25 The record in this case falls far short of that showing.26
He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the States and protects the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition from state abridgment with the same force and to the same degree that the First Amendment protects them from federal abridgment.27 He believed the constitutional right of association includes the privilege of any person to associate with Communists or anti-Communists, Socialists or anti-Socialists, or people of all kinds of beliefs.28 Florida cannot compel answers to questions which abridge that right.29
He would reverse on the ground that there has been a direct abridgment of the right of association of the NAACP and its members.30
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court.31 He noted that the State is subject to the same restrictions in making the investigation as the First Amendment places on the Federal Government by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 He argued that government can intervene only when belief, thought, or expression moves into the realm of action that is inimical to society.33
He emphasized that joining a lawful organization is an associational activity that comes within the purview of the First Amendment.34 The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights protected by the First Amendment.35 He maintained that the State and the Federal Governments are barred from investigating any person's faith or ideology by summoning officers or members of his society, church, or club.36
Whether the evidence presented to the Committee established a sufficient connection or nexus between the NAACP and Communist or subversive activities to justify compelled disclosure of its membership lists?37
It is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.38 Absent such a relation between the NAACP and conduct in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern, the Committee has not demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining the membership information sought as to justify the substantial abridgment of associational freedom.39
No. The evidence presented to the Committee consisted largely of the testimony of a former Communist and an investigator identifying 14 persons as having some connection to the NAACP.40 The facts indicate that this was minimal and there is no evidence that these attempts were successful or that the NAACP as an organization was in any way connected with the Communist Party.41 The petitioner volunteered to answer questions from personal knowledge but could associate none of the 14 with the NAACP.42
The evidence presented to the Committee did not establish a sufficient connection or nexus between the NAACP and Communist or subversive activities to justify compelled disclosure of its membership lists.43
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Clark And Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented.44 He believed the difficulties with this decision will become apparent once the case is deflated to its true size.45 He argued that the Court rests reversal on its finding that the Committee did not have sufficient justification for including the Miami Branch of the NAACP within the ambit of its investigation.46
He read the opinion as proceeding on the premise that the governmental interest in investigating Communist infiltration into admittedly nonsubversive organizations is not sufficient to overcome the countervailing right to freedom of association.47 He maintained that until today no decision suggested any difference in the degree of governmental investigatory interest as between Communist infiltration of organizations and Communist activity by organizations.48 He found the information preliminarily developed by the Committee's investigator sufficient to satisfy the requirement of nexus under any reasonable test.49
He also found it difficult to see how this case presents any serious question as to interference with freedom of association.50 The willingness of the petitioner to testify from recollection and the limited purpose for which the records were sought support this view.51
Justice White also dissented.52 In his view the opinion of the Court represents a serious limitation upon the Court's previous cases dealing with this subject matter and upon the right of the legislature to investigate the Communist Party and its activities.53 He noted that one of the classic and recurring activities of the Communist Party is the infiltration and subversion of other organizations.54
He argued that the Court holds that even where a legislature has evidence that a legitimate organization is under assault. Even though that organization is itself sounding open and public alarm, an investigating committee is nevertheless forbidden to compel the organization or its members to reveal the fact, or not, of membership in that organization of named Communists assigned to the infiltrating task.55 He believed the decision represents a marked departure from the principles of Barenblatt v. United States and like cases.56 He thought that the organization's interest in secrecy is reduced when the information is already public and that disclosure would permit members to know with whom they are associating.57