413 U.S. 1 (1973)
Respondents, full-time students and officers in the student government at Kent State University in Ohio, filed this action in the District Court on October 15, 1970, on behalf of themselves and all other students.1 The essence of the complaint is that during a period of civil disorder on and around the University campus in May 1970, the National Guard, called by the Governor of Ohio to preserve civil order and protect public property, violated students’ rights of speech and assembly.2 The actions of the National Guard were without legal justification and caused injury to several students and death to several others.3
They sought injunctive relief against the Governor to restrain him in the future from prematurely ordering National Guard troops to duty in civil disorders.4 They also sought an injunction to restrain leaders of the National Guard from future violation of the students’ constitutional rights.5 They also sought a declaratory judgment that § 2923.55 of the Ohio Revised Code is unconstitutional.6 The District Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the suit.7
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the District Court’s dismissal with respect to injunctive relief against the Governor’s premature employment of the Guard on future occasions and with respect to the validity of the state statute.8 At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that the complaint stated a cause of action with respect to one issue.9 This issue was remanded to the District Court. The remand directed resolution of whether there was and is a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard which singly or together require or make inevitable the use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders when the total circumstances at the critical time are such that nonlethal force would suffice to restore order and the use of lethal force is not reasonably necessary.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the action of the Court of Appeals.10 Since the complaint was filed in the District Court in 1970, none of the named respondents is still enrolled in the University.11 Likewise, the officials originally named as party defendants no longer hold offices in which they can exercise any authority over the State’s National Guard.12 In addition, both the petitioners and the Solicitor General appearing as amicus curiae have informed the Court that since 1970 the Ohio National Guard has adopted new use of force rules substantially differing from those in effect when the complaint was filed.13 The initial training of National Guard recruits relating to civil disorder control has been revised.14
Respondents assert nevertheless that these changes in the situation do not affect their right to a hearing on their entitlement to injunctive and supervisory relief.15 They continue to seek for the benefit of all Kent State students a judicial evaluation of the appropriateness of the training, weaponry and orders of the Ohio National Guard.16 They further demand that the District Court establish standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of orders to control the actions of the National Guard.17 Thereafter the District Court must assume and exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure compliance with whatever training and operations procedures may be approved by that court.18
Whether the claims as narrowed by the Court of Appeals remand order concerning a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard present a justiciable controversy?19
The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.20
No. The relief sought would require the District Court to assume continuing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National Guard.21 This would embrace critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches under Art. I, § 8, cl. 16.22
The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible, as the Judicial Branch is not, to the electoral process.23
The claims as narrowed by the Court of Appeals remand order do not present a justiciable controversy.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the reversal on the ground that the relief sought by respondents, through continuing surveillance, would require the District Court to evaluate and pass upon the merits of the Guard’s training programs, weapons, use of force, and orders.25 He noted that this case relates to prospective relief in the form of judicial surveillance of highly subjective and technical matters involving military training and command.26 As such, it presents an inappropriate subject matter for judicial consideration because respondents are asking the District Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking under Baker v. Carr.27
Blackmun added that respondents’ complaint rests upon a single, isolated, and tragic incident at Kent State University, and the conditions that existed at the time of the incident no longer prevail, with the complaint containing nothing suggesting that respondents are likely to suffer specific injury in the future.28
Whether changes in enrollment, officeholders, and National Guard policies since the 1970 filing of the complaint render the case moot?29
No. Some basis therefore exists for a conclusion that the case is now moot.32 However, on the record before the Court it is not prepared to resolve the case on that basis and therefore turns to the important question whether the claims alleged in the complaint, as narrowed by the Court of Appeals’ remand, are justiciable.33
Changes in enrollment, officeholders, and National Guard policies since the 1970 filing do not render the case moot for purposes of the Court’s resolution.34
Whether the respondents possess standing to maintain the action seeking continuing judicial surveillance over the Ohio National Guard?35
Justiciability is a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. No justiciable controversy is presented when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion or when there is no standing to maintain the action.36
No. The advisory nature of the judicial declaration sought is clear from respondents' argument and from the very language of the court's remand.37 Added to this is that the nature of the questions to be resolved on remand are subjects committed expressly to the political branches of government.38 These factors, when coupled with the uncertainties as to whether a live controversy still exists and the infirmity of the posture of respondents as to standing, render the claim and the proposed issues on remand nonjusticiable.39
Respondents do not possess standing to maintain the action seeking continuing judicial surveillance over the Ohio National Guard.40