19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963)
Mr. Gilson was injured when a one-year-old bull weighing 500 pounds suddenly lunged at him while he was seated on a bench inside the auction ring along with several other customers.1 The bull had been introduced into the ring without any warning to the customers and without being guarded or tethered, contrary to the common practice at livestock sales.2
Mr. Jacobs, a livestock buyer for over thirty years who was seated on the same bench, testified that the animal suddenly seemed to be coming right at his little boy sitting alongside and that Mr. Gilson pushed the child back where he rolled over the bar through the ring before the animal struck him directly.3 The plaintiff and his brother both testified as to the distinction between the handling of bulls and cows, stressing the extra caution which is practiced with the former, and Mr. Jacobs emphasized the quickness of younger bulls.4
The plaintiff was a man with wide experience in the ways and propensities of animals.5 No claim was made of any structural defect in the defendants' building or equipment.6 The trial court directed a verdict against Mr. Gilson.7
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the appellant had not brought a motion for a new trial before the trial court so that the latter could re-examine the propriety of its having granted a directed verdict.8
Whether the evidence permitted a jury to find that the plaintiff's negligence was less than fifty percent of the total negligence?9
The test for determining whether a verdict should be directed is whether the evidence is so clear and convincing as reasonably to permit unbiased and impartial minds to come to but one conclusion.10 When weighing a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, a court must regard the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.11 Ordinarily the comparison of negligence is peculiarly within the jury's province, and the instances in which a court can determine as a matter of law that the plaintiff's negligence equaled or exceeded the defendant's are extremely rare.12
Yes. Viewed in its most favorable light to Mr. Gilson, the testimony showed that he was injured by the sudden lunge of a one-year-old bull weighing 500 pounds that was introduced into the auction ring without warning and without being guarded or tethered, contrary to common practice at livestock sales.13
Mr. Jacobs testified that the bull lunged toward his boy, prompting Mr. Gilson to push the child to safety before the animal struck Mr. Gilson directly.14 The plaintiff and his brother both testified to the extra caution required with bulls, and Mr. Jacobs stressed the quickness of younger bulls.15
These facts permit a jury to reasonably find that the plaintiff's negligence was less than fifty percent of the total.16
The plaintiff offered enough proof to entitle him to have his case resolved by the jury, so the directed verdict was improper on this ground.17
Whether the defendants violated the safe-place statute?18
No. There was no claim of any structural defect in the defendants' building or equipment.21 The placing of a bench within the sales ring was not in itself an act of negligence nor did it make the premises unsafe.22
The bench did not possess the quality of causing injury by itself, unlike woven wire lying on a floor that could trip a person.23 The safe-place statute therefore imposed no liability on these facts.24
The defendants did not violate the safe-place statute.25
Whether the doctrine of assumption of risk applied to the plaintiff's conduct?26
The defense of assumption of risk has been abolished by the court as it applies to host-guest automobile cases and employer-employee farm cases.27 When the alleged assumption of risk arises by implication rather than by express agreement, greater fairness results if the claimed negligence is couched in terms of contributory negligence.28
No. The plaintiff was a man with wide experience in the ways and propensities of animals. The trial judge observed that because of this knowledge the plaintiff assumed the risk of being injured in the manner that he was injured.29
The policy reasons that prompted abrogation of the doctrine in host-guest and employer-employee settings do not apply with comparable clarity here.30 Nevertheless, the claimed negligence of Mr. Gilson should be evaluated as contributory negligence rather than assumption of risk whenever the assumption arises by implication, as it did in this case.31
The doctrine of assumption of risk should not be applied to Mr. Gilson's conduct on retrial.32
Whether the plaintiff was entitled to appellate review of the directed verdict without first moving for a new trial in the trial court?33
No error of the court should be reviewable as a matter of right on appeal without first moving in the trial court for a new trial bottomed on such error. This rule applies if the error is of a category that a trial court could correct by granting a new trial.34
No. The appellant did not bring a motion for a new trial before the trial court so that the latter could re-examine the propriety of its having granted a directed verdict.35
A fair reading of the governing precedent requires the conclusion that careful practice would have prompted the bringing of a timely motion for a new trial before the trial court.36 The appellant therefore was not entitled to review as a matter of right.37
The plaintiff was not entitled to appellate review of the directed verdict without first moving for a new trial.38
Whether a new trial should be granted in the interests of justice under sec. 251.09, Stats.?39
The supreme court possesses discretionary authority under sec. 251.09, Stats., to grant a new trial whenever it is deemed that there has been a miscarriage of justice.40
Yes. The trial court erred in directing a verdict against Mr. Gilson because the evidence permitted a jury to find his negligence less than fifty percent.41
Notwithstanding the appellant's failure to comply with the rule requiring a motion for new trial, the supreme court will order a new trial in the interests of justice.42
A new trial is granted in the interests of justice under sec. 251.09, Stats.43