369 U.S. 463 (1962)
Goldlawr, Inc. brought a private antitrust action for treble damages, and other relief under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 and 15 U.S.C. § 15, against several defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1
After hearings on a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania District Court found venue improper as to two corporate defendants under 15 U.S.C. § 22.2 Those defendants were neither inhabitants of, found, nor transacting business in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania court refused to dismiss the action. Instead, it transferred the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to the Southern District of New York, where venue was proper and personal jurisdiction could be obtained by service of process.
The two corporate defendants appeared in the New York District Court and moved to dismiss. They argued that the Pennsylvania court had lacked personal jurisdiction and therefore had no power to transfer the action.3 The New York District Court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the same ground.4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the uniform course of decisions by other courts of appeals.5 The Pennsylvania court had also transferred claims against individual defendants, but the writ was dismissed as to Marcus Heiman on an independent ground not raised on certiorari.6
Whether a district court lacking personal jurisdiction over defendants may transfer an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to another district where venue is proper and jurisdiction may be obtained?7
Section 1406(a) provides that the district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.8 The language of the section does not limit its operation to actions in which the transferring court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants.9 Its legislative history supports a broad interpretation to avoid injustice to plaintiffs from erroneous venue choices that could bar actions under statutes of limitations.10
Yes. The Pennsylvania District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the two corporate defendants because they were neither inhabitants of, found, nor transacting business in Pennsylvania under 15 U.S.C. § 22.11 Despite this, the court transferred the action to the Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), where venue was proper and jurisdiction could be obtained.12
A district court lacking personal jurisdiction over the defendants may transfer the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).13
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that allowing a district court to deal with an in personam action in such a way as possibly to affect a defendant's substantive rights, without first acquiring jurisdiction over him, is not a familiar concept in federal jurisprudence.14 He observed that no one suggests that Congress was aware that 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) might be so used when it enacted that statute.15 Justice Harlan concluded that the matter is better left for further action by Congress, preferably after the Judicial Conference of the United States has expressed its views on the subject, and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.16