444 U.S. 996 (1979)
Senator Barry Goldwater and several other members of Congress filed suit against President Jimmy Carter after the President announced termination of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan.1
The termination was tied to the United States decision to recognize the government in Peking.2 The plaintiffs asserted that the action deprived them of their constitutional role regarding changes to the supreme law of the land.3 No official action was taken by Congress as a whole on the termination.4
The Senate considered a resolution stating that Senate approval is necessary to terminate any mutual defense treaty.5 Congressional Record entries from 1979 show debate on the resolution, including discussion of possible retroactive effect, but no final vote occurred on the measure.6 It remained unclear whether either the Senate or the House had rejected the President's position on treaty termination.7
The record contains no indication of any formal congressional rejection of the President's claim regarding the treaty.8
Whether the dispute over the President's termination of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan is ripe for judicial review?9
An issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review.10 Prudential considerations persuade that a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority.11 Differences between the President and the Congress should turn on political rather than legal considerations.12 The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.13
No. Senator Barry Goldwater and several other members of Congress filed suit against President Jimmy Carter after the President announced termination of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan.14 The termination was tied to the United States decision to recognize the government in Peking. The plaintiffs asserted that the action deprived them of their constitutional role regarding changes to the supreme law of the land. No official action was taken by Congress as a whole on the termination.
The Senate considered a resolution stating that Senate approval is necessary to terminate any mutual defense treaty. Congressional Record entries from 1979 show debate on the resolution, including discussion of possible retroactive effect, but no final vote occurred on the measure. It remained unclear whether either the Senate or the House had rejected the President's position on treaty termination. The record contains no indication of any formal congressional rejection of the President's claim regarding the treaty. Because Congress has taken no official action asserting its constitutional authority, the dispute has not reached a constitutional impasse and remains unripe for judicial review.15
The dispute is not ripe for judicial review.16
Related opinions on this issue
Although agreeing with the result reached by the Court, Justice Powell would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.17 He noted that this Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review.18 Prudential considerations persuade him that a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority.19
In this case a few Members of Congress claim that the President’s action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role, yet Congress has taken no official action.20 The Senate considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty but no final vote has been taken on the resolution.21 It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President’s claim.22
If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not the task of the courts to do so.23
Whether the question of the President's authority to terminate a treaty without congressional approval presents a nonjusticiable political question?24
The basic question presented is political and therefore nonjusticiable.25 It involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations.26 The extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President is also at issue.27 The Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty.28 It is silent as to that body’s participation in the abrogation of a treaty.29 Therefore the controversy is a nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches.30
Yes. The Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty but is silent as to that body’s participation in the abrogation of a treaty.31 The present case involves foreign relations, specifically a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a foreign government if attacked.32 The effect of the action is entirely external to the United States and falls within the category of foreign affairs.33
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties, the controversy must be controlled by political standards rather than judicially manageable standards.34
The question presents a nonjusticiable political question.35
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Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, And Mr. Justice Stevens
Justice Rehnquist is of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners is political and therefore nonjusticiable.36 It involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations. The extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President is also at issue. He believes it follows a fortiori from Coleman v. Miller that the controversy is a nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches.37
Here the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty but is silent as to that body’s participation in the abrogation of a treaty.38 The case is directly analogous to Coleman.39 The justifications for concluding that the question is political in nature are even more compelling than in Coleman because it involves foreign relations.40 Having decided that the question presented is nonjusticiable, the appropriate disposition is for the Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss the complaint.41
Whether the Court of Appeals judgment should be vacated and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint?42
A controversy that is a nonjusticiable political dispute should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches. The appropriate disposition is for the Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss the complaint. This procedure ensures that resolution of a political question which should not have been decided by a lower court does not spawn any legal consequences.43
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and addressed the matter in December 1979.44 Because the question presented is nonjusticiable, the prior proceedings in the federal courts must be vacated and the complaint dismissed.45
The Court of Appeals judgment is therefore vacated and the case is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.46
The Court of Appeals judgment should be vacated and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.47
Whether the President's recognition of a foreign government resolves the treaty termination dispute as a matter of constitutional authority?48
The Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes.49 Abrogation of a defense treaty was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of a new government because the defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the prior government was the only legitimate political authority.50 When that mandate is clear, judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further.51
Yes. The termination was tied to the United States decision to recognize the government in Peking. Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government.52 The defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the only legitimate political authority in China.53 The constitutional question is prudently answered in narrow terms by recognizing the President’s well-established authority to recognize and withdraw recognition from foreign governments.54
Our judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further.55
The President's recognition of a foreign government resolves the treaty termination dispute as a matter of constitutional authority.56
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissents from the order directing the District Court to dismiss this case.57 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the President’s well-established authority to recognize and withdraw recognition from foreign governments.58 In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question, he believes the political-question principle is profoundly misapprehended as it applies to matters of foreign relations.59 The doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of political decisionmaking power.60
The issue of decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion.61 The constitutional question raised here is prudently answered in narrow terms.62 Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government.
Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize and withdraw recognition from foreign regimes.63 That mandate being clear, judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further.64
Joined by Mr. Justice White
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissents in part.65 In his view the time factor and its importance are illusory.66 If the President does not have the power to terminate the treaty, the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect.67
It is indefensible without further study to pass on the issue of justiciability or on the issues of standing or ripeness.68 He joins in the grant of the petition for certiorari but would set the case for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so obviously deserves.69