372 U.S. 368 (1963)
In 1961 a qualified voter residing in Fulton County, Georgia, instituted suit in federal district court against the Chairman and Secretary of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia.1 The plaintiff sought to restrain use of the county unit system in counting votes for the Democratic nomination of a United States Senator and other statewide officers.2 He requested declaratory relief, alleging that the system violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment.3 Because the constitutionality of a state statute was drawn into question, a three-judge district court was convened.4
Under the county unit system then in force each county received a number of unit votes equal to twice its representation in the lower house of the Georgia General Assembly.5 The candidate receiving the highest popular vote in a county took all of that county's units.6 The complaint set forth 1960 census figures showing that Fulton County had a population of 556,326, or 14.11 percent of the state's total population of 3,943,116, yet received only six unit votes out of 410, or 1.46 percent of the total units.7 Echols County, with a population of 1,876 or 0.05 percent of the state total, received unit votes amounting to 0.48 percent of all units, so that one unit vote in Echols County represented 938 residents while one unit vote in Fulton County represented 92,721 residents.8
Georgia amended the challenged statutes in 1962, replacing the prior allocation formula with a bracket system that assigned units according to successive population increments.9 The amendment required a candidate to obtain both a majority of unit votes and a majority of popular votes for nomination in the first primary.10 A runoff between the leading unit-vote and popular-vote candidates was required if neither obtained both majorities.11 The plaintiff was permitted to amend the complaint to attack the revised statute.12 The district court, after a hearing that included answers to interrogatories, affidavits, statistical data, and judicial notice of matters of public record, concluded that the amended system still caused votes in more populous counties to count for less.13
The district court issued an injunction that did not bar all use of a county unit system.14 It prohibited any system whose disparities exceeded those permitted in the electoral college or under the equal-proportions formula for congressional representation.15 After the district court's decision the Democratic Committee voted to conduct the 1962 primary on a popular-vote basis.16 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.17
Whether the conduct of Georgia's Democratic primary for nomination of a United States Senator and statewide officers constitutes state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?18
Yes. Georgia requires managers for primaries and collaborates in their conduct by putting state power behind party rules.21 The statutes detail the process and thereby adopt the primary as part of the public election machinery.22 This collaboration makes the exclusions enforced by the party into exclusions enforced by the State itself.23
The conduct of Georgia's Democratic primary constitutes state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.24
Whether a qualified voter residing in Fulton County has standing to challenge the county unit system?25
A person whose right to vote is impaired by a state's electoral system has standing to sue for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment.26
Yes. The plaintiff is a qualified voter residing in Fulton County.27 His vote is impaired because the county unit system dilutes the influence of votes cast in more populous counties relative to those in smaller counties such as Echols County.28 Under the 1960 census figures, one resident had an influence equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County.29
A qualified voter residing in Fulton County has standing to challenge the county unit system.30
Whether the case is moot because the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis?31
No. But for the injunction the 1962 Act remains in force and would govern future elections.34 Dismissal would leave appellants free to return to their old ways of using the county unit system.35 The voluntary abandonment does not relieve the court of adjudicating the legality of a deeply rooted practice.36
The case is not moot because the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis.37
Whether Georgia's county unit system as applied to counting votes in statewide primaries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?38
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote.39 The conception of political equality under the Constitution means one person, one vote and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits weighting votes according to place of residence.40
Yes. Georgia gives every qualified voter one vote in a statewide election but employs the county unit system which in end result weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote.41 One resident in Echols County had an influence in the nomination of candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County under the 1960 census figures.42 The Equal Protection Clause requires that all qualified voters have an equal vote once the geographical unit is designated.43
Georgia's county unit system as applied to counting votes in statewide primaries violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Related opinions on this issue
This case does not involve the validity of a State's apportionment of geographic constituencies from which representatives to the State's legislative assembly are chosen.45 Nor does it involve any of the problems under the Equal Protection Clause which such litigation would present.46 We do not deal here with the basic ground rules implementing Baker v. Carr.47 This case, on the contrary, involves statewide elections of a United States Senator and of state executive and judicial officers responsible to a statewide constituency.48
Within a given constituency, there can be room for but a single constitutional rule—one voter, one vote.49
A violation of the Equal Protection Clause cannot be found in the mere circumstance that the Georgia County Unit System results in disproportionate vote weighting.50 The urban-rural problem is familiar in American politics.51 A state may rationally conclude that its general welfare is best served by apportioning more influence to agricultural communities than to urban centers.52
The disproportions are not greatly out of line with those existing under the Electoral College count for the Presidency.53
Whether the county unit system may be upheld by analogy to the federal electoral college or to apportionment of seats in state or federal legislatures?54
Analogies to the electoral college or to apportionment in state or federal legislatures are inapposite.55 The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution validated the collegiate principle despite its numerical inequality due to specific historical concerns.56 No such specific accommodation validates numerical inequality in a state's use of a county unit system for a statewide election.57
No. The present case is only a voting case that does not involve the composition of a legislature.58 The assumption that precise equality is unnecessary because it is impossible in the electoral college or congressional representation does not apply to weighting votes by place of residence in a statewide primary.59 The analogies to the electoral college and to districting are inapposite.60
The county unit system may not be upheld by analogy to the federal electoral college or to apportionment of seats in state or federal legislatures.61
Related opinions on this issue
The Court's holding flies in the face of history because one person, one vote has never been the universally accepted political philosophy in England, the American Colonies, or in the United States.62 The Federal Electoral College was born in compromise.63 It could hardly be said that such a system used in a state among its counties, assuming rationality and absence of arbitrariness in end result, could be termed invidious.64
The Court itself rejected the notion of political equality now pronounced in MacDougall v. Green.65