408 U.S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972)
Negro students at West Senior High School in Rockford, Illinois, first presented their grievances to school administrators, but when the principal took no action on crucial complaints, a public demonstration was planned, leading approximately 200 people including students, their family members, and friends to gather next to the school grounds on April 25, 1969.1 Appellant Richard Grayned, whose brother and twin sisters were attending the school, participated in this group that marched on a sidewalk about 100 feet from the school building, with many carrying signs summarizing the grievances such as "Black cheerleaders to cheer too," "Black history with black teachers," and "Equal rights, Negro counselors," while others made the "power to the people" sign with upraised and clenched fists.2
At Grayned's trial, government witnesses reported that the demonstrators repeatedly cheered, chanted, baited policemen, and made noise audible inside the school, that hundreds of students were distracted from their school activities and lined the classroom windows to watch the demonstration, that some demonstrators successfully yelled to their friends to leave the school building and join the demonstration, and that uncontrolled latenesses after period changes were far greater than usual.3 Defense witnesses claimed that the demonstrators were at all times quiet and orderly, that they did not seek to violate the law but only to "make a point," that the only noise was made by policemen using loudspeakers, that almost no students were noticeable at the schoolhouse windows, and that orderly school procedure was not disrupted.4
After warning the demonstrators, the police arrested 40 of them, including appellant Grayned, who was then tried and convicted of violating the antipicketing ordinance and the antinoise ordinance, resulting in a $25 fine for each violation.5
Grayned appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois under Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 302, claiming that the ordinances were invalid on their face, although he did not argue that they punished constitutionally protected activity as applied to him.6 The Supreme Court of Illinois held both ordinances constitutional on their face in 46 Ill. 2d 492, 263 N. E. 2d 866 (1970), and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 404 U. S. 820 (1971).7
Whether Rockford's antipicketing ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?8
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.9
Yes. The antipicketing ordinance is the same as the Chicago ordinance struck down in Mosley because it excepts peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.10 Grayned's demonstration concerned racial grievances at the school and was not a labor dispute, so the ordinance as applied to him and on its face discriminates on the basis of the content of the speech.11
The antipicketing ordinance is unconstitutional on its face under the Equal Protection Clause, and Grayned's conviction under it must be reversed.12
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joins in the judgment and in Part I of the opinion of the Court.13 He concurs in the result as to Part II of the opinion.14 Blackmun's position reflects agreement with the outcome on the equal protection claim while reserving judgment on the First Amendment analysis applied to the antinoise provision, thereby limiting his endorsement to the equal protection holding without adopting the full vagueness and overbreadth discussion.15
Whether Rockford's antinoise ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face?16
A law is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined, failing to give fair warning to citizens and explicit standards to enforcers, particularly when it abuts First Amendment freedoms.17
No. The antinoise ordinance, as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court in light of analogous cases like Chicago v. Meyer and Chicago v. Gregory, prohibits only actual or imminent interference with the peace or good order of the school.18 This interpretation provides fair notice because it is tied to the specific context of school sessions and measures disturbance by impact on normal activities.19 The ordinance differs from the vague breach of peace ordinances in Cox v. Louisiana or Coates v. Cincinnati.20
The antinoise ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague on its face.21
Whether Rockford's antinoise ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?22
A clear enactment may be overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct, but reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permitted if narrowly tailored to significant governmental interests and not based on the content of the message.23
No. The antinoise ordinance is narrowly tailored to Rockford's compelling interest in undisrupted school sessions, punishing only conduct that disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities, consistent with Tinker v. Des Moines School District.24 It permits peaceful picketing that does not interfere and does not punish based on the message expressed.25 The demonstration could be regulated at that time and place next to the school.26
The antinoise ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas would reverse the conviction under the antinoise ordinance as well.28 He notes that appellant made no noise, marched quietly, and raised his arm in salute, with the picketing being orderly and the only noise from police loudspeakers.29 The pickets were mostly students who had been counseled to remain quiet and walk hand in hand.30
There was no violence.31 Appellant himself engaged in no boisterous conduct. Douglas concludes that the ordinance as applied here punishes protected First Amendment activity in the best tradition of free speech on public streets, as the racial issue is one for solution by First Amendment means.32