403 U.S. 88 (1971)
In July 1966 the petitioners, Negro citizens residing in Kemper County, Mississippi, were passengers in an automobile belonging to and operated by R. G. Grady of Memphis, Tennessee.1 They were traveling on federal, state, and local highways in and about DeKalb, Mississippi, performing errands and visiting friends.2 The respondents, Lavon Breckenridge and James Calvin Breckenridge, white adult citizens residing in DeKalb, Kemper County, Mississippi, acted under a mistaken belief that Grady was a worker for civil rights for Negroes.3
On July 2, 1966, the respondents conspired to block the passage of the automobile, stop and detain its occupants, and assault them with deadly weapons.4 The respondents drove their truck into the path of Grady’s automobile and blocked its passage over the public road.5 They forced Grady and the petitioners to get out of the automobile, prevented their escape, clubbed Grady with a blackjack, pipe, or other kind of club, pointed firearms at the petitioners, and uttered threats to kill and injure them if their orders were not obeyed.6 Respondent James Calvin Breckenridge then clubbed each of the petitioners on and about the head, severely injuring all of them, while both respondents continued to assault the petitioners and prevent their escape by pointing firearms at them.7
The petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi seeking compensatory and punitive damages.8 The complaint alleged that the respondents had wilfully and maliciously conspired for the purpose of preventing the petitioners and other Negro-Americans, through force, violence, and intimidation, from seeking the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens under the laws of the United States and the State of Mississippi, including rights to freedom of speech, movement, association, and assembly, the right to petition government for redress of grievances, the right to be secure in their persons, and the right to travel the public highways without restraint in the same terms as white citizens.9
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.10 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of dismissal.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider questions going to the scope and constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).12
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) reaches conspiracies by private individuals acting without any state involvement?13
The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies, as the text speaks of two or more persons conspiring or going in disguise on the highway, and the legislative history confirms coverage of private action without requiring state involvement.14 The statute requires an invidiously discriminatory animus, such as racial bias, behind the conspirators' action.15
Yes. The litigation began when the petitioners, Negro citizens of Kemper County, Mississippi, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.16 They alleged that on July 2, 1966, while traveling on highways in DeKalb, Mississippi, in a car operated by R. G. Grady from Memphis, Tennessee, they were assaulted by the respondents, white citizens of DeKalb.17
The respondents, acting under a mistaken belief that Grady was a civil rights worker, conspired to block the car, force the occupants out, and assault them with clubs and firearms, severely injuring the petitioners.18 The complaint detailed the conspiracy's purpose to prevent Negro-Americans from enjoying equal rights through force and intimidation.19
The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Collins v. Hardyman.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the scope and constitutionality of the statute.21
Applying the rule, the facts show private action by the Breckenridges without state involvement, satisfying the statutory elements as the conspiracy was motivated by racial animus against Negro citizens.22
Section 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies motivated by racial animus.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the Court's opinion except on one point.24 He found it unnecessary to rely on the right of interstate travel as a premise for justifying federal jurisdiction under section 1985(3).25 Harlan's reservation reflects his view that the statute's application to private racial conspiracies could be sustained on alternative constitutional grounds.26
With that reservation, he joined the opinion and judgment of the Court.27
Whether Congress possessed constitutional authority to enact 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to remedy private conspiracies motivated by racial animus that interfere with rights of national citizenship?28
Yes. The complaint alleged that the petitioners were traveling on federal, state, and local highways when the private conspiracy occurred, and that the conspiracy aimed to prevent them and other Negro-Americans from exercising rights including travel on public highways without restraint in the same terms as white citizens.31 The racial animus is evident from the respondents' mistaken belief that Grady was a civil rights worker and their targeting of the Negro petitioners.32 These facts bring the case within congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to address badges and incidents of slavery through effective legislation, as well as the power to protect the right of interstate travel.33
Congress had constitutional power to enact the statute as applied to the complaint.34
Whether the complaint filed by the petitioners alleges facts that satisfy the elements of a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)?35
A complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) when it alleges that the defendants conspired for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.36 It must also allege that one or more conspirators did an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.37 Finally, it must allege that another was injured in person or property or deprived of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.38
Yes. The complaint alleged with particulars that the respondents conspired to carry out the assault and that their purpose was to prevent the petitioners and other Negro-Americans through force, violence, and intimidation from seeking the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens. The claims of detention, threats, and battery satisfy the requirement of acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the petitioners allege personal injury resulting from those acts.39 The allegations support the requisite animus to deprive the petitioners of the equal enjoyment of legal rights because of their race.40
The complaint states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).41