297 U.S. 233 (1936)
The Louisiana legislature enacted Act No. 23 on July 12, 1934, which levied a license tax of two percent on the gross receipts from advertising sales or charges in any newspaper or publication circulating more than 20,000 copies per week within the state.12 The tax was imposed in addition to all other taxes and licenses, and persons subject to it had to file sworn quarterly reports detailing gross receipts with payment due at filing time.3
Nine publishers operating thirteen newspapers in Louisiana, each exceeding the 20,000-copy weekly circulation threshold, initiated a suit in federal district court against state officials to enjoin enforcement of the tax.4 These thirteen publications represented the only newspapers in the state meeting or surpassing that circulation level, though four competing daily newspapers circulated slightly under 20,000 copies per week and 120 weekly newspapers also competed for readers and advertisers to varying extents.5 Revenue for the plaintiffs derived almost entirely from subscriptions and advertising payments.6
The challenged statute mandated quarterly sworn reports of gross receipts and immediate tax payment upon filing, with violations treated as misdemeanors carrying fines up to $500, imprisonment up to six months, or both, and corporations facing an additional $500 penalty.7 All plaintiffs were corporations. The district court, in a decision reported at 10 F. Supp. 161, upheld jurisdiction and issued a permanent injunction against the tax's enforcement.89
The jurisdictional amount exceeded $3,000 for six of the nine plaintiffs, and no motion was made below to dismiss the claims of the remaining three.10 State officials appealed the district court's decree to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Whether the federal district court had jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of section 24 of the Judicial Code where the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000 for only six of the nine plaintiffs?11
Federal jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of section 24 of the Judicial Code is sustained when the requisite jurisdictional amount is involved in respect of each of six of the nine appellees because this is enough to sustain jurisdiction over the bill in its entirety when the motion to dismiss is directed to the bill as a whole and no separate motion addresses the three appellees with insufficient amounts.12
Yes. The case arises under the Federal Constitution and the bill alleges and the record shows that the requisite amount is involved in respect of each of six of the nine appellees. This is enough to sustain the jurisdiction of the district court. The motion was to dismiss the bill in its entirety and in that form it was properly denied.
No motion to dismiss was made or considered by the lower court as to the three appellees in respect of whom the jurisdictional amount was insufficient and that question therefore is not before the reviewing court.13
The federal district court had jurisdiction over the suit.14
Whether the plaintiffs possessed a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law precluding equitable relief from enforcement of the tax?15
Equitable relief to enjoin enforcement of a tax is available when the laws of the state afford no remedy whereby restitution of taxes and property exacted may be enforced even where payment has been made under both protest and compulsion and any statutory refund provision is limited to payments not due within the terms of the act and remains at best a matter of speculation.16
No. The laws of Louisiana afford no remedy whereby restitution of taxes and property exacted may be enforced even where payment has been made under both protest and compulsion. The present act contains a provision to the effect that where it is established to the satisfaction of the Supervisor of Public Accounts of the state that any payment has been made under the act which was not due and collectible the Supervisor is authorized to refund the amount out of any funds on hand collected by virtue of the act and not remitted to the state treasurer according to law. It seems clear that this refers only to a payment not due and collectible within the terms of the act and does not authorize a refund on the ground that the act is invalid. Moreover the act allows the Supervisor to make remittances immediately to the state treasurer of taxes paid under the act and requires him to do so not later than the 30th day after the last day of the preceding quarter in which event the right to a refund if not sooner exercised would be lost.
Whether an aggrieved taxpayer may obtain relief under the provision is at best a matter of speculation. In no view can it properly be said that there exists a plain adequate and complete remedy at law.17
The plaintiffs did not possess a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law and the district court properly granted equitable relief by permanent injunction.18
Whether the license tax imposed by Act No. 23 abridges the freedom of the press in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?19
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes any form of previous restraint upon printed publications or their circulation including taxes imposed with the purpose of curtailing the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect of their governmental affairs because such taxes on knowledge have historically been used by government to suppress criticism and comment objectionable to those in power.20
Yes. The tax imposed is designated a license tax for the privilege of engaging in the business of selling or making any charge for advertising and as applied to the nine appellees it is a tax of two percent on the gross receipts derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers when and only when the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. It thus operates as a restraint in a double sense because its effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising and its direct tendency is to restrict circulation. This is plain enough when considering that if it were increased to a high degree as it could be if valid it well might result in destroying both advertising and circulation.
The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity was to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information and the tax here involved is bad because in the light of its history and of its present setting it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government and the people and to allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.21
The license tax abridges the freedom of the press in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decree of the district court granting a permanent injunction is affirmed.22
Whether the license tax denies the publishers the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment?23
When a court has already determined that a state statute is unconstitutional under one provision of the Constitution it is unnecessary to consider an additional ground of challenge such as denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.24
No. Having reached the conclusion that the act imposing the tax in question is unconstitutional under the due process of law clause because it abridges the freedom of the press the court deems it unnecessary to consider the further ground assigned that it also constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws.25
It is unnecessary to decide whether the license tax denies the publishers the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.26