601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979)
In 1973 the Denver Broncos played the Cincinnati Bengals in a regular season professional football game in Denver.1 Dale Hackbart served as a defensive back for the Broncos while Charles Clark played as an offensive back for the Bengals.2 After a pass was intercepted by Broncos free safety Billy Thompson and returned to mid-field, Hackbart attempted to block Clark and then remained on the ground with one knee down watching the continuing play.3
Clark stepped forward and struck Hackbart on the back of the head and neck with his right forearm, causing both players to fall forward.4 The trial court found that Clark acted out of anger and frustration but without a specific intent to injure.5 Clark later testified that his frustration arose because his team was losing the game.6 Officials did not call a foul because they did not observe the incident, although game films clearly recorded the sequence of events.7 Both players returned to their sidelines without complaint to officials or each other.8
Hackbart did not report the incident during the game.9 Pain prevented him from playing golf the following day, and he eventually informed the Broncos trainer who provided treatment.10 He played on specialty teams for two more Sundays before the Broncos released him on waivers in his thirteenth season.11 Subsequent medical examination revealed a serious neck fracture injury.12
Hackbart sued Clark and the Cincinnati Bengals in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.13 By agreement the parties submitted the liability question to the court for decision without a jury.14 The district court entered judgment for the defendants, and Hackbart appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.15
Whether the trial court erred in ruling that as a matter of policy the principles of law governing the infliction of injuries should be entirely refused where the injury took place in the course of the game?16
Federal courts must exercise jurisdiction whenever it is conferred by law. They cannot decline to hear a case on policy grounds unless one of the narrow exceptions such as the political-question doctrine or abstention applies, as articulated in Cohens v. Virginia and reaffirmed in Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.17
Yes. The district court erred when it refused to apply ordinary tort principles to the blow Clark delivered to Hackbart during the 1973 Broncos-Bengals game in Denver.18 After Thompson intercepted the pass and returned it to mid-field, Hackbart knelt on the ground watching the continuing play; Clark then stepped forward and struck him on the back of the head and neck with his forearm.19 The trial court treated the professional football field as a battlefield beyond judicial reach and therefore dismissed the claim on policy grounds alone.20 That approach directly contradicted the settled rule that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state law and may not invent a blanket immunity for injuries occurring inside a football game.21
The Colorado Constitution further guarantees every person a remedy for injury to person or character, and the common law of torts supplies that remedy unless the legislature has modified it.22 No Colorado statute or decision creates an exception for professional football.23 The district court therefore lacked authority to withhold jurisdiction on the basis of its own view that the game is too violent for civil liability rules to apply.24
The trial court erred in dismissing the action on policy grounds rather than deciding whether Clark's conduct violated applicable tort standards.25
Did the trial court err in concluding that the employee was not vicariously liable for an activity for which he had not received express authorization?26
The trial court resolved the liability issue solely on policy grounds and did not reach or decide whether the Bengals were vicariously liable for Clark's conduct.27
No. The district court never reached or decided the question of the Bengals' vicarious liability for Clark's conduct.28 Its judgment rested exclusively on the policy determination that intentional blows during a professional football game are not actionable at all.29 Because the trial court did not conclude that Clark acted outside the scope of employment or that express authorization was required, it cannot be said to have erred on a ground it never addressed.30
The trial court did not err on the vicarious-liability issue because it never decided that issue.31
Whether it was error to receive in evidence numerous episodes of violence which were unrelated to the case at bar, that is, incidents of intentional infliction of injury which occurred in other games?32
Yes. The district court admitted films depicting acts of violence between other players and other teams that had no connection to the Hackbart-Clark incident.35 Those films were offered solely to show that professional football routinely involves intentional blows, a purpose that Rule 404(b) prohibits.36 The only relevant film was the one that captured the actual sequence in which Clark struck the kneeling Hackbart after the interception.37
All other violence footage was irrelevant to whether Clark's specific act constituted reckless disregard of Hackbart's safety.38
Admission of unrelated violence films from other games constituted error.39
Whether it was error for the trial court to receive in evidence unrelated acts on the part of the plaintiff?40
Evidence of a person's prior acts is admissible to prove character only when character is an essential element of a claim or defense or when the acts are offered for a proper non-character purpose under Rule 404(b).41
Yes. The district court received evidence that Hackbart had engaged in rough or dirty play in prior games.42 The indications from the picture of the action here are that he threw a body block and after the lapse of some time, a short period of time, the blow was struck while Hackbart was down on his knee watching the action.43 Because Hackbart's character was not an element of any claim or defense and the prior acts were not offered for a permissible purpose such as proving motive or intent, their admission was erroneous.44
Admission of unrelated prior acts by Hackbart constituted error.45
Whether the evidence justifies consideration by the court of the issue of reckless conduct as it is defined in A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Torts Second, § 500, because the assault and battery theory is not available due to the one-year statute of limitations?46
Reckless misconduct under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 exists when an actor intentionally performs an act with knowledge that it involves a risk of harm substantially greater than that necessary to make the conduct negligent.47 The actor does so without the intent to cause the precise harm that results.48 Colorado recognizes this cause of action and applies the six-year statute of limitations to it.49
Yes. The evidence in the record supports submission of a reckless-disregard claim.50 Clark admitted that he acted out of anger and frustration and intentionally delivered the forearm blow to the back of Hackbart's head and neck while Hackbart knelt on the ground.51 Although Clark lacked a specific intent to fracture Hackbart's neck, the act itself carried a risk of serious harm substantially greater than ordinary negligence.52
Because the one-year assault-and-battery statute had expired, the six-year statute governing reckless conduct applied, and the district court should have evaluated the claim under the § 500 standard rather than dismissing the entire action on policy grounds.53
The evidence justifies consideration of reckless conduct under Restatement § 500, and the six-year statute governs that claim.54