239 U.S. 394 (1915)
J.C. Hadacheck acquired an eight-acre tract of land in 1902 that contained valuable deposits of clay suitable for manufacturing brick.1 The land lay outside the city limits of Los Angeles at the time of purchase and distant from existing dwellings.2 Hadacheck constructed kilns, machinery, and buildings necessary for brick production and operated the business continuously thereafter.3
The territory containing the land was later annexed to the City of Los Angeles.4 The city council enacted an ordinance that prohibited the operation of any brick yard or brick kiln within a described district of about three square miles that encompassed Hadacheck's property.5 Hadacheck was convicted of violating the ordinance and committed to the custody of Chief of Police Sebastian.6
Hadacheck filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California.7 In the petition he alleged that his land was worth approximately $800,000 for brick-making purposes but only $60,000 for any other use, that the clay deposits could not be economically transported to another location, that the business emitted no noxious odors and only minimal smoke, that no complaints had been made during seven years of operation, and that the ordinance was designed to discriminate against him in favor of competing brick manufacturers.8
The Chief of Police filed a return supported by affidavits stating that emissions from the brick yard had caused sickness and serious discomfort to nearby residents and that the district had become primarily residential.9 The California Supreme Court considered the petition, return, and affidavits, concluded that the evidence overcame any claim of arbitrary action, and discharged the writ while remanding Hadacheck to custody.10 The Chief Justice then allowed a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court.11
Whether the Los Angeles ordinance prohibiting brick yards within a designated district deprives the owner of property without due process of law?12
The police power permits a state or municipality to regulate or prohibit a lawful business in a defined locality when the business produces fumes, gases, smoke, soot, steam, or dust that cause sickness and serious discomfort to residents.13 This authority exists even if the regulation greatly diminishes the value of prior investments in the business, provided the measure is not arbitrary.14
No. Hadacheck acquired the eight-acre tract in 1902 outside city limits and built kilns and machinery for brick production on clay deposits worth far more for that use than any other.15 After annexation the city enacted the ordinance covering three square miles that included his land, and he was convicted for continuing operations.16 Affidavits in the return established that emissions from the yard caused sickness and discomfort to nearby residents in a district that had become primarily residential.17 The California Supreme Court weighed the petition allegations, the return, and the affidavits, applied the presumption favoring legislative judgment, and found the prohibition addressed real detriment rather than constituting an arbitrary invasion of private right.18
The United States Supreme Court accepted that determination and held that private interests must yield when they stand in the way of community progress under the police power.19
The ordinance does not deprive the owner of property without due process of law.20
Whether the ordinance denies the owner equal protection of the laws by discriminating against him while permitting other brick yards to operate?21
The equal protection clause forbids legislative classifications that rest on arbitrary distinctions between similarly situated businesses or localities.22 Any difference in treatment must be reasonably related to the legitimate objects of regulation and must operate alike on all persons within the statutory terms.23
No. Hadacheck alleged that the ordinance singled him out while allowing other brick yards elsewhere in the city to continue without regulation and that it favored his competitors.24 The return denied that the measure was aimed solely at him and noted that brickmaking was prohibited in at least one other district.25 The California Supreme Court examined the record and rejected the discrimination claim, concluding that the ordinance was enacted and enforced in good faith as a uniform regulation applying to everyone within its boundaries. The United States Supreme Court found the equal-protection contention dependent on factual comparisons not established in the record and therefore insufficient to overturn the legislative judgment.26
The ordinance does not deny the owner equal protection of the laws.27
Whether the ordinance constitutes an arbitrary exercise of police power rather than a legitimate regulation addressing health and comfort in a residential area?28
An exercise of the police power is not arbitrary when affidavits and other evidence show that the regulated activity produces emissions injurious to health and comfort in a district that has become primarily residential.29 The legislative body could reasonably conclude that prohibition within defined limits serves the public welfare.30
No. The Chief of Police supported the return with affidavits stating that fumes, gases, smoke, soot, steam, and dust from Hadacheck's plant caused sickness and serious discomfort to persons living in the vicinity.31 The California Supreme Court found that this evidence, together with the presumption in favor of legislative findings, overcame any contention that the prohibition was a mere arbitrary invasion of private right unsupported by a tenable belief that the business was detrimental.32 The United States Supreme Court agreed that the record justified the conclusion that the ordinance was a legitimate regulation operating alike on all who came within its terms.33 The ordinance was not designed to discriminate against Hadacheck or the other brick yard in the district.34
The ordinance constitutes a legitimate regulation addressing health and comfort rather than an arbitrary exercise of police power.35