307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939)
The respondents, consisting of individual citizens of the United States, unincorporated labor organizations composed of such citizens, and a membership corporation, brought suit in the United States District Court against the petitioners.1 The petitioners were the Mayor, the Director of Public Safety, the Chief of Police of Jersey City, New Jersey, and the Board of Commissioners, the governing body of the city.2
The bill alleged that acting under a city ordinance forbidding the leasing of any hall without a permit from the Chief of Police for a public meeting at which a speaker shall advocate obstruction of the Government of the United States or a state or a change of government by other than lawful means, the petitioners had denied respondents the right to hold lawful meetings in Jersey City on the ground that they were Communists or Communist organizations.3 It further alleged that pursuant to an unlawful plan the petitioners had caused the eviction from the municipality of persons considered undesirable because of their labor organization activities.4
The bill further alleged that acting under an ordinance which forbids any person to distribute or cause to be distributed or strewn about any street or public place any newspapers, paper, periodical, book, magazine, circular, card or pamphlet, the petitioners had discriminated against the respondents by prohibiting and interfering with distribution of leaflets and pamphlets by the respondents while permitting others to distribute similar printed matter.5 The petitioners had caused respondents and those acting with them to be arrested for distributing printed matter in the streets.6 They had caused them to be carried beyond the limits of the city or to remote places therein and had compelled them to board ferry boats destined for New York.7 The petitioners had interfered with the distribution of pamphlets discussing the rights of citizens under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.8
The bill charged that the suit was to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, statute and ordinance, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States and of rights secured by laws of the United States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States.9 It charged that the petitioners' conduct had been in pursuance of an unlawful conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate citizens of the United States in the free exercise and enjoyment of the rights and privileges secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.10
The bill alleged that respondents had repeatedly applied for permits to hold public meetings in the city for the stated purpose as required by ordinance, although they did not admit the validity of the ordinance.11 In execution of a common plan and purpose the petitioners had consistently refused to issue any permits for meetings to be held by or sponsored by respondents.12 The respondents did not purpose to advocate the destruction or overthrow of the government of the United States or that of New Jersey.13 Their sole purpose was to explain to workingmen the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act, the benefits to be derived from it, and the aid which the Committee for Industrial Organization would furnish workingmen to that end, with all activities to be performed peacefully.14
The answer denied generally or qualified the allegations of the bill.15 It denied that the amount in controversy as to each plaintiff and against each defendant exceeds $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs.16 It alleged that the supposed grounds of federal jurisdiction are frivolous.17 After trial upon the merits the District Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a decree in favor of respondents.18 The Circuit Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of fact, held the District Court had jurisdiction under Section 24(1) and (14) of the Judicial Code, modified the decree in respect of one of its provisions, and as modified affirmed it.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction under Section 24(1) of the Judicial Code?21
Section 24(1) of the Judicial Code confers original jurisdiction on district courts over civil suits where the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs and arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.22 In suits for injunctive relief a traverse of the amount allegation requires substantial proof of value to each plaintiff individually.23 Aggregation of interests is not permitted.24
No. The bill alleged the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000 for each respondent.25 The answer denied that allegation.26 The record contains no showing of the value of the asserted rights to the respondents individually.27 The suggestion that the rights in total have the requisite value is unavailing because the plaintiffs may not aggregate their interests to attain the amount necessary for jurisdiction under Section 24(1).28
The District Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 24(1) of the Judicial Code.29
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction under Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code?30
Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code grants jurisdiction over suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation under color of state law of any right privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any law of the United States providing for equal rights of citizens.31
Yes. The bill charged the suit was brought to redress deprivation under color of state law statute and ordinance of rights privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution.32 The petitioners conduct was in pursuance of an unlawful conspiracy to injure citizens in the free exercise of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.33 The individual respondents as natural persons are entitled to maintain the suit under this provision.34
The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 24(14) of the Judicial Code.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Reed
Justice Stone concurred in the result but concluded that jurisdiction rests on the due process clause rather than the privileges and immunities clause.36 The record contains no finding that any respondent is a citizen of the United States.37 There is also no finding that the meetings were called to discuss the National Labor Relations Act.38
Freedom of speech and assembly are secured to all persons by the due process clause.39 The Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorizes any person to maintain suit without regard to citizenship or amount in controversy.40 The decree should rest on that established ground rather than a novel privileges and immunities theory unsupported by the record.41
Whether freedom to disseminate information concerning the National Labor Relations Act and to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act is a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States secured against state abridgment by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment?42
The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.43 These include the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits advantages and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.44 They also include the right peaceably to assemble for that purpose.45
Yes. The respondents sole purpose was to explain to workingmen the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act the benefits to be derived from it and the aid which the Committee for Industrial Organization would furnish.46 All activities were to be performed peacefully.47 Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits advantages and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom.48
Freedom to disseminate information concerning the National Labor Relations Act and to assemble peaceably for discussion of the Act is a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States secured against state abridgment by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Hughes agreed with the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts on the merits that the right to discuss the National Labor Relations Act is a privilege of a citizen of the United States.50 He stated he was not satisfied that the record adequately supports resting jurisdiction upon that ground.51 He therefore concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone on the jurisdictional point.52
Hughes emphasized that the privileges and immunities theory was an afterthought not supported by the pleadings or findings.53 The safer and more established route was the due process clause available to all persons.54
Whether the street meeting ordinance is unconstitutional on its face or has been unconstitutionally administered?55
Yes. The petitioners acting under the ordinance have consistently refused to issue any permits for meetings to be held by or sponsored by respondents.58 They have adopted and enforced a deliberate policy of forbidding the respondents from communicating their views by holding meetings in the open air and at public places.59 The ordinance does not make comfort or convenience the standard of official action and therefore cannot stand.60
The street meeting ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and has been unconstitutionally administered.61
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Mcreynolds
Justice Butler dissented on the ground that the challenged ordinance is not void on its face.62 In principle it does not differ from the Boston ordinance upheld in Davis v. Massachusetts.63 That earlier ordinance had been sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts speaking through Justice Holmes and affirmed by this Court speaking through Justice White.64
Butler concluded that the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed because the ordinance represented a valid exercise of municipal authority over its streets and parks.65
Whether the decree exceeds the court's power and is impracticable of enforcement or of compliance?66
No. The Circuit Court of Appeals modified the decree in respect of one of its provisions and as modified affirmed it.69 The decree goes too far in paragraphs 2 3 and 4 of Section B by attempting to formulate conditions for distribution of literature and administration of the void ordinance.70 Those paragraphs must be modified to declare the ordinance void and enjoin its enforcement while the remainder of the decree is affirmed.71
The decree must be modified in part because some provisions exceed the court's power.72
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McReynolds dissented on the ground that in the circumstances disclosed the District Court should have refused to interfere by injunction with the essential rights of the municipality to control its own parks and streets.73 There was ample opportunity for respondents to assert their claims through an orderly proceeding in courts of the State empowered authoritatively to interpret its laws with final review here in respect of federal questions.74