323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711
The plaintiffs, Susie Hall and her adoptive mother Mary Hall, brought separate civil actions against the defendants, including The Salisbury Post and its special assignment reporter Rose Post, alleging invasion of privacy.1 The claims arose from two articles published in July 1984 concerning the search by Lee and Aledith Gottschalk for Aledith's daughter, whom she and her former husband had abandoned in Rowan County in September of 1967.2
In 1967, Aledith Maxson and her then-husband Clarence, a carnival barker, left their four-month-old daughter with babysitter Mary Hall after the county fair closed and the carnival moved on.3 Clarence later told Aledith that he had signed papers authorizing the baby's adoption.4 In 1984, Aledith, now married to Lee Gottschalk, returned to Rowan County with her husband to look for the child.5
On 18 July 1984, The Salisbury Post published an article by Rose Post headlined "Ex-Carny Seeks Baby Abandoned 17 Years Ago," which recounted the details of the abandonment, the Gottschalks' unsuccessful search, and invited anyone with information to contact them at Room 173 of the Econo Motel.6 Shortly after publication, the Gottschalks received a call identifying the child as Susie Hall and providing her location with Mary Hall.7
The newspaper published a second article on 20 July 1984 reporting that the Gottschalks had located the child and describing the telephone encounter between the Gottschalks and Mrs. Hall along with the emotions of both families.8 The plaintiffs alleged that they fled their home to avoid public attention resulting from the articles and that each sought and received psychiatric care for the emotional and mental distress caused by the incident.9
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the complaints failed to state a claim.10 After a consolidated hearing on the motions, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendants in both cases on 20 May 1986.11 The Court of Appeals reversed, and on 28 July 1987 the Supreme Court allowed the defendants' petition for discretionary review.12
Whether claims for tortious invasion of privacy by truthful public disclosure of private facts concerning the plaintiffs are cognizable at law in North Carolina?13
North Carolina common law does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of true but private facts.14 The tort overlaps substantially with intentional infliction of emotional distress, which requires extreme and outrageous conduct that is intended to cause or recklessly inflicts severe emotional distress.15 Recognition would add to existing tensions between the First Amendment and tort law because the tort imposes liability for truthful speech on matters that may be of public interest.16 The private facts tort is constitutionally suspect under precedents such as Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn because it punishes publication of accurate information without requiring falsity.17
No. The plaintiffs Susie Hall and her adoptive mother Mary Hall filed separate actions against The Salisbury Post and reporter Rose Post after the newspaper published two articles in July 1984.18 The first article on 18 July 1984 described the 1967 abandonment of infant Susie by biological parents Aledith and Clarence Maxson with carnival workers and the Gottschalks' search that invited public tips at the Econo Motel.19 The second article on 20 July 1984 reported the location of Susie with Mary Hall and described the emotional telephone encounter between the families.20 The publications were true in every respect.21 The plaintiffs fled their home to avoid attention and each received psychiatric care for resulting emotional distress.22 Because the tort of public disclosure of private facts is not recognized, the complaints fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted even though the facts show genuine distress from the truthful reporting.
The Court of Appeals had reversed summary judgment after concluding that the private facts tort should be recognized and that material issues existed.23 This Court reverses that decision.24 The common law in force in 1776 did not include the private facts tort, and it has never been adopted in England or other common law jurisdictions.25 Adoption would deliver little practical value because a plaintiff who satisfies the Restatement elements of publicity, private facts, high offensiveness, and lack of legitimate public concern would almost always satisfy the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, allowing only a single recovery.26 The First Amendment concerns are decisive because truthful speech receives robust protection and the tort would require courts to decide after the fact whether a publication crossed into morbid prying.27
Claims for tortious invasion of privacy by truthful public disclosure of private facts concerning the plaintiffs are not cognizable at law in North Carolina.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Meyer
Justice Frye concurs only in the result reached by the majority. He would recognize the private facts tort consisting of the four elements set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D: publicity, private facts, high offensiveness to a reasonable person, and lack of legitimate public concern. He parts from the majority by rejecting the conclusion that recognition of the tort would unduly add to First Amendment tensions or duplicate other causes of action.
Nevertheless, he concludes that the published information was of legitimate public concern as a matter of law. The articles focused on a biological mother's return after seventeen years to search for the daughter she had abandoned, an event that drew public responses and became a matter of community interest.28 Because the facts were newsworthy, summary judgment remains proper even under a recognized tort.29
Justice Meyer dissents from the refusal to recognize a related privacy tort. He believes the false light invasion of privacy tort fills a gap not covered by defamation because a publication may place a person in a false light without being defamatory.30 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E recognizes the tort, as do the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
In this case genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the articles implied the plaintiffs consented to publicity and were actively involved in a search organization, whether those implications would be highly offensive, and whether the defendants acted with actual malice, all of which should be resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment. He would affirm the Court of Appeals and allow the case to proceed to trial.
Whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants?31
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.32 When the asserted claim rests on a tort that North Carolina does not recognize, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment regardless of factual disputes about offensiveness or newsworthiness.33 Even if the tort were recognized, summary judgment would still be appropriate if the published facts were of legitimate public concern as a matter of law under the Restatement standard that distinguishes information to which the public is entitled from morbid prying.34
Yes. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment for the defendants on 20 May 1986 after a consolidated hearing.35 The plaintiffs' complaints alleged invasion of privacy by truthful publication of private facts arising from the two Salisbury Post articles.36 Because this Court holds that such claims are not cognizable, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and no trial is required.37 The undisputed facts establish that the articles accurately reported the 1967 abandonment, the 1984 search, and the resulting family contact.38 The plaintiffs' evidence of emotional distress and psychiatric treatment, while showing actual harm, cannot support a nonexistent cause of action.39
Even under the approach advocated by Justice Frye that would recognize the tort, summary judgment remains proper.40 The central story of a mother returning after seventeen years to locate her abandoned child is a matter of legitimate public concern rather than morbid sensationalism.41 The articles arose directly from the Gottschalks' public appeal for information and the subsequent public response that identified Susie Hall.42 No reasonable juror could find that the reporting constituted a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake when the events had already become a public search involving the community.43
The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Meyer
Justice Frye agrees that summary judgment was correctly entered.45 Although he would recognize the private facts tort, he concludes that the published facts were of legitimate public concern as a matter of law.46 The story originated with the biological mother's public request for help in locating her daughter, and the newspaper merely reported the resulting events and community response.47
That context removes any basis for liability even if the tort existed.48 He would reverse the Court of Appeals decision on the ground that the published information was of legitimate concern to the public while still acknowledging that the tort is recognizable in this jurisdiction.
Justice Meyer would reverse the summary judgment.49 He concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether the articles placed the plaintiffs in a false light by implying consent and active involvement in an organization, whether those implications were highly offensive to a reasonable person, and whether the defendants acted with actual malice.50 Those questions should be submitted to a jury rather than resolved on summary judgment.51
He believes the false light tort fills a gap not adequately covered by defamation and would affirm the Court of Appeals to allow the case to proceed to trial.