914 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. 2009)
Richard and Suzanne Hamilton were granted a divorce in Florida in July 2005.1 The Florida divorce judgment awarded Suzanne physical custody of the couple’s two children and required Richard to pay support in the amount of $1,473 per month.2 The judgment also required Richard to pay a $3,619 arrearage in support from the time the couple separated in March 2005.3
Richard did not fulfill his child support responsibilities, and by January 2006 he owed a total of $11,879.4 Suzanne sought enforcement of Richard’s support obligation by filing a motion for contempt in the Florida court.5 Richard did not appear at the hearing on Suzanne’s motion, and on January 13, 2006, the Florida court held Richard in contempt.6 The Florida court found Richard had the ability to pay Suzanne but had willfully failed to do so, and sentenced him to 170 days in jail unless he tendered $7,500 within twenty days.7 The court also set up a payment schedule for Richard to satisfy the balance of the arrearages and the ongoing support obligation.8
Suzanne and the children remained Florida residents, but at some point Richard moved to Evansville in Vanderburgh County, Indiana where he lived with his parents.9 Suzanne sought enforcement of the Florida orders by registering the Florida support judgment and contempt order in Vanderburgh Superior Court.10 The Indiana court ruled that the child support judgment was a properly registered foreign order entitled to full faith and credit.11 The court also extended full faith and credit to the findings and conclusions in the Florida contempt order.12 The court did not extend full faith and credit to the judgment that the Husband is ordered incarcerated in the jail for a time of 170 days.13 Although the Indiana court found Richard in contempt, it stayed the jail sentence if Richard tendered $3,750 and made monthly payments of $1,250.14 In a separate order entered November 10, 2006, the court established Richard’s arrearages at $20,466.50.15
Richard struggled to meet his monthly obligations, and Suzanne soon sought relief through a writ of bodily attachment.16 On March 29, 2007, the Indiana trial court ordered Richard to serve 170 days in the county jail, but stayed the sentence contingent upon Richard’s paying Suzanne $1,000, obtaining full-time employment, and executing a wage assignment in an amount specified by the Indiana Child Support Guidelines or $150 per week, whichever was greater.17 In May 2007, Suzanne again sought to hold Richard in contempt for failure to meet the conditions of the court’s orders.18 Richard testified that he had met the three conditions imposed by the March 29 order, and the court found no contempt.19 In November 2007, Suzanne again asked the court to find Richard in contempt and asked for larger monthly payments and more aggressive enforcement of the Florida support order.20 At the hearing on this motion, Richard testified that he was working between thirty and fifty hours per week and earning $7 per hour.21 Financial exhibits reflected that he was paying an average of $150 per week in support.22 On March 4, 2008, the trial court ruled that Richard was not in contempt of the Indiana orders and explained its view of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits on income withholding.23
Suzanne appealed this order, arguing that the order constituted an impermissible modification of the Florida support judgment, that the trial court erred in finding that the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act capped the husband’s child support obligations, and that the court abused its discretion in failing to hold Richard in contempt.24 The Court of Appeals affirmed.25 The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.26
Whether the trial court’s March 4, 2008 judgment constituted a modification of the original Florida support order?27
Under the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, a responding state must recognize and enforce but may not modify a registered foreign support order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.28 Modification is defined as a change in the amount, scope, or duration of the order.29 Responding states have discretion to employ enforcement mechanisms such as contempt orders that specify the amount and manner of compliance to compel payment without altering the underlying obligation.30
No. The Indiana trial court gave full faith and credit to the Florida support judgment requiring Richard to pay $1,473 per month and allowed arrearages to continue accruing in accordance with the Florida order. The March 4, 2008 order permitted Richard to avoid incarceration by paying $150 per week through wage assignment.31 This constitutes a valid enforcement mechanism under Indiana Code section 31-18-3-5(b)(2) rather than a modification of the original obligation.32
The trial court did not divert, suspend, or alter Richard's support responsibilities as prohibited in cases like Reis v. Zimmer or Walker v. Amos.33 Instead, it exercised discretion to fashion a remedy designed to encourage compliance given Richard's economic circumstances, consistent with both UIFSA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.34
The trial court’s contempt orders did not modify the Florida support judgment in violation of UIFSA or FFCCSOA.35
Whether the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the amount of child support that may be ordered?36
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act limits the portion of disposable earnings subject to garnishment for support orders to fifty or sixty percent, with increases for arrears, but does not restrict the total amount of child support that a court may order or the basis for contempt findings.37 Courts may order support in excess of the garnishment limits, and parents may still owe additional amounts beyond what is withheld from wages.38
No. Although the trial court discussed the FCCPA limits on income withholding in its March 4, 2008 order, the Act applies only to wage garnishment and does not cap the $1,473 monthly support obligation from the Florida judgment or prevent contempt for failure to pay the full amount.39 Richard's payment of $150 per week was within the garnishment limits but the underlying support duty remained unchanged.40
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the FCCPA references were observations that did not form the basis of the ruling.41 The record supports the decision not to hold Richard in contempt based on his compliance with the conditions imposed.42 To the extent the trial court’s ruling was based on the FCCPA garnishment limitations, it was predicated on an erroneous view of the law.43
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act does not limit the amount of child support that may be ordered.44
Whether the trial court erred by not holding Richard in contempt?45
A party may be held in contempt only upon a showing of willful disobedience of a court order.46 The determination whether to hold a party in contempt is within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only if there is no evidence or inferences to support the findings.
No. Richard complied with the three conditions of the March 29, 2007 order by paying $1,000, obtaining full-time employment, and executing the wage assignment, leading the trial court to find no contempt in May 2007 and again in March 2008.47 The record shows Richard was working thirty to fifty hours per week at $7 per hour and paying an average of $150 per week.48
However, because the trial court devoted much of its order to the FCCPA and may have relied on an erroneous view that the Act limited the support obligation, the case is remanded for a new contempt determination without reference to the FCCPA.49 The record is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that Richard fulfilled the conditions set forth in the trial court’s March 29 order.50
The trial court is directed to render a contempt determination without deference to the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.51