247 U.S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918)
A father filed a bill in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.1 He acted in his own behalf and as next friend of his two minor sons.2 One son was under the age of fourteen years.3 The other son was between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years.4 The sons worked as employees in a cotton mill at Charlotte, North Carolina.5 The suit sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act of Congress of September 1, 1916.6
That statute was intended to prevent interstate commerce in the products of child labor.7 The first section prohibited any producer, manufacturer, or dealer from shipping or delivering for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any article produced in a mine or factory where children under fourteen had worked within thirty days prior to removal.8 It also barred shipment where children aged fourteen to sixteen had worked more than eight hours daily, more than six days weekly, or between seven o'clock postmeridian and six o'clock antemeridian.9 Other sections provided for enforcement and prescribed penalties.10
The District Court held the act unconstitutional.11 It entered a decree enjoining enforcement.12 This appeal brings the case to the Supreme Court.13
Whether the Act of September 1, 1916 is a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce?14
No. The Act aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.18 It does not regulate transportation itself.19 The goods shipped are of themselves harmless.20 The labor of their production is complete before any shipment occurs.21
The father filed suit on behalf of his two minor sons employed in a North Carolina cotton mill.22 He sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act that barred shipment of products from factories using child labor under the specified ages and hours.23 The District Court held the Act unconstitutional. The appeal reached the Supreme Court on that record.24
Because the prohibition operates on local production rather than on the channels of commerce, the statute exceeds the commerce power.25
The Act of September 1, 1916 is not a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Mckenna, Justice Brandeis, And Justice Clarke
Justice Holmes dissented from the majority's conclusion on the commerce power.27 He maintained that the statute in its immediate operation is clearly within Congress's constitutional power.28 The power to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit any part of it.29
Possible indirect effects on state production policies furnish no ground for invalidating an otherwise valid exercise of federal power.30 He argued that precedents established that Congress may close the channels of commerce to articles whose transportation Congress deems harmful to national policy.31
Whether the Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution?32
Yes. The Act exerts federal authority over a purely local matter by conditioning interstate shipment on compliance with federal child-labor standards that the states alone may set.36 The sons worked in a Charlotte cotton mill subject to North Carolina law, which already limited employment of children under twelve.37 The federal statute sought to impose uniform national standards through the threat of barring goods from interstate commerce, thereby invading the reserved authority of the states over internal production and labor conditions.38
The Act contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.39
Whether the Act conflicts with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution?40
The attack upon the act rests upon three propositions: First: It is not a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; Second: It contravenes the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; Third: It conflicts with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.41
No. Separate determination was not required.42 The suit challenged the Act on three grounds including the Fifth Amendment.43 The controlling question and the decision rested on the absence of commerce authority and the Tenth Amendment violation.44 Because the statute was held invalid on those grounds, the court did not apply Fifth Amendment standards to the father's claim.45 That claim asserted interference with his sons' employment in the cotton mill.46
The court did not decide whether the Act conflicts with the Fifth Amendment.47
Whether it is within the authority of Congress, in regulating commerce among the States, to prohibit the transportation in interstate commerce of manufactured goods, the product of a factory in which children under the age of fourteen have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven o'clock P.M. or before the hour of six o'clock A.M.?48
No. The prohibition in the Act targets the employment practices inside factories rather than any evil occurring during or because of the transportation itself.52 The father's sons worked in a North Carolina cotton mill.53 The Act barred shipment of the mill's products if children under fourteen or fourteen-to-sixteen-year-olds working excessive hours had been employed within thirty days before removal.54 The goods shipped are of themselves harmless. The labor of their production is complete before any shipment occurs.
The statute attempts to control a local matter through denial of commerce facilities and therefore lies outside congressional authority.55
It is not within the authority of Congress to prohibit such transportation to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in factories within the States.56