357 U.S. 235 (1958)
In 1935 Dora Browning Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed a trust instrument in Delaware naming the Wilmington Trust Company as trustee.1 The corpus consisted of securities.2 Mrs. Donner reserved the income for life and retained a power of appointment over the remainder exercisable by inter vivos deed or will.3 She also retained the rights to amend, alter, or revoke the agreement, to change the trustee, and to require the consent of a trust advisor she appointed for sales of assets, investments, and participation in reorganizations.4
In 1944 Mrs. Donner became domiciled in Florida and remained there until her death in 1952.5 On December 3, 1949, while in Florida, she executed both her will and an inter vivos power of appointment.6 The appointment directed $200,000 to each of two trusts benefiting her grandchildren Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, with the balance appointed to her executrix.7 Mrs. Donner died on November 20, 1952.8 Her will was admitted to probate in Florida, naming Elizabeth Donner Hanson as executrix.9
Fourteen months after the death, residuary legatees Katherine N. R. Denckla and Dorothy B. R. Stewart petitioned a Florida chancery court for a declaratory judgment concerning property passing under the residuary clause.10 Personal service was made on the executrix and beneficiaries.11 Nonresident defendants including the Wilmington Trust Company and the Delaware Trust Company were served by ordinary mail and local publication under Florida statutes.12 The Delaware trustee did not appear.13 After the Florida suit began, the executrix filed a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine rights to the trust assets held there.14 All trust companies and most beneficiaries appeared in the Delaware proceeding.15
The Florida chancellor initially ruled he lacked jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees because no personal service had been made and the trust corpus was outside Florida.16 He proceeded as to appearing parties and held the power of appointment testamentary and void under Florida law, so that the $400,000 passed under the residuary clause.17 The Delaware Chancellor ruled the trust and appointment valid under Delaware law and that the corpus had been properly paid to the appointees.18 The Florida Supreme Court reversed the jurisdictional ruling, held Florida law applied, and affirmed that the trust was invalid and the appointment ineffective.19 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its own judgment and refused to accord full faith and credit to the Florida decree.20
The United States Supreme Court postponed the question of jurisdiction in the Florida appeal and granted certiorari to the Delaware Supreme Court.21 Both state supreme court judgments are before the Court.22
Whether Florida erred in holding that it had jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants?23
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.24 Jurisdiction exists only where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum such that the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.25 The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.26
Yes. The Delaware trustee had no office in Florida and transacted no business there.27 None of the trust assets had ever been held or administered in Florida.28 The trust agreement was executed in Delaware by a settlor domiciled in Pennsylvania.29
The trustee performed no acts in Florida bearing a relationship to the agreement.30 The settlor's execution of the power of appointment in Florida was unilateral activity that cannot create the necessary contacts for jurisdiction.31 The Florida court therefore lacked in personam jurisdiction over the trustee and in rem jurisdiction over the trust assets located in Delaware.32
Florida erred in holding that it had jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants.33
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Burton And Justice Brennan
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the Florida court had acquired jurisdiction because the appointment was made in Florida by a domiciliary.34 The beneficiaries resided there.35 The trustee had maintained business relations with the settlor in Florida for eight years, regularly communicating with her.36
He emphasized that the appointment had very close and substantial connections with Florida.37 The trustee chose to maintain business relations with Mrs. Donner in that State.38 Justice Black viewed the majority's decision as an unwarranted restriction on state jurisdiction over transactions with abundant connections to the forum.39
Whether Delaware erred in refusing full faith and credit to the Florida decree?40
A state is not obligated to give full faith and credit to a judgment rendered by a court that lacked jurisdiction over an indispensable party in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41
No. Because the Florida judgment was invalid for lack of jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, who was an indispensable party under Florida law, Delaware was entitled to conclude that the judgment was not binding and refuse to accord it full faith and credit.42
Delaware properly determined that the Florida court had neither personal jurisdiction over the trustee nor jurisdiction over the trust res.43
Delaware did not err in refusing full faith and credit to the Florida decree.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the trustee was in privity with the deceased settlor.45 Florida had a plain and compelling relation to the intangibles, giving it the right to make the controlling determination even without personal service over the trustee.46 He noted that the trustee was to do the settlor's bidding and transfer the property as she designated, making the trustee a stakeholder identified in interest with the decedent.47
Justice Douglas would have held that Florida could determine interests in the intangibles under these circumstances.48