383 U.S. 663 (1966)
Virginia residents initiated suits seeking to have Virginia’s poll tax declared unconstitutional as a condition for voting in state elections.1 Section 173 of Virginia’s Constitution directs the General Assembly to levy an annual poll tax not exceeding $1.50 on every resident of the State 21 years of age and over.2 One dollar of the tax is allocated exclusively to public free schools.3 The remainder is returned to the counties for general purposes.4
Section 18 of the Constitution includes payment of poll taxes as a precondition for voting.5 Section 20 requires that a person must personally pay all state poll taxes for the three years preceding the year in which registration is sought.6 Section 21 mandates that the poll tax be paid at least six months prior to the election in which the voter seeks to participate.7
The poll tax is often assessed along with the personal property tax.8 Individuals who do not pay a personal property tax bear the responsibility to request assessment for the poll tax.9 Enforcement of the poll tax takes the form of disenfranchisement.10 Collection of delinquent taxes cannot be pursued through legal proceedings until three years after delinquency.11
A three-judge District Court dismissed the complaints, considering itself bound by the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Breedlove v. Suttles.12 The cases arrived at the Supreme Court on appeal, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.13 At the time of the suits, only Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia conditioned the franchise on payment of a poll tax.14
Whether Virginia’s constitutional provisions conditioning the right to vote in state elections on payment of a poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?15
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously discriminate on the basis of wealth or payment of a fee.16 A State violates the Equal Protection Clause whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard, as voter qualifications have no relation to wealth.17
Yes. The rule prohibits conditioning the franchise on payment of a fee because such a requirement introduces a capricious factor unrelated to voter qualifications.18 Virginia's poll tax provisions require payment as a precondition for voting and enforce it through disenfranchisement.19 This directly makes affluence an electoral standard in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.20
The facts show that the tax is not related to any legitimate qualification for intelligent voting.21 The Court therefore overrules Breedlove to the extent it sanctioned the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting.22
The Virginia poll tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the Court was not faithfully interpreting the Equal Protection Clause but instead substituting its own policy preferences for the original meaning.24 He would have adhered to the precedent in Breedlove v. Suttles and Butler v. Thompson.25 The Constitution had not been amended to prohibit poll taxes.26
Any such change should be accomplished through the Article V amendment process rather than by judicial fiat.27 Black argued that the poll tax could rationally be justified as a means to collect revenue and to ensure that voters have a stake in the government.28 He further contended that the Court was improperly using the Equal Protection Clause in the manner of the discredited natural-law-due-process formula.29 This imposed contemporary notions of good policy rather than respecting the broad leeway states possess in areas of their constitutional competence.30
Justice Harlan dissented, contending that the Court had departed from established equal protection standards by imposing its own egalitarian views rather than applying the rational basis test.31 He maintained that poll taxes have a rational basis in promoting civic responsibility and that property qualifications have historical roots in American political theory.32 Harlan would have affirmed the District Court, leaving changes to the political process or constitutional amendment.33
He emphasized that the traditional test asks only whether a classification rests on some rational and constitutionally permissible state policy.34 He found the poll tax rational both for encouraging payment of taxes and for limiting the franchise to those with a demonstrated interest in public affairs.35