466 U.S. 408 (1984)
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Helicol), a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in Bogota, owned a helicopter that crashed in Peru on January 26, 1976, killing four United States citizens.1 Respondents are the survivors and representatives of the four decedents.2
At the time of the crash, the decedents were employed by Consorcio, the alter ego of a joint venture named Williams-Sedco-Horn (WSH) headquartered in Houston, Texas.3 Consorcio had been formed to enable the venturers to contract with Petro Peru for construction of the pipeline.4
In 1974, Consorcio/WSH needed helicopter services for the project.5 Helicol's chief executive officer, Francisco Restrepo, flew to Houston and conferred with representatives of the three joint venturers on prices, availability, working conditions, fuel, supplies, and housing.6 The parties reached an agreement under which Helicol would begin performance before the formal contract was signed in Peru on November 11, 1974.7 The contract provided that payments would be made to Helicol's account with the Bank of America in New York City and that controversies would be submitted to Peruvian courts.8
Between 1970 and 1977, Helicol purchased helicopters, spare parts, and accessories for more than four million dollars from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth, accounting for approximately eighty percent of its fleet.9 During the same period, Helicol sent prospective pilots to Fort Worth for training and to ferry aircraft to South America.10 It also sent management and maintenance personnel to Bell's facilities for plant familiarization and technical consultation.11 Helicol received over five million dollars in payments from Consorcio/WSH drawn on the First City National Bank of Houston into its New York City and Panama City bank accounts.12
Helicol maintained no place of business in Texas, was never licensed to do business there, had no agent for service of process in the state, performed no helicopter operations in Texas, and owned no real or personal property there.13 Respondents filed wrongful-death actions against Helicol, Consorcio/WSH, and Bell Helicopter in the District Court of Harris County, Texas.14 After Helicol's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was denied, a consolidated jury trial resulted in a verdict of $1,141,200 against Helicol.15 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds.16 The Supreme Court of Texas ultimately upheld jurisdiction on rehearing.17
Whether the contacts of a foreign corporation with the State of Texas were sufficient to allow a Texas state court to assert jurisdiction over the corporation in a cause of action not arising out of or related to the corporation's activities within the State?18
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates to limit the power of a State to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.19 Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.20 When a controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum, a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.21 Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation.22
No. Helicol's contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session, accepting checks drawn on a Texas bank, purchasing helicopters and equipment from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums, and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for training.23 These contacts do not constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.24 The one trip to Houston cannot be described as continuous and systematic.25 Acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank is of negligible significance.26
Purchases and related training trips, standing alone, are not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.27
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented, concluding that the undisputed contacts between Helicol and Texas were sufficiently important and related to the underlying cause of action to permit the Texas courts to assert personal jurisdiction.29 He argued that the negotiations in Texas led directly to the contract for the transportation services used at the time of the crash.30 The helicopter involved was purchased in Texas, and the pilot whose negligence allegedly caused the crash was trained in Texas.31
Brennan further contended that the Court should recognize specific jurisdiction whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum, rather than limiting analysis to general jurisdiction, because such a rule would be fair and reasonable given Helicol's purposeful availment of the forum's commercial opportunities.32