83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
Barbara Helling first consulted ophthalmologists Dr. Thomas F. Carey and Dr. Robert C. Laughlin in 1959 for myopia and received contact lenses.1 She returned for further consultations in September and October 1963 regarding lens irritation. She consulted again in February 1967 and on multiple occasions throughout 1968.2
Until October 1968 the defendants attributed all of Helling's visual difficulties to contact-lens complications.3 On that date Dr. Carey performed an eye-pressure test and visual-field examination for the first time.4 This diagnosed primary open-angle glaucoma in the 32-year-old plaintiff.5 By that date the 32-year-old plaintiff had already suffered extensive irreversible loss of peripheral vision and reduction of central vision to approximately five degrees vertical by ten degrees horizontal.6
Medical experts for both sides testified at trial that the prevailing standard of ophthalmology did not call for routine pressure testing of patients under age 40. The disease occurs in fewer than one in 25,000 persons in that age group.7 Helling filed her malpractice complaint in August 1969 after consulting additional physicians.8
The trial court entered judgment for the defendants following a defense verdict.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted Helling's petition for review.10
Whether the defendants' compliance with the professional standard of ophthalmology, which did not require routine pressure testing for glaucoma in patients under 40, insulates them from liability for the plaintiff's vision loss?11
The standard of care is fixed by reasonable prudence rather than professional custom; what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices, and courts must in the end say what is required.12
Yes. The defendants complied with the prevailing professional standard under which routine pressure testing was not required for patients under 40.13 The pressure test itself is simple, relatively inexpensive, and harmless when the physical condition of the eye permits, yet the defendants performed it for the first time only in October 1968 after multiple earlier consultations beginning in 1959.14 By that date the 32-year-old plaintiff had already suffered extensive irreversible loss of peripheral vision and reduction of central vision to approximately five degrees vertical by ten degrees horizontal.
Because the precaution of timely testing is so imperative that its universal disregard by the ophthalmology profession does not excuse its omission, reasonable prudence required the defendants to administer the test earlier, rendering their compliance with the professional standard insufficient to insulate them from liability.15
The defendants' compliance with the professional standard does not insulate them from liability for the plaintiff's vision loss.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Finley And Hamilton, Jj.
Justice Utter concurs in the result reached by the majority.17 He believes a greater duty of care could be imposed on the defendants than was established by their profession.18 The duty could be imposed when a disease such as glaucoma can be detected by a simple, well-known harmless test whose results are definitive.19
The disease can be successfully arrested by early detection, but where the effects of the disease are irreversible if undetected over a substantial period of time.20 He observes that the majority's negligence analysis seems to be imposing a stigma of moral blame upon the doctors.21 The defendants used all the precautions commonly prescribed by their profession in diagnosis and treatment.22
We are in reality imposing liability because in choosing between an innocent plaintiff and a doctor who acted reasonably according to his specialty but who could have prevented the full effects of this disease by administering a simple, harmless test and treatment, the plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of loss.23 As such, imposition of liability approaches that of strict liability.24