506 U.S. 390 (1993)
In late September 1981, the body of Texas Department of Public Safety Officer David Rucker was found beside his patrol car on a highway near Los Fresnos, Texas.1 At about the same time, Los Fresnos Police Officer Enrique Carrisalez stopped a speeding vehicle and was shot by the driver, dying nine days later.2 Petitioner Leonel Torres Herrera was arrested a few days after the shootings and charged with the capital murders of both officers. He was tried in January 1982, convicted of Carrisalez's capital murder, and sentenced to death; he pleaded guilty to Rucker's murder in July 1982.3
At Herrera's trial for Carrisalez's murder, eyewitness Enrique Hernandez identified him as the shooter from the patrol car. A declaration by the dying Carrisalez to the same effect was admitted. The speeding car was registered to Herrera's live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had keys to it in his pocket when arrested.4 Herrera's Social Security card was found at Rucker's scene. Blood spatters of type A, matching Rucker but not Herrera's type O, were found on the car and on Herrera's jeans and wallet. A handwritten letter found on Herrera when arrested strongly implied he had killed Rucker.5
Herrera's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 1984, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. His state habeas application was denied. A federal habeas petition challenging the identifications was denied by the Fifth Circuit in 1990, with certiorari denied by the Supreme Court.6
In 1990, Herrera filed a second state habeas petition raising a claim of actual innocence supported by affidavits from attorney Hector Villarreal and former cellmate Juan Franco Palacious, both stating that Herrera's brother Raul Herrera Sr., who died in 1984, had confessed to committing the murders. The state courts denied relief.7 In February 1992, Herrera filed his second federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, presenting those affidavits plus additional ones from Raul Herrera Jr. and Jose Ybarra Jr. claiming Raul Sr. had confessed and that Raul Jr. had witnessed the shootings.8
The District Court dismissed most claims as an abuse of the writ but granted a stay of execution to permit Herrera to present his actual innocence claim in state court. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay, holding that a claim of actual innocence without an accompanying constitutional violation is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.9
Whether a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is cognizable on federal habeas corpus absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding?10
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.11 This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution, not to correct errors of fact.12 The rule also reflects the prudential limitation on habeas relief that federal courts should not retry a state criminal case.13
No. Herrera's claim rests solely on newly discovered affidavits alleging his brother committed the murders.14 No constitutional violation such as a Brady violation or ineffective assistance of counsel is asserted regarding the 1982 trial.15 The trial record included multiple eyewitness identifications by Hernandez and the dying declaration of Carrisalez.16 Physical evidence of blood type and the Social Security card supported the conviction, as did Herrera's own handwritten letter confessing involvement.17
The affidavits were presented more than eight years after the crime.18 They do not tie to any trial error.19 The rule therefore bars federal habeas review of this freestanding actual innocence claim.20
Herrera's claim of actual innocence does not entitle him to federal habeas relief.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Kennedy
Justice O’Connor joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to stress that the decision leaves open the possibility that a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence could render execution unconstitutional in an appropriate case.22 She noted that executing a legally and factually innocent person would be constitutionally intolerable.23 Yet she emphasized that the required showing must be extraordinarily high.24
The affidavits here fell far short, consisting of hearsay and inconsistencies without meeting the threshold for relief.25
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia concurred to underscore that the Constitution provides no basis for a freestanding claim of actual innocence after a fair trial.26 He explained that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial rather than an error-free one.27 Once a defendant receives the full panoply of constitutional protections and is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the state’s interest in finality prevails.28
Such claims, he stated, belong in state forums through new trial motions or executive clemency rather than federal habeas.29
Justice White concurred in the judgment while assuming arguendo that a persuasive showing of actual innocence after trial would render execution unconstitutional.30 He clarified that even under this assumption, the petitioner must at minimum demonstrate that no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the new evidence and the trial record, a standard drawn from Jackson v. Virginia. He concluded that Herrera’s showing failed to satisfy even this lenient threshold.31
Joined by Justices Stevens And Souter
Justice Blackmun dissented, contending that the execution of an actually innocent person violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as the ultimate denial of due process and a purposeless imposition of pain.32 He argued that the majority’s focus on finality cannot justify executing an innocent individual.33 The affidavits, if credited, established sufficient doubt about guilt to require an evidentiary hearing in federal court rather than dismissal on procedural grounds.34
Blackmun further maintained that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments that are grossly out of proportion to the crime, and executing the innocent epitomizes such excess.35 He also advanced a substantive due process claim, asserting that the execution shocks the conscience and constitutes an arbitrary imposition from which there is no recovery.36
Justice Stevens joined Blackmun’s dissent and wrote separately to highlight that the majority’s ruling marks a troubling departure from precedents stressing the need to ensure only the guilty face execution in capital cases.37 He maintained that the risk of executing an innocent person is unacceptable under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.38 The affidavits cast serious doubt on guilt, warranting merits consideration in federal habeas rather than insulation behind procedural barriers.39
Stevens emphasized that the Court’s approach insulates potentially unconstitutional executions from meaningful judicial review and represents an unwarranted restriction on habeas corpus in capital cases where new evidence of innocence emerges.40