555 U.S. 135 (2009)
On July 7, 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson of the Coffee County Sheriff's Department learned that Bennie Dean Herring had arrived at the department's impound lot to retrieve items from his truck.1 Anderson, familiar with Herring from prior encounters, directed the county warrant clerk, Sandy Pope, to check for outstanding arrest warrants.2 Finding none locally, Pope contacted Sharon Morgan, the warrant clerk in neighboring Dale County, whose database indicated an active warrant for Herring's failure to appear on a felony charge.3
Anderson and a deputy followed Herring as he left the lot, stopped his vehicle, and arrested him based on the reported warrant.4 A search incident to the arrest uncovered methamphetamine in Herring's pocket and a pistol in his truck.5 Shortly thereafter, Morgan discovered that the warrant had actually been recalled five months earlier in February 2004, but the recall had not been entered into the Dale County database.6 She notified Pope, who alerted Anderson via radio, all within ten to fifteen minutes of the arrest.7
Herring was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.8 He faced charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the arrest was unlawful because the warrant had been rescinded.9 The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the suppression motion, a recommendation adopted by the District Court in 451 F.Supp.2d 1290 (2005).10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction in 492 F.3d 1212 (2007), concluding that the database error was merely negligent and attenuated from the arrest.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the application of the exclusionary rule in this context.12
Whether the exclusionary rule applies when police mistakes leading to an unlawful search are the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest and search?13
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that applies only where its deterrent effect outweighs the substantial social costs of excluding reliable evidence.14 It serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence, but isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest does not trigger suppression.15
No. The error in this case was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.16 The Dale County warrant clerk failed to update the computer database after the warrant for Herring's arrest was recalled five months earlier, yet the Coffee County officers relied in good faith on the database report of an active warrant when they stopped Herring's vehicle, arrested him, and conducted the search that uncovered methamphetamine in his pocket and a pistol in his truck.17 The record contains no evidence that the error was the result of anything other than isolated negligence by an employee in the sheriff's office.18 The agency maintained a policy of updating the database to reflect recalled warrants.19
The marginal deterrence that might result from excluding the evidence does not outweigh the substantial social costs of suppression.20
The exclusionary rule does not apply, so the evidence obtained from the search incident to Herring's arrest remains admissible at trial.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, And Breyer
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which she contended that the exclusionary rule remains essential to redress Fourth Amendment violations arising from negligent police recordkeeping.22 She noted that the arrest and search violated Herring's rights because no warrant was outstanding and the police lacked probable cause. Ginsburg maintained that the rule serves not only to deter misconduct but also to enable the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness.23 She argued that it assures the people that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior.
She argued that the majority's approach leaves no remedy for violations of constitutional rights and underestimates the gravity of recordkeeping errors in modern law enforcement databases.24
Joined by Justice Souter
Justice Breyer joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent and wrote separately to highlight the distinction between police recordkeeping errors and judicial errors.25 He explained that in Arizona v. Evans the Court had treated judicial mistakes differently because the exclusionary rule targets police misconduct and court employees lack a stake in criminal prosecutions.26 Breyer argued that police personnel are part of the law enforcement team engaged in ferreting out crime, so their errors should trigger the exclusionary rule.27
He favored a clear line applying the rule to police errors rather than the majority's case-by-case inquiry into culpability.28