414 U.S. 105 (1973)
Gregory Hess was convicted in an Indiana City Court of violating the state's disorderly conduct statute after an incident during an antiwar demonstration at Indiana University.1 The Superior Court conducted a trial de novo on a stipulated set of facts and affirmed the conviction.2 The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the conviction with one justice dissenting.3
The demonstration involved approximately 100 to 150 demonstrators who moved onto a public street and blocked the passage of vehicles.4 When the demonstrators did not respond to verbal directions from the sheriff to clear the street, the sheriff and his deputies walked up the street, causing the demonstrators to move to the curbs on either side where spectators had gathered.5 Hess stood off the street as the sheriff passed him.6
The sheriff heard Hess utter the words "We'll take the fucking street later" or "We'll take the fucking street again" in a loud voice and immediately arrested him on the disorderly conduct charge.7 It was stipulated that these were the words spoken by Hess.8 Two witnesses in the immediate vicinity testified that Hess did not appear to be exhorting the crowd to return to the street, that he was facing the crowd rather than the street, that his statement was not addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone, though loud, matched that of others in the area.9
The trial court found that Hess' statement was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd and was likely to produce such action.10 The case reached the United States Supreme Court on appeal from the Indiana Supreme Court's affirmance.11
Whether the Indiana disorderly conduct statute is unconstitutionally vague?12
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.13
No. The Court did not address or resolve the vagueness contention on the merits because reversal was required on the separate ground that the statute as applied punished protected speech.14
The Court did not hold the disorderly conduct statute unconstitutionally vague.15
Whether the statute is overbroad in that it forbids activity protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?16
A statute is overbroad if it prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct in addition to its legitimate applications.17
No. The Court did not address or resolve the overbreadth contention on the merits because reversal was required on the separate ground that the statute as applied punished protected speech.18
The Court did not hold the disorderly conduct statute overbroad.19
Whether the statute as applied abridged Hess's constitutionally protected freedom of speech?20
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.21
Yes. The words spoken by Hess were not directed to any person or group of persons and there was no evidence or rational inference that his words were intended to produce and likely to produce imminent disorder.22 The trial court found that Hess' statement was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity of appellant and was likely to produce such action.23 At best the statement could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.24
This is not sufficient to permit the State to punish Hess' speech under the Brandenburg standard.25 The uncontroverted evidence showed that Hess' statement was not directed to any person or group of persons and that he was facing the crowd and not the street when he uttered the statement.26 His tone although loud was no louder than that of the other people in the area and the statement did not appear to be addressed to any particular person or group.27
The application of the statute to Hess's speech violated the First Amendment and the conviction must be reversed.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the majority substituted its own factual inferences for those reached by the courts below.29 The sentence could reasonably be construed as an exhortation particularly when uttered in a loud voice while facing a crowd.30 The opinions of the two defense witnesses cannot be considered proof to the contrary since the trial court was free to reject this testimony.31
The majority placed great emphasis on the word later but there are possible constructions of the statement which would encompass more or less immediate and continuing action against the harassed police.32 The Court exceeded the proper scope of review by not considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and resolving credibility questions against the appellant.33