485 U.S. 624 (1988)
Alta Sue Adams married Phillip William Feiock in 1968, and the couple had three children.1 In 1973, Feiock left the family.2 In January 1976, a California court entered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage.3 The court awarded custody of the children to Mrs. Feiock and ordered Feiock to pay child support beginning February 1, 1976.4 The payments were set at $35 per child per month for the first four months and $75 per child per month starting June 1, 1976.5 After the final judgment, Mrs. Feiock and the children moved to Ohio.6
Respondent made child support payments only sporadically and stopped making any payments by December 1982.7 Mrs. Feiock filed a complaint in Ohio under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.8 The Ohio court transmitted the complaint to the Superior Court of California for the County of Orange.9 On June 22, 1984, after a hearing, the California court ordered Feiock to pay $150 per month on a temporary basis beginning July 1, 1984.10 Feiock made payments only for August and September 1984.11
In 1985, the Orange County District Attorney filed orders to show cause alleging nine counts of contempt.12 At the August 9, 1985 hearing, the petitioner established a prima facie case of contempt.13 Respondent testified about his ability to pay but was found in contempt on five counts.14 He received a suspended sentence of 25 days in jail and three years of probation.15 Probation conditions required $150 monthly support payments and $50 monthly payments on the $1,650 arrearage.16
Respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal.17 The court annulled the contempt order, holding that section 1209.5 imposed an unconstitutional mandatory presumption.18 The California Supreme Court denied review.19 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether the ability to comply with a court order constitutes an element of the offense of contempt or, instead, inability to comply is an affirmative defense to that charge?21
Federal courts must accept a state appellate court's resolution of questions of state law when the state supreme court has denied review, as that resolution constitutes the law of the state applicable to the parties.22
No. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to depart from the state appellate court's resolution of these issues of state law.23 Applying this rule to the established facts, the California Court of Appeal annulled the contempt order after determining that section 1209.5 imposed a mandatory presumption on an element of the crime, and the United States Supreme Court accepted that state-law determination without reexamination.24
The federal court must accept the state court's determination on this point of state law.25
Whether section 1209.5 of the California Civil Procedure Code requires the alleged contemnor to shoulder the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of production in attempting to establish inability to comply with the order?26
Federal courts must accept a state appellate court's resolution of questions of state law when the state supreme court has denied review, as that resolution constitutes the law of the state applicable to the parties.
No. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to depart from the state appellate court's resolution of these issues of state law. Applying this rule to the established facts, the California Court of Appeal held that the statute imposed a mandatory presumption compelling a conclusion of guilt, and the United States Supreme Court accepted that state-law determination without reexamination.27
The federal court must accept the state court's determination on this point of state law.
Whether the contempt proceeding was a criminal proceeding or a civil proceeding, that is, whether the relief imposed upon respondent was criminal or civil in nature?28
The classification of contempt relief as civil or criminal for federal constitutional purposes turns on whether the sanction is determinate and punitive or conditional and coercive with a purge clause.29 The purge clause allows the contemnor to avoid or end the penalty by complying with the original order.30 State law labels are not controlling.31
No. The state appellate court erred insofar as it sustained respondent's challenge to the statute under the Due Process Clause simply because it concluded that this contempt proceeding is quasi-criminal as a matter of California law.32 Applying this rule to the established facts, respondent received a suspended determinate sentence of twenty-five days with three years of informal probation conditioned on making one-hundred-fifty-dollar monthly support payments and fifty-dollar monthly arrearage payments totaling one-thousand-six-hundred-fifty dollars.33 It remains unclear whether satisfying the arrearage would purge the sentence because the trial court did not specify that aspect of the disposition.34 The proper course is to vacate the judgment below and remand for further consideration of section 1209.5 free from the compulsion of an erroneous view of federal law.35
The judgment below is vacated and the case is remanded for further consideration of section 1209.5 free from the compulsion of an erroneous view of federal law.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Scalia
Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground that the proceeding is civil in nature as a matter of federal law.37 Therefore, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the trial court from applying a legislative presumption that the parent remained capable of complying with the order until the time of the contempt proceeding.38 She explained that respondent can avoid jail entirely by meeting the conditions of informal probation requiring both future support payments and payments on the arrearage.39
Respondent thereby carries the keys to the prison in his own pocket.40 The District Attorney acted on behalf of the ex-wife under the civil enforcement provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.41