95 S. Ct. 2281, 422 U.S. 332, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223
In November 1973, Buena Park police officers seized four copies of the film "Deep Throat" from the Pussycat Theatre under four separate search warrants issued on November 23 and 24.1 On November 26, an eight-count criminal misdemeanor complaint was filed in Orange County Municipal Court against two theater employees, and the Superior Court of Orange County issued an order to show cause why the film should not be declared obscene.2 The theater owners appeared on November 26, objected on state-law grounds, purported to reserve federal questions, and declined further participation; the next day the Superior Court viewed the film, took evidence, declared it obscene, and ordered all copies seized from the theater.3
On November 29, 1973, the theater owners Vincent Miranda, doing business as Pussycat Theater, and Walnut Properties, Inc., filed this action in federal district court against four Buena Park police officers, the Orange County District Attorney, and the Assistant District Attorney.4 The complaint sought a declaration that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional and an injunction ordering return of the seized films.5 A single district judge denied a temporary restraining order, and a three-judge court was designated on January 8, 1974; service of the complaint was completed on January 14.6
On January 15, 1974, the Municipal Court complaint was amended to name the theater owners as additional defendants and to add four conspiracy counts.7 The three-judge court issued its judgment on June 4, 1974, declaring the obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordering return of the films.8 Appellants informed the court of the Supreme Court's dismissal of Miller II and of the Superior Court Appellate Department's reversal of an earlier suppression order in the criminal case.9 On September 30 the three-judge court denied rehearing, reaffirmed its rulings, and amended the injunction to require appellants to petition the Municipal Court for return of three of the four prints.10
Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court from both the June 4 judgment and the September 30 amended judgment; the Court postponed further consideration of its jurisdiction to the merits.11
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 from a three-judge district court judgment declaring a state obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordering the return of seized films?12
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, any party may appeal directly to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in a civil action required to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.13 Section 2281 requires three-judge courts for certain injunctions against state statutes.14
Yes. The three-judge court declared the California obscenity statute unconstitutional and ordered return of all seized copies of Deep Throat.15 That order would have aborted the pending criminal prosecution. It therefore constituted an injunction within the meaning of § 1253.16
After the September 30 amendment the injunction still required appellants to petition the Municipal Court for return of three prints.17 Those prints were the subject of nine of the twelve counts in the amended criminal complaint. The order thereby interfered with both the prosecution and enforcement of the state statute on constitutional grounds.18 Because the order was issued by a federal court against state authorities and rested on federal constitutional grounds, direct appellate jurisdiction under § 1253 was proper.
The Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction over the direct appeal from both the June 4 judgment and the September 30 amended judgment.19
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Chief Justice Burger joined the majority opinion.20 He added a word about the composition of the three-judge District Court and the circumstances under which it was convened. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2284 the district judge to whom the application for relief is presented must constitute one member of the three-judge court.21
The statute uses mandatory language that "shall" means "must."22 The judge who called for the three-judge court here was not named to the panel.23 Appellants made no timely objection to the composition of the court.24
The issue was raised for the first time on appeal.25 It was therefore too late for consideration.26 When substitution occurs there is an obligation to ensure the record reveals at least the circumstances accounting for the substitution.27
Whether a three-judge district court is bound by the Supreme Court's summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the same state obscenity statute?28
Summary dismissals for want of a substantial federal question are votes on the merits.29 They bind lower federal courts unless and until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise or doctrinal developments indicate that the question is no longer insubstantial.
Yes. Miller II presented a federal constitutional challenge to the identical California obscenity statute and was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.30 That dismissal constituted a merits disposition that bound the three-judge court.31 The District Court therefore erred in concluding it could ignore Miller II and declare the statute unconstitutional.32
Nevertheless Miller II did not require dissolution of the three-judge court because the complaint also challenged the constitutionality of multiple seizures under the California search-warrant statutes.33 That issue was independent of the obscenity statute's validity and remained live after the Miller II dismissal.34
The three-judge court was bound by Miller II on the obscenity question but properly retained jurisdiction to address the separate search-warrant issue.35
Whether the principles of Younger v. Harris require dismissal of a federal action challenging a state criminal statute when state criminal proceedings against the federal plaintiffs commence after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court?36
Where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed, but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris apply in full force and require dismissal absent extraordinary circumstances.37
Yes. The federal complaint was filed on November 29, 1973.38 The theater owners were not named as defendants until the Municipal Court complaint was amended on January 15, 1974.39 That amendment occurred after service of the federal complaint but before any proceedings of substance occurred before the three-judge court.40
The owners possessed a substantial stake in the state prosecution because the seized films belonged to them.41 Their interests were intertwined with those of the charged employees.42 The federal action sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would directly interfere with the pending state case.43 Because the owners could have presented their federal claims in the state proceedings, the comity considerations of Younger v. Harris could not be avoided merely because no criminal charges were pending against them on the date the federal complaint was filed.44
The federal action should have been dismissed under Younger v. Harris.45
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Douglas, Brennan, And Marshall, Jj.
Justice Stewart dissented from Part III.46 He argued that the rule adopted by the Court distorts the balance struck in Steffel v. Thompson.47 The rule allows a state to file criminal charges after the federal action begins in order to oust federal jurisdiction.48
He maintained that as of the time federal jurisdiction is invoked in a Steffel situation, no substantial state interests counsel the federal court to stay its hand.49 The subsequent filing of state charges should not change the federal court's duty to vindicate constitutional rights.50 The new rule creates an open invitation to state officials to institute proceedings simply to defeat federal jurisdiction.51
It thereby distorts the accommodation of competing interests reflected in Younger v. Harris.52
Whether the record demonstrated bad faith and harassment by state officials sufficient to create an exception to the requirements of Younger v. Harris?53
A finding of bad faith and harassment sufficient to except a case from Younger v. Harris requires more than a pattern of seizures authorized by judicial warrant or a district court's disagreement with a state court's ruling on the constitutionality of a statute.54 At minimum, the district court must make some effort to impeach the entitlement of prosecuting officials to rely on repeated judicial authorization.55
No. Each of the four seizures was authorized by a judicial warrant.56 The Superior Court conducted an adversary hearing and declared the film obscene.57 The District Court did not purport to invalidate any warrant or question the propriety of the Superior Court proceedings.58 The District Court's findings were vague and conclusory.59
They rested almost entirely on its own conclusion that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutional.60 That conclusion could not support an inference of official bad faith when the statute had not yet been condemned by controlling precedent at the time of the seizures.61 Allowing such a disagreement to establish bad faith would swallow the Younger rule by creating an exception in every case in which a state statute is ultimately ruled unconstitutional.62
No exception to Younger v. Harris was established on the record.63