368 U.S. 424 (1962)
In 1954 a jury in a Federal District Court found the petitioner guilty of transporting a kidnapped person in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201.1
The jury also found the petitioner guilty of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
The petitioner was represented by court-appointed counsel at his trial.2 When, with counsel, he appeared before the District Judge for sentencing, the petitioner was not asked whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf.3
The District Judge, after noting his familiarity with the petitioner’s character and history, imposed consecutive prison sentences of twenty years and three years for the two offenses of which the jury had found the petitioner guilty.4 There was no appeal.5
The present litigation began in 1959 with the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.6 The motion alleged that the petitioner at the time of sentencing had been denied the right under Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.7 The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32(a) claim.8 The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32(a) in the proceeding which he has now brought.10
Whether petitioner may raise his claim under Federal Criminal Rule 32(a) in the proceeding which he has now brought?11
Section 2255 authorizes a motion to vacate sentence on four grounds: the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, the court lacked jurisdiction, the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.12 The legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.13
No. The established facts show that in 1954 the petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of two federal offenses and appeared with counsel for sentencing, where he was not asked to make a personal statement.14 In 1959 he filed a § 2255 motion alleging denial of his Rule 32(a) right.15 The District Court denied the motion without explicitly discussing the Rule 32(a) claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, per curiam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to whether the Rule 32(a) claim could be raised in that proceeding.16
The facts establish that the sentencing judge noted familiarity with the petitioner’s character and history, imposed consecutive sentences within statutory limits, and received no appeal.17 The error was a failure to follow the formal requirement of Rule 32(a) without any claim that the petitioner would have offered mitigating information or that the judge was misinformed.18 Such an omission is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional and does not constitute a fundamental defect producing a complete miscarriage of justice.19 Therefore the claim cannot be raised under § 2255.20
The petitioner may not raise his Rule 32(a) claim in the § 2255 proceeding.21
Whether a district court’s failure explicitly to afford a defendant an opportunity to make a statement at the time of sentencing furnishes grounds for a successful collateral attack upon the judgment and sentence?22
A district court’s failure to afford a defendant the opportunity to speak under Rule 32(a) is not an error of the character or magnitude cognizable on collateral attack.23 Collateral relief is unavailable when the only showing is noncompliance with the formal requirements of the Rule and no aggravating circumstances are present.24
No. The established facts demonstrate that the petitioner, represented by counsel, was not asked to make a statement at sentencing and received consecutive sentences of twenty years and three years.25 The record contains no assertion that the petitioner possessed mitigating information the judge lacked or that the sentence would have differed had he spoken.26 The error therefore remains a bare violation of the formal command of Rule 32(a).27
Because the facts show neither a jurisdictional defect, a constitutional violation, nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the omission does not furnish grounds for collateral attack.28 The judgment and sentence stand.29
The failure to afford the defendant an opportunity to speak does not furnish grounds for a successful collateral attack.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas And Mr. Justice Brennan
Justice Black dissented on the ground that a sentence imposed without according the defendant the personal right to speak under Rule 32(a) is illegal and therefore correctable under Rule 35.31 He maintained that the ordinary meaning of illegal encompasses any sentence imposed in a manner forbidden by law, regardless of whether the punishment itself exceeds statutory limits.32
Black pointed out that other courts had applied Rule 35 to sentences imposed in violation of Rule 43.33 He maintained that the same corrective power should extend to a Rule 32(a) violation.34
He further noted that the petitioner’s prior convictions made the opportunity to speak especially valuable and would have remanded for resentencing after compliance with Rule 32(a).35
Whether the failure to comply with Rule 32(a) renders the sentence illegal within the meaning of Rule 35?36
Rule 35 permits correction at any time of an illegal sentence, but its narrow function is to correct a sentence that is illegal on its face because the punishment exceeds the statutory maximum, multiple terms are imposed for the same offense, or the terms of the sentence are otherwise legally or constitutionally invalid.37 The Rule does not authorize re-examination of errors occurring before imposition of sentence.38
No. The established facts show that the petitioner received consecutive sentences of twenty years and three years for two distinct offenses.39 The punishment did not exceed the maximum authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1201 or § 2312, no multiple terms were imposed for the same offense, and the terms of the sentence itself were not legally or constitutionally invalid.40 The only defect was the sentencing court’s failure to invite the petitioner to speak personally.41
Because the facts establish that the sentence was lawful on its face and the error occurred in the proceedings leading to sentencing rather than in the sentence itself, Rule 35 supplies no relief.42
The failure to comply with Rule 32(a) does not render the sentence illegal within the meaning of Rule 35.43
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas And Mr. Justice Brennan
Justice Black dissented, contending that the language of Rule 35 contains no limitation to sentences illegal only in the amount or form of punishment.44 He argued that a sentence imposed in violation of the defendant’s legal right to speak is illegal by reason of the manner of its imposition.45
Black pointed out that other courts had applied Rule 35 to sentences imposed in violation of Rule 43, and he maintained that the same corrective power should extend to a Rule 32(a) violation.46
He would have reversed and remanded for resentencing after the petitioner was given his opportunity to speak.47