480 U.S. 136 (1987)
Lawton and Company, a Florida jeweler, hired appellant Paula Hobbie in October 1981. She was employed by Lawton for two and a half years, first as a trainee and then as assistant manager of a retail jewelry store.1
In April 1984, Hobbie informed her immediate supervisor that she was to be baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist Church and that, for religious reasons, she would no longer be able to work on her Sabbath, from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday. The supervisor devised an arrangement with Hobbie under which she agreed to work evenings and Sundays while he substituted for her on Friday evenings and Saturdays.2
This arrangement continued until June 1984 when the general manager learned of it. After a meeting with Hobbie and her minister, the general manager informed appellant that she could either work her scheduled shifts or submit her resignation to the company. When Hobbie refused to do either, Lawton discharged her.3 On June 4, 1984, appellant filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security.4
Lawton contested the payment of benefits on the ground that Hobbie had been discharged for misconduct connected with her work.5 A claims examiner for the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation denied Hobbie's claim for benefits, and she appealed that determination. Following a hearing before a referee, the Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed the denial of benefits, agreeing that Hobbie's refusal to work scheduled shifts constituted misconduct connected with her work.6 Hobbie challenged the Appeals Commission's order in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.
On September 10, 1985, that court summarily affirmed the Appeals Commission.7 The Supreme Court postponed jurisdiction over the appeal and granted review.8
Whether Florida's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to appellant violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment?9
Under precedents such as Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., a state's denial of unemployment benefits imposes a substantial burden on free exercise when it forces an employee to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment. Such a burden is permissible only if justified by a compelling state interest.10
Yes. Florida's denial of benefits placed the same coercive pressure on religious observance that the Court found impermissible in Sherbert and Thomas.11 Lawton and Company had discharged Hobbie for refusing scheduled Saturday shifts after her post-hire conversion to Seventh-day Adventist beliefs.12 The Appeals Commission offered no compelling interest to justify the disqualification under the misconduct provision of Fla. Stat. § 443.101(1)(a).13 The Court therefore applied strict scrutiny and found the denial unconstitutional.14
Florida's denial of unemployment compensation benefits therefore violates the Free Exercise Clause.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell agrees that Sherbert and Thomas control the outcome because the state denied Hobbie benefits after she was forced to leave her job due to sincerely held religious beliefs.16 He notes that the plurality reasoning in Bowen v. Roy does not apply here since the unemployment scheme involves individualized exemptions rather than a neutral requirement like a Social Security number.17 He concurs only in the judgment because he views the majority's broader rejection of Roy as unnecessary dictum that reaches beyond what the case requires.18
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents from the majority's decision and would affirm the denial of benefits.19 He adheres to the views he stated in his dissent in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720-727 (1981).20 Rehnquist maintains this position without further elaboration in the present case.21
Whether the fact that an employee adopted religious beliefs after beginning employment distinguishes the case from prior precedents involving unemployment benefits?22
The First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another after they are hired.23 The timing of a conversion is immaterial because the salient inquiry is the burden the state places on religious observance rather than when the belief arose.24
No. Although Hobbie informed her supervisor of her upcoming baptism and Sabbath observance only after two and a half years of employment at Lawton and Company, the resulting discharge and denial of benefits under the misconduct provision created the identical choice between religious fidelity and loss of benefits that existed in Sherbert and Thomas.25 The post-hire adoption of beliefs does not remove the free exercise violation.26
The fact that the employee adopted religious beliefs after beginning employment does not distinguish the case from prior precedents.27
Whether a limited disqualification from benefits rather than complete ineligibility avoids a free exercise violation?28
A state may not avoid strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause by imposing a limited or temporary disqualification from unemployment benefits instead of permanent ineligibility. The immediate coercive effect on religious practice remains substantial and the distinction lacks constitutional significance.29
No. Florida's provision for a fixed-term disqualification under § 443.101(1)(a) before Hobbie could again qualify for benefits still penalized her refusal to work Saturday shifts after her conversion. This produced the same substantial pressure to modify religious behavior that the Court rejected in Thomas, which itself involved a comparable disqualification scheme.30
A limited disqualification from benefits rather than complete ineligibility does not avoid a free exercise violation.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment.32 He notes that the State of Florida provides unemployment benefits to those persons who become "unemployed through no fault of their own" but singles out the religiously motivated choice that subjected Paula Hobbie to dismissal as her fault and indeed as "misconduct connected with . .
. work. " The State thus regards her religious claims less favorably than other claims.33
In such an instance, granting unemployment benefits is necessary to protect religious observers against unequal treatment.34 Stevens also agrees with the Court's explanation of why the two grounds upon which we might distinguish Sherbert and Thomas must be rejected.35
Whether awarding unemployment benefits to an employee discharged for refusing scheduled shifts due to later-adopted religious convictions would violate the Establishment Clause?36
No. Awarding benefits to Hobbie after her discharge from Lawton and Company for observing her Seventh-day Adventist Sabbath would merely extend the same neutral obligation recognized in Sherbert.39 The Court held that providing benefits to Sabbatarians alongside other workers does not entangle the state in fostering religion or create an establishment violation.40
Awarding unemployment benefits to an employee discharged for refusing scheduled shifts due to later-adopted religious convictions would not violate the Establishment Clause.41