573 U.S. 79 (2002)
Karen Howsam was a client of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. Between 1986 and 1994, Dean Witter recommended that Howsam buy and hold interests in four limited partnerships. Howsam claimed that Dean Witter had misrepresented the virtues of the partnerships.1
The parties' Client Service Agreement included an arbitration clause providing that all controversies concerning any account or transaction would be determined by arbitration before a self-regulatory organization or exchange of which Dean Witter was a member.2 Howsam chose to arbitrate before the National Association of Securities Dealers and signed the NASD's Uniform Submission Agreement, which specified that the matter was submitted in accordance with the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure.3
The NASD Code contains a rule stating that no dispute shall be eligible for submission to arbitration where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute.4 Following execution of the submission agreement, Dean Witter filed a lawsuit in federal district court. It asked the court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. Dean Witter also sought an injunction prohibiting Howsam from proceeding with arbitration.5
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the time limit rule.6 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve differing conclusions among the courts of appeals about whether a court or an arbitrator should primarily interpret and apply the NASD rule.8
Whether a court or an NASD arbitrator should apply the NASD time limit rule to the underlying controversy?9
The question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the question of arbitrability, is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, but procedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide.10
No. The applicability of the NASD time limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator.11 The time limit rule closely resembles the gateway questions that this Court has found not to be questions of arbitrability, such as allegations of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.12 In the present case, the rule is an aspect of the controversy which called the grievance procedures into play, and the NASD arbitrators are comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own rule.13
The NASD arbitrator should apply the time limit rule to the underlying controversy.14
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. He noted that the agreement provides it shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.15 Under Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., when an arbitration agreement contains a choice-of-law provision, that provision must be honored.16
Interpreting similar agreements, the New York Court of Appeals held that issues implicating the NASD Code section 10304 are for arbitrators to decide.17 Because the parties agreed to be bound by New York law, he would permit arbitrators to resolve the issues.18