462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972.1 In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable.2 Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.3
On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship.4 A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act.5
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship.6
Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings.7 Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported.8 Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal.9
Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.10 The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional.11 After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order.12
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.13
Whether this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 to hear the appeal?14
28 U.S.C. § 1252 provides that any party to a civil action involving a congressional enactment may appeal to this Court from a judgment of a federal court holding the statute unconstitutional.15
Yes. Chadha was a party to the action in the Court of Appeals.16 The judgment of that court held the Act of Congress to be unconstitutional. The fact that the INS agreed with the Court of Appeals’ holding that the House Resolution was unconstitutional does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction because the INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals’ judgment.1718
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252.19
Whether Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the House Resolution?20
A party has standing to challenge governmental action if he has demonstrated injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent the injury.21
Yes. Chadha suffered an injury in fact when the House Resolution ordered his deportation.22 There is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent that injury by setting aside the deportation order.23 The Court of Appeals judgment directly redresses the harm Chadha faced from the one-House veto.
Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the House Resolution.24
Whether the House and Senate have standing to defend the constitutionality of the Act?25
The House and Senate have standing to defend the constitutionality of a statute when they have a concrete interest in the validity of the statute.26
Yes. The House and Senate have a concrete interest in the validity of the statute as entities directly affected by the constitutional challenge to the one-House veto provision they enacted.27 Their institutional role in the legislative process gives them standing to defend the Act.28 The veto mechanism was their chosen means of oversight, making the challenge to its validity a direct threat to their authority.
The House and Senate have standing to defend the constitutionality of the Act.29
Whether the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is unconstitutional?30
The prescription for legislative action in Article I, sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution requires passage by a majority of both Houses and either approval by the President or passage over his veto.31 This procedure is an integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of powers.32 Action by one House that alters the legal rights of persons outside the Legislative Branch is legislative in purpose and effect and therefore subject to those requirements.33
Yes. The action taken by the House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) was essentially legislative in purpose and effect.34 The House Resolution had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including Chadha, outside the Legislative Branch.35 The House Resolution was a legislative act, and thus was subject to the procedural requirements of Art.
I, § 7, for legislative action.36 The legislative veto is an invalid shortcut.37 It is not a valid exception to the general rule that Congress may not delegate lawmaking power to itself or one of its Houses.38
The one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is unconstitutional.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court except on the characterization of the House Resolution.40 He viewed the House Resolution as an exercise of judicial power rather than legislative power.41 The House was acting as a court to determine Chadha’s right to remain in the United States.42
The House Resolution was therefore subject to the requirements of Article III.43 This narrower ground would invalidate the veto without broadly striking down all legislative veto provisions.
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice White dissented from the invalidation of the legislative veto.44 The Court’s decision strikes down a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that has been used by Congress for many years to control the execution of the immigration laws.45 The legislative veto is a useful device that allows Congress to retain some control over the administration of the laws it enacts.46
The Constitution does not prohibit this device.47 The Framers did not intend to prohibit all forms of legislative participation in the execution of the laws.48 The legislative veto is a constitutional means by which Congress can ensure that the Executive Branch does not exceed its authority.49
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White’s dissent.50 The legislative veto is a practical accommodation that has worked well for many years.51 The Court’s decision today will have far-reaching consequences for the balance of power between the branches of government.52
Congress did not intend the one-House veto provision to be severable from the remainder of the Act.53 By severing the provision the majority permits suspension of deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that suspension was appropriate.