228 P.3d 737, 746 (Utah 2010)
In an unspecified year, Jerad and Emily Egbert were involved in a car accident while driving a 1998 Nissan Altima. Mr. Egbert lost control of the vehicle while attempting to avoid another car, causing the Altima to roll over. During the rollover, the front passenger window, which was made of tempered glass, shattered. Mrs. Egbert, who was eight months pregnant, was ejected through the broken window and sustained serious injuries that required an emergency cesarean section. The couple's daughter, J.E., was born with a serious brain injury.1
The Egberts filed products liability claims against Nissan North America, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. They alleged that the passenger window was defectively designed because it used tempered glass that shatters on impact rather than laminated glass that would remain intact and serve as a secondary restraint. The Egberts contended that the use of laminated glass would have prevented Mrs. Egbert's ejection, reduced her injuries, and avoided J.E.'s brain injury. Nissan responded that the tempered glass met applicable federal safety standards at the time of manufacture and that the glass was not the proximate cause of the injuries because Mrs. Egbert would have been ejected regardless.2
This case reached the Utah Supreme Court after the federal district court certified two questions for resolution. The certification followed an earlier decision in the same matter, Egbert v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2007 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058, in which the court addressed different certified questions regarding jury instructions on a statutory presumption and recognition of enhanced injury liability under section 16(a) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. The federal district court determined that the remaining issues were controlling and had not yet been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted the certification under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 and exercised original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(1).3
The procedural history also includes prior litigation concerning the Utah Product Liability Act. In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. addressed the constitutionality of portions of the Act, including section 78-15-3. Following that decision, the legislature enacted a new section 78-15-3 in 1989 that changed a statute of repose to a statute of limitations. In 2008, the legislature recodified and revised Title 78, renumbering section 78-15-6 as section 78B-6-703 and making substantive changes to the statutory scheme.4
Whether Utah Code section 78-15-6(8) is constitutional?5
Yes. After Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. rendered section 78-15-6 void due to non-severability from the unconstitutional statute of repose in section 78-15-3, the legislature passed House Bill 78 in 2008.8 This recodification renumbered section 78-15-6 as section 78B-6-703.9 The bill received three separate readings in each house as required by article VI, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.10
The legislature also made a substantive change by deleting the former definition of unreasonably dangerous.11 Through this legislative action the provision was fully enacted and became constitutional.12
Utah Code section 78-15-6(8) is constitutional following the 2008 recodification.13
Whether Utah recognizes section 16(b)-(d) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?14
In enhanced-injury products liability cases, Utah Code section 78B-5-818(3) requires that fault in all its forms, including products liability, be apportioned among parties so that no defendant is liable for more than its proportion of fault.15 This rejects both the Fox-Mitchell approach of joint and several liability for indivisible injuries and the Huddell-Caiazzo approach that would allow complete non-recovery.16
No. The Egberts asserted an enhanced-injury claim against Nissan arising from the 1998 Nissan Altima rollover.17 The tempered-glass window allegedly increased Mrs. Egbert's ejection injuries and caused J.E.'s brain injury.18 Under Utah's comparative-fault statute the plaintiff must prove the defect was a substantial factor in enhancing the harm.19 The jury must apportion fault between the original tortfeasor and the product seller.20 No burden shifts to the defendant.21 Joint and several liability for indivisible injuries is not permitted.22
Utah does not recognize section 16(b)-(d) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.23