413 U.S. 717 (1973)
Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, first arrived in the United States in 1965 as a visitor.1 In 1967 she married a United States citizen and established residency in Connecticut.2 After completing law school, Griffiths applied in 1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination.3
The County Bar Association determined that she met all qualifications except the citizenship requirement imposed by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963).4 On that basis alone, the association denied her the opportunity to sit for the examination. Griffiths then pursued judicial relief, claiming that the citizenship rule violated the Equal Protection Clause.5
The Superior Court rejected her challenge.6 The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that decision.7 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and ultimately reversed the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.8
Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes constraints on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the bar?9
Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.10 Aliens as a class are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.11 To justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.12
Yes. The Equal Protection Clause imposes meaningful constraints on state bar admission rules that employ alienage classifications.13 The State possesses a constitutionally permissible and substantial interest in assuring that persons licensed to practice law possess the requisite character and general fitness.14 Connecticut may therefore require appropriate training, familiarity with local law, and satisfactory performance on character investigations.15
Yet the total exclusion of resident aliens fails the necessity prong because the State already possesses and exercises case-by-case mechanisms sufficient to protect its interest.16 Griffiths was found qualified in every respect except citizenship.17 She indicated willingness to take both the attorney's oath and the commissioner's oath.18 Connecticut may still conduct a full character investigation and may impose post-admission discipline ranging from contempt sanctions to disbarment.19 The powers conferred on Connecticut lawyers as commissioners of the Superior Court, such as signing writs and administering oaths, do not involve formulation of government policy or acts of unique responsibility that only citizens can perform.20 Because the State has not demonstrated that exclusion of all aliens is necessary to vindicate its legitimate interest in professional standards, the citizenship requirement cannot survive strict scrutiny.21
Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that states reserved the power to regulate the practice of professions within their borders as part of the constitutional compact.23 He emphasized that a lawyer functions as an officer of the court who receives a monopoly of authority to issue subpoenas, compel testimony, and appear in judicial proceedings, powers not granted to the public at large.24 In his view this role justifies a rational distinction favoring citizens who owe undivided allegiance to the United States.25 The traditions of independent advocacy and ethical responsibility are more likely to be internalized by those who accept the full burdens of citizenship.26 Burger therefore concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be read to force states to admit aliens who decline naturalization.27
He suggested states could adopt reciprocal admission rules limited to countries that extend similar privileges to American citizens.28