5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000)
Sun and Barry met in Montreal in the summer of 1987 and maintained a relationship during ensuing months through telephone contacts.1
In October 1987, at Barry’s invitation, Sun visited him for 10 days at his home in Phoenix, Arizona.2
In November 1987, Sun moved to Phoenix to take up residence with Barry and, one week later, the two became engaged to be married.3
In January 1988, they decided to marry before the commencement of professional baseball’s spring training.4
On February 5, 1988, in Phoenix, the parties entered into a written premarital agreement in which each party waived any interest in the earnings and acquisitions of the other party during marriage.5
That same day, they flew to Las Vegas, and were married the following day.6
Each of the parties then was 23 years of age. Barry, who had attended college for three years and who had begun his career in professional baseball in 1985, had a contract to play for the Pittsburgh Pirates. His annual salary at the time of the marriage ceremony was approximately $106,000. Sun had emigrated to Canada from Sweden in 1985, had worked as a waitress and bartender, and had undertaken some training as a cosmetologist, having expressed an interest in embarking upon a career as a makeup artist for celebrity clients. Although her native language was Swedish, she had used both French and English in her employment, education, and personal relationships when she lived in Canada. She was unemployed at the time she entered into the premarital agreement.7
Barry petitioned for legal separation on May 27, 1994, in California, the parties then being California residents. Sun requested custody of the parties’ two children, then three and four years of age. In addition, she sought child and spousal support, attorney fees, and a determination of property rights. The petition was amended to request dissolution, and the court bifurcated the trial proceedings, first adjudicating the issue of the validity of the premarital agreement and then reaching the remaining issues involving application of the agreement to the property held by the parties and the determination of spousal and child support.8
Whether the absence of independent counsel for one party to a premarital agreement requires that the voluntariness of the agreement be subjected to strict scrutiny?9
Pursuant to Family Code section 1615, a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the party did not execute the agreement voluntarily.10 The absence of independent counsel is only one of several factors that must be considered in determining whether a premarital agreement was entered into voluntarily, and it does not trigger strict scrutiny.11
No. The Court of Appeal majority erred in holding that a premarital agreement in which one party is not represented by independent counsel should be subjected to strict scrutiny for voluntariness.12 The official comment to the Uniform Act states that nothing in the enforcement section makes the absence of assistance of independent legal counsel a condition for the unenforceability of a premarital agreement. However, lack of that assistance may well be a factor in determining whether the conditions stated in the section may have existed.13
Applying the rule to the established facts, the trial court found that Sun had sufficient awareness and understanding of her right to, and need for, independent counsel. Respondent was advised at a meeting with Attorney Brown at least one week prior to execution of the Agreement that she had the right to have an attorney represent her and that Attorneys Brown and Megwa represented Petitioner, not Respondent. On at least two occasions during the February 5, 1988, meeting, Respondent was told that she could have separate counsel if she chose. Respondent declined. Respondent was capable of understanding this admonition.14
These findings show that the absence of independent counsel did not render the agreement involuntary.15
The absence of independent counsel for one party does not require that the voluntariness of a premarital agreement be subjected to strict scrutiny.16
Whether the trial court’s determination that a premarital agreement was entered into voluntarily is supported by substantial evidence when one party lacked independent counsel, had limited English proficiency, and signed the agreement the day before an impromptu wedding?17
A reviewing court should accept such factual determinations of the trial court as are supported by substantial evidence when determining the voluntariness of a premarital agreement.18 Under the substantial evidence rule, all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged to uphold the finding if possible.19
Yes. The trial court’s determination that Sun entered into the premarital agreement voluntarily is supported by substantial evidence.20 The trial court made specific findings of fact regarding the factors relevant to the determination of voluntariness. These findings are supported by substantial evidence and should have been accepted by the Court of Appeal majority.21
The trial court determined that there had been no coercion. It declared that Sun had not been subjected to any threats, that she had not been forced to sign the agreement, and that she never expressed any reluctance to sign the agreement.22 It found that the temporal proximity of the wedding to the signing of the agreement was not coercive, because under the particular circumstances of the case, including the small number of guests and the informality of the wedding arrangements, little embarrassment would have followed from postponement of the wedding.23 It found that the presentation of the agreement did not come as a surprise to Sun, noting that she was aware of Barry’s desire to protect his present property and future earnings, and that she had been aware for at least a week before the parties signed the formal premarital agreement that one was planned.24
With respect to the presence of independent counsel, although Sun lacked legal counsel, the trial court determined that she had a reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel. The trial court stated that Respondent had sufficient awareness and understanding of her right to, and need for, independent counsel and had an adequate and reasonable opportunity to obtain independent counsel prior to execution of the Agreement.25 With respect to the question of inequality of bargaining power, the trial court determined that Sun was intelligent and capable of understanding the agreement and the explanations proffered by Barry’s attorneys.26 With respect to full disclosure of the property involved, the trial court found that Sun was aware of what separate property was held by Barry prior to the marriage.27
With respect to the question of knowledge, the trial court was impressed with the extent of Sun’s awareness. Barry’s testimony established that he and Sun had agreed from the beginning of their relationship that each would forgo any interest in the other’s earnings and acquisitions during marriage.28 Family Code section 1615 places on the party seeking to avoid a premarital agreement the burden of demonstrating that the agreement was involuntary. The trial court determined that Sun did not carry her burden.29
The trial court’s determination that the premarital agreement was entered into voluntarily is supported by substantial evidence.30