436 U.S. 412 (1978)
In the summer of 1973, local and national newspapers reported that pregnant mothers on public assistance in Aiken County, South Carolina, were being sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition of continued receipt of medical assistance under the Medicaid program.1 Gary Allen, an Aiken businessman and officer of a local organization serving indigents, called the South Carolina Council on Human Relations requesting that one of its representatives come to Aiken to address some of the women who had been sterilized.2 At the Council's behest, appellant, who had not known Allen previously, called him and arranged a meeting in his office in July 1973.3
Among those attending the July 1973 meeting was Mary Etta Williams, who had been sterilized by Dr. Clovis H. Pierce after the birth of her third child.4 Williams and her grandmother attended because Allen, an old family friend, had invited them.5 At the meeting, Primus advised those present, including Williams, of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit.6 Early in August 1973 the ACLU informed Primus that it was willing to provide representation for Aiken mothers who had been sterilized.7 After being advised by Allen that Williams wished to institute suit against Dr. Pierce, Primus decided to inform Williams of the ACLU's offer of free legal representation.8
Primus sent Williams a letter dated August 30, 1973, on the stationery of the Carolina Community Law Firm, notifying her that the ACLU would like to file a lawsuit on her behalf for money against the doctor and offering to explain what was involved.9 Williams showed the letter to Dr. Pierce's lawyer during a visit to discuss her child's illness, signed a release of liability in the doctor's favor, and called Primus from the doctor's office to announce her intention not to sue.10 There was no further communication between Primus and Williams.11
On October 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina filed a formal complaint charging that Primus had engaged in solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics by sending the August 30, 1973, letter to Williams.12 The complaint was heard by a panel of the Board on March 20, 1975.13 The State's evidence consisted of the letter, the testimony of Williams, and a copy of the summons and complaint in the action instituted against Dr. Pierce and various state officials, Walker v. Pierce.14
Following denial of Primus's motion to dismiss, she testified in her own behalf and called Allen, several ACLU representatives, and several character witnesses.15 The panel filed a report recommending that Primus be found guilty of soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU in violation of Disciplinary Rules 2-103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and 2-104(A)(5) and that a private reprimand be issued.16 After a hearing on January 9, 1976, the full Board approved the panel report and administered a private reprimand.17 On March 17, 1977, the Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an order which adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions of the panel report and increased the sanction to a public reprimand.18 Primus filed a jurisdictional statement on July 9, 1977, and the United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on October 3, 1977.19
Whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated?20
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and subsequent cases, a State may not punish a lawyer for advising a layperson of legal rights and offering free legal assistance from a nonprofit organization when the activity is undertaken to advance political and ideological goals through associational activity and litigation, absent a showing of actual misconduct such as undue influence or conflict of interest.21
No. The established facts demonstrate that Primus's conduct fell squarely within the associational and expressive protections recognized in Button.22 Primus, affiliated with the ACLU and acting without any prospect of pecuniary gain to herself or the organization from the litigation, met with Williams at the July 1973 gathering and later sent the August 30 letter solely to convey the availability of free representation in service of civil-liberties objectives concerning coerced sterilizations.23 The record contains no evidence of actual overreaching, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation, or injurious lay interference with the attorney-client relationship.24 South Carolina applied its broad Disciplinary Rules without the narrow specificity or proof of substantive evils required when core First Amendment activity is at stake, rendering the public reprimand unconstitutional.25
South Carolina may not punish Primus for her protected conduct, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina must be reversed.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately to emphasize that the statements in Part VI concerning state authority to proscribe misleading statements during political solicitation are unnecessary dicta.27 He observed that any resolution of whether negligent misstatements by a lawyer on behalf of an organization advancing associational interests may be prohibited would require careful balancing of state interests against First Amendment values.28 The Court properly deferred that task to a future case presenting the issue with full briefing and argument.29
Justice Rehnquist dissented, contending that the majority failed to identify a principled distinction between Primus's solicitation and the in-person solicitation at issue in the companion Ohralik case.30 He argued that States retain authority to regulate lawyer solicitation prophylactically to guard against potential harms such as overreaching or baseless litigation, even when the lawyer acts from political conviction rather than pecuniary gain.31 He further argued that the Button line of cases does not compel a different result when an attorney initiates individual contact with a person who has not already joined the collective activity.32