533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 150 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2001)
Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1986. Ten years later, on March 8, 1996, he pleaded guilty in a state court to a charge of selling a controlled substance in violation of Connecticut law. That conviction made him deportable.1
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was enacted on April 24, 1996. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 was enacted on September 30, 1996. Both statutes contained comprehensive amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 Removal proceedings against St. Cyr were not commenced until April 10, 1997, after both statutes became effective.3
In his habeas corpus petition, St. Cyr alleged that the restrictions on discretionary relief from deportation contained in the 1996 statutes do not apply to removal proceedings brought against an alien who pleaded guilty to a deportable crime before their enactment.4 The district court accepted jurisdiction of his application and agreed with his submission. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.5
The importance of both questions warranted the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari.6
Whether AEDPA and IIRIRA repealed habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for challenges by criminal aliens to removal orders?7
Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal of habeas jurisdiction. There is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and a longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.8
No. The provisions of AEDPA § 401(e) and IIRIRA §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) do not mention 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and employ the term judicial review, which historically carries a distinct meaning from habeas corpus in the immigration context.9 Applied to the established facts, St. Cyr filed a habeas petition raising a pure question of law concerning eligibility for discretionary relief after his March 8, 1996 guilty plea and the April 10, 1997 commencement of removal proceedings. None of the cited statutory provisions supplies the requisite clear statement to strip district court jurisdiction under § 2241 over that claim.10
Habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains available for St. Cyr's challenge to the Attorney General's interpretation of the 1996 statutes.11
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Thomas, J.
Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that IIRIRA unambiguously repeals the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to deportation challenges brought by certain kinds of criminal aliens in categorical terms that admit of no exception.12 Scalia maintained that the majority's efforts to derive ambiguity from the statute's clear language were unconvincing and that the Court had fabricated a superclear statement requirement unparalleled in jurisprudence.13
The result of the majority's approach perversely gives criminal aliens more opportunities for delay-inducing judicial review than are afforded to noncriminal aliens or even than were afforded to criminal aliens prior to this legislation.14
Justice O'Connor joined Parts I and III of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in this case.15 She did not join Part II. She believed that, assuming arguendo that the Suspension Clause guarantees some minimum extent of habeas review, the right asserted by the alien in this case falls outside the scope of that review.16
The reasons are explained by Justice Scalia in Part II—B of his dissenting opinion. The question whether the Suspension Clause assures habeas jurisdiction in this particular case properly is resolved on this ground alone. There is no need to say more.17
Whether IIRIRA § 304(b) applies retroactively to eliminate eligibility for discretionary § 212(c) relief for aliens who pleaded guilty to deportable offenses before its enactment?18
A statute may not be applied retroactively absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result, and congressional enactments will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.19
No. IIRIRA § 304(b) contains no clear statement that its repeal of § 212(c) relief applies to convictions obtained through plea agreements entered before the statute's effective date.20 Applied to the established facts, St. Cyr pleaded guilty on March 8, 1996, at a time when his conviction would not have rendered him ineligible for § 212(c) relief. Removal proceedings began only after both AEDPA and IIRIRA took effect. The elimination of any possibility of relief therefore attaches a new disability to a transaction completed before enactment and produces an impermissible retroactive effect.21
Section 212(c) relief remains available for aliens such as St. Cyr. Their convictions were obtained through plea agreements. They would have been eligible for such relief at the time of their pleas under the law then in effect.22