71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003)
Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel engineer, formed an organization named Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACE-Intel) to disseminate information and views critical of Intel's employment and personnel policies and practices.1 Over a 21-month period, Hamidi sent six mass e-mails on behalf of FACE-Intel to employee addresses on Intel's electronic mail system.2 Each message was sent to thousands of addresses (as many as 35,000 according to FACE-Intel's Web site).3 The messages criticized Intel's employment practices, warned employees of the dangers those practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider moving to other companies, solicited employees' participation in FACE-Intel, and urged employees to inform themselves further by visiting FACE-Intel's Web site.4 Hamidi created the recipient address list using an Intel directory on a floppy disk anonymously sent to him.5 Internal Intel memoranda show the company's management concluded no security breach had occurred.6 The messages stated that recipients could, by notifying the sender of their wishes, be removed from FACE-Intel's mailing list; Hamidi did not subsequently send messages to anyone who requested removal.7
Intel maintains an electronic mail system, connected to the Internet, through which messages between employees and those outside the company can be sent and received, and permits its employees to make reasonable nonbusiness use of this system.8 Nor is there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution of Hamidi's electronic messages damaged Intel's computer system or slowed or impaired its functioning.9 Intel did present uncontradicted evidence, however, that many employee recipients asked a company official to stop the messages and that staff time was consumed in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel.10 According to the FACE-Intel Web site, moreover, the messages had prompted discussions between "[e]xcited and nervous managers" and the company's human resources department.11 When Intel, in March 1998, demanded in writing that Hamidi and FACE-Intel stop sending e-mails to Intel's computer system, Hamidi asserted the organization had a right to communicate with willing Intel employees; he sent a new mass mailing in September 1998.12
Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel, pleading causes of action for trespass to chattels and nuisance, and seeking both actual damages and an injunction against further e-mail messages.13 Intel later voluntarily dismissed its nuisance claim and waived its demand for damages.14 The trial court entered default against FACE-Intel upon that organization's failure to answer.15 The court then granted Intel's motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents "from sending unsolicited e-mail to addresses on Intel's computer systems."16
The Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the grant of injunctive relief.17
We granted Hamidi's petition for review.18
Whether an electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning constitutes an actionable trespass to chattels under California law?19
Under California law, trespass to chattels lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has proximately caused injury.20 Dispossession alone is actionable.21 Other forms of interference require some additional harm to the personal property or the possessor's interests in it.22 The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability is not given legal protection by an action for nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel.23 In order that an actor who interferes with another's chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other and more important interest of the possessor.24
Yes. The rule requires injury to the chattel or the possessor's interest in it.25 Hamidi's six mass e-mails reached up to 35,000 Intel employees yet caused no physical damage, no slowing of the system, and no impairment of its functioning or marginal operating cost, as the undisputed facts establish.26 The only effects were employee requests to stop the messages, staff time spent on blocking efforts, and internal management discussions, none of which altered the computers' condition, quality, or value or deprived Intel of their use for any measurable period.27
Because the communications produced no actionable injury to Intel's personal property or its legally protected interest therein, they do not constitute trespass to chattels.28
An electronic communication that neither damages the recipient computer system nor impairs its functioning does not constitute an actionable trespass to chattels under California law.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment.30 She framed the question by analogy to occasional personal calls to a mobile phone that cause no damage or significant impairment of usefulness.31 She agreed that using another's equipment to communicate with an authorized user who does not object constitutes trespass to chattels only if the communications damage the equipment or significantly impair its usefulness or availability.32
Because Intel demonstrated neither actual damage to its computer system nor any significant impairment of its functioning, Intel failed to establish the tort.33 Justice Kennard noted that Intel could still pursue other tort theories if the messages were defamatory or interfered with economic interests and that the Legislature might address bulk e-mail problems through statute.34
Justice Brown dissented.35 She argued that Intel possessed a protectible interest in the integrity and utility of its computer system, which Hamidi's repeated transmissions impaired by diverting employee time and undermining productivity.36 She maintained that the value of chattels to their owner can be impaired without physical damage when the owner's intended use is disrupted.37
Justice Brown rejected the majority's distinction between content and use, asserting that Intel was entitled to exclude unwanted messages from its private system regardless of their content.38 She concluded that injunctive relief was proper to prevent continuing trespass even without proof of physical injury to the system.39
Joined by Chief Justice George
Justice Mosk dissented.40 He viewed Hamidi's repeated bulk transmissions across Intel's proprietary intranet, despite express demands to stop, as actionable intermeddling that impaired the quality and value of the system to its owner.41 He emphasized that self-help proved ineffective and that the tort protects against unauthorized use that diminishes the chattel's utility for the possessor's purposes.42
Justice Mosk stressed that Intel's connection of its system to the Internet did not convert its private network into a public forum.43 He concluded that the injunction merely required Hamidi to cease trespassory conduct while leaving alternative channels of communication open.44