431 U.S. 324 (1977)
The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal court against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations.1
The complaint charged discriminatory hiring, assignment, and promotion policies against Negroes at its Nashville terminal.2
Almost three years later, the Government filed a second action in a Texas federal court against the company.3
It alleged a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system.4
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was joined as a defendant.5
The two actions were consolidated for trial in the Northern District of Texas.6
The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against minorities in hiring so-called line drivers.7
Those Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers.8
They were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers.9
The complaint also challenged the seniority system established by the collective-bargaining agreements between the employer and the union.10
The Government sought a general injunctive remedy and specific make-whole relief for all individual discriminatees.11
The cases went to trial.12
The District Court found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII.13
The court further found that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining contracts between the company and the union violated Title VII because it operated to impede the free transfer of minority groups into and within the company.14
With respect to individual relief the court accepted the Government's basic contention that the affected class of discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver operation.15
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the basic conclusions of the District Court.16
It held, however, that the relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate.17
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply its remedial principles.18
The Supreme Court granted both the company's and the union's petitions for certiorari.19
Whether the evidence established that the company engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed Americans?20
Under Title VII, a pattern or practice of discrimination is established when the Government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the employer's standard operating procedure rather than isolated or sporadic acts.21
Yes. The District Court found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Court of Appeals agreed with the basic conclusions of the District Court that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination.
The central claim was that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against minorities in hiring line drivers while assigning Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons to lower paying jobs as servicemen or local city drivers. The Government bolstered its statistical evidence with testimony of over 40 specific instances of discrimination, including qualified minority applicants whose requests were ignored or who received false information.22
The company attempted to rebut the evidence by pointing to low personnel turnover and recent minority hiring. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found upon substantial evidence that the company had engaged in a course of discrimination that continued well after the effective date of Title VII. The Supreme Court held that there was no warrant to disturb these findings.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the evidence established a pattern or practice of employment discrimination by the company.23
Whether the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining agreements violated Title VII?24
A seniority system violates Title VII if it is not bona fide and operates to perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination. Section 703(h) provides that it is not unlawful for an employer to apply different terms pursuant to a bona fide seniority system provided the differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate.25
No. The District Court found that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining contracts between the company and the union violated Title VII because it operated to impede the free transfer of minority groups into and within the company. The Court of Appeals agreed that the seniority system violated Title VII as applied to victims of prior discrimination.
The practical effect of the system was that a city driver or serviceman who transferred to a line-driver job forfeited all competitive seniority accumulated in the previous bargaining unit and started at the bottom of the line drivers' board.26 This locked minority workers into inferior jobs and perpetuated prior discrimination by discouraging transfers.27
However, the Supreme Court held that the seniority system was entirely bona fide because it applied equally to all races, was negotiated and maintained free from any illegal purpose, and did not have its genesis in racial discrimination.28
The Supreme Court held that the seniority system did not violate Title VII because it was protected by section 703(h).29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented from the holding that the seniority system was lawful.30 He argued that the system clearly would violate Title VII absent section 703(h) because it awards the choicest jobs to those possessing seniority which blacks and Spanish-surnamed employees were prevented from acquiring due to past discrimination.31 Marshall contended that the legislative history does not support immunizing systems that perpetuate discrimination and that subsequent developments, including EEOC interpretations and the 1972 amendments, confirm that such systems are unlawful.32
Whether section 703(h) of Title VII immunizes an otherwise bona fide seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination?33
Section 703(h) immunizes bona fide seniority systems from Title VII liability even when they perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination, because Congress intended to protect vested seniority rights and did not intend to require employers to grant constructive seniority to pre-Act discriminatees.
Yes. The District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the seniority system unlawfully perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination by locking minority workers into inferior jobs.34 The Supreme Court held that an otherwise neutral legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination.35
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress considered this very effect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of immunity to them.36 Statements by the Act's proponents confirmed that Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights even where the employer had discriminated prior to the Act.37
The Court concluded that the seniority system in this litigation was entirely bona fide, applied equally to all races, and did not have its genesis in racial discrimination.38
The Supreme Court held that section 703(h) immunizes an otherwise bona fide seniority system that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that the legislative history of the 1964 Act does not support the conclusion that Congress intended to legalize seniority systems that perpetuate discrimination.40 He noted that the Clark-Case memorandum and Justice Department statements addressed only pre-Act expectations and did not contemplate systems that continue to disadvantage incumbent minority employees.41 Marshall emphasized that Congress sought to enable black workers to assume their rightful place and would not have written off an entire generation of minority employees.42
Whether the Government's burden of proof in a pattern-or-practice case requires specific evidence that each individual class member was an actual victim of discrimination?43
In a pattern-or-practice case the Government need only establish a prima facie case that a discriminatory policy existed. Once shown, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that individual class members were not victims. Specific evidence for each individual is not required at the liability stage.44
No. The petitioners argued that the Government introduced specific evidence of discrimination against only some 40 employees and therefore the District Court properly refused relief to the remainder of the class.45 The Supreme Court held that the Government's burden in a pattern-or-practice case is to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy, not to offer evidence that each person was a victim.46
Proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employment decision during the period was made in pursuit of that policy.47 The Government need only show that an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for a job and therefore was a potential victim.48
The District Court and Court of Appeals correctly found that the Government had proved a systemwide pattern and practice, so every post-Act minority group applicant for a line-driver position is presumptively entitled to relief subject to the company's rebuttal.49
The Supreme Court held that the Government's burden of proof in a pattern-or-practice case does not require specific evidence that each individual class member was an actual victim of discrimination at the liability stage.50
Whether nonapplicants are entitled to an award of retroactive seniority relief under Title VII?51
An incumbent employee's failure to apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority under Title VII. Nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to prove that they would have applied but for the employer's discriminatory practices and are therefore presumptively entitled to relief.52
Yes. The Court of Appeals held that all qualified nonapplicants were presumptively entitled to relief because a member of the affected class may have concluded that an application for transfer was not worth the candle.53 The Supreme Court held that an incumbent employee's failure to apply for a job is not an inexorable bar to an award of retroactive seniority.54
A consistently enforced discriminatory policy can deter job applications from those who are aware of it and unwilling to subject themselves to certain rejection.55 When a person's desire for a job is not translated into a formal application solely because of unwillingness to engage in a futile gesture, he is as much a victim of discrimination as one who submits an application.56
However, a nonapplicant must show that he was a potential victim by proving he would have applied but for the discriminatory practices. The Government must carry this burden with respect to each specific individual at the remedial hearings.
The Supreme Court held that nonapplicants may be entitled to retroactive seniority relief under Title VII if they prove they were deterred from applying by the employer's discriminatory practices.57
Whether the District Court properly balanced the remedial interests of discriminatees against the contractual recall expectations of laid-off line drivers?58
In devising remedies under Title VII a court must balance the equities between the remedial interests of discriminatees and the legitimate expectations of other employees innocent of wrongdoing, drawing on qualities of mercy and practicality to reconcile competing claims.59
No. The District Court subordinated the interests of class members to the contractual recall expectations of laid-off employees by defining vacancies to exclude positions that became available while laid-off employees awaited recall.60 The Court of Appeals modified the decree to allow class members to compete for vacancies with laid-off employees on the basis of retroactive seniority.61
The Supreme Court held that neither court's concept was completely valid because the size and composition of the class of minority employees entitled to relief may be altered substantially after the evidentiary hearings on remand.62 Until those hearings determine the number of identifiable victims and the extent of necessary relief, it is not possible to evaluate the equitable balance.63
The determination is best left to the sound equitable discretion of the trial court, which must clearly state its reasons so that meaningful review may be had on appeal.64
The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not properly balance the remedial interests because further proceedings were required to determine the proper scope of relief.65