366 U.S. 717 (1961)
In December 1954 and March 1955, six murders were committed in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana.1 The petitioner was arrested on April 8, 1955.2 Shortly thereafter, the Prosecutor of Vanderburgh County and Evansville police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the six murders.3 The Vanderburgh County Grand Jury indicted the petitioner for the murder of Whitney Wesley Kerr allegedly committed in Vanderburgh County on December 23, 1954.4
Counsel appointed to defend the petitioner sought a change of venue from Vanderburgh County, which was granted to adjoining Gibson County.5 Alleging that the widespread and inflammatory publicity had also highly prejudiced the inhabitants of Gibson County against the petitioner, counsel on October 29, 1955 sought another change of venue from Gibson County to a county sufficiently removed from the Evansville locality.6 The motion was denied apparently because the pertinent Indiana statute allows only a single change of venue.7 During the course of the voir dire examination which lasted some four weeks, the petitioner filed two more motions for a change of venue and eight motions for continuances, all of which were denied.8
The panel consisted of 430 persons.9 The court itself excused 268 of those on challenges for cause as having fixed opinions as to the guilt of the petitioner.10 One hundred three were excused because of conscientious objection to the imposition of the death penalty.11 Twenty, the maximum allowed, were peremptorily challenged by the petitioner and ten by the State.12 Twelve persons and two alternates were selected as jurors.13 An examination of the 2,783-page voir dire record shows that 370 prospective jurors or almost 90 percent of those examined on the point entertained some opinion as to guilt.14
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in Irvin v. State.15 The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana.16 He claimed that his conviction had been obtained in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that he did not receive a fair trial.17 That court dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the petitioner had failed to exhaust his state remedies.18 On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.19 After the Supreme Court remanded the case, the Court of Appeals decided the claim adversely to the petitioner.20
Whether the petitioner was tried by an impartial jury as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?21
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a criminal defendant receive a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors.22 It is not required that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.23 It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.24 The test for determining whether a juror should be disqualified is whether the nature and strength of any opinion formed are such as to raise a presumption of partiality.25 A trial court's finding of impartiality may be set aside by a reviewing court only where the error is manifest.26
No. The extensive pretrial publicity created a pattern of deep and bitter prejudice throughout Gibson County.27 Of the twelve jurors ultimately seated, eight thought the petitioner was guilty before hearing any evidence.28 Two-thirds of the jurors were familiar with the material facts, including other murders attributed to the petitioner, and some stated that it would take evidence to overcome their belief in his guilt.29
One juror indicated he could not give the defendant the benefit of the doubt that he is innocent.30 Although each juror stated he could be fair, the psychological impact of such declarations in the face of pervasive community bias renders them insufficient to meet constitutional standards.31 The finding of impartiality therefore does not satisfy due process requirements.32
The petitioner was not tried by an impartial jury as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and his conviction and sentence must be set aside.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the judgment.34 He emphasized that this case exemplifies a recurring problem where inflammatory newspaper accounts, often with the prosecutor's collaboration, poison the minds of potential jurors before trial.35 When a jury comes to its task with minds ineradicably poisoned against the accused, these conditions are wanting, resulting in a denial of due process.36
Frankfurter observed that not a term passes without the Court being asked to review such convictions across the country.37 He stressed that the fair administration of criminal justice must not be subordinated to freedom of the press.38 He also stressed that the poisoner is not constitutionally protected in plying his trade when it leads to miscarriages of justice.39