378 U.S. 368 (1964)
On June 14, 1960, at about 1 a.m., petitioner Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliott entered a Brooklyn hotel where Elliott registered for both.1 Jackson drew a gun, took money from the room clerk, ordered the clerk and others into an upstairs room, and left.2 He encountered Elliott and a policeman on the street.3 During a struggle both drew guns, the policeman was fatally wounded, and Jackson was shot twice in the body.4 Jackson hailed a cab and was taken to the hospital.5
A detective questioned Jackson at about 2 a.m. soon after arrival.6 Jackson stated his name, said he had shot the colored cop and got the drop on him, and admitted the hotel robbery. According to the detective, Jackson was in strong condition despite his wounds.7 At 3:55 a.m. Jackson, who had been shot in the liver and lung and had lost about 500 cc. of blood, was given 50 milligrams of demerol and 1/50 of a grain of scopolamine.8 Immediately thereafter an Assistant District Attorney questioned him in the presence of police officers and hospital personnel.9 The interrogation was recorded by a stenographer.10 Jackson again admitted the robbery and, in response to further questions, admitted shooting the policeman and firing the first shot.11 The interview ended at 4 a.m. An operation began at 5 a.m. and was completed at 8 a.m.12
Jackson and Elliott were indicted for murder in the first degree and tried together.13 The statements made by Jackson at 2 a.m. and 3:55 a.m. were introduced in evidence without objection by his counsel.14 Jackson took the stand in his own defense.15 His account of the robbery and of the shooting of the policeman differed in important respects from his confession.16 According to Jackson's testimony, there was a substantial interval of time between his leaving the hotel and the shooting, and the policeman attempted to draw his gun first and fired the first shot.17 As to the questioning at the hospital, Jackson recalled that he was in pain and gasping for breath at the time.18 He was refused water and told he would not be let alone until the police had the answers they wanted.19 He knew that he had been interrogated but could remember neither the questions nor the answers.20 The State offered testimony from the attending physician and others that Jackson was refused water because of the impending operation rather than his refusal to answer questions.21 On cross-examination of the doctor, Jackson's counsel, with the help of the hospital records, elicited the fact that demerol and scopolamine were administered to Jackson immediately before his interrogation.22 But any effect of these drugs on Jackson during the interrogation was denied.23
Although Jackson's counsel did not specifically object to admission of the confession initially, the trial court indicated awareness that counsel was questioning the circumstances of the interrogation.24 In closing argument counsel sought a verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter rather than acquittal, stressing the interval between the robbery and the shooting and the evidence that the policeman fired first.25 Consistent with New York practice, the trial court submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury along with the other issues.26 The jury was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary it was to disregard it and determine guilt or innocence from the other evidence.27 If it found the confession voluntary it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly.28 The jury found Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree and he was sentenced to death.29 Elliott was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree.30
Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, whose remittitur was amended to show that it had necessarily passed upon the voluntariness of the confession and found no violation of constitutional rights.31 Certiorari was denied.32 Jackson then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court claiming that the New York procedure for determining voluntariness was unconstitutional and that his confession was involuntary.33 After examining the state court record the district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding no clear and conclusive proof that the statements were extorted or given involuntarily and no constitutional infirmity in the New York procedure.34 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.35
Whether the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession is constitutionally adequate?36
It is axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession, and a defendant has a constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the confession.37
No. The New York procedure, as applied to Jackson, submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury along with guilt or innocence with instructions that if the jury found the confession voluntary it must determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly, thereby permitting the jury to consider the truth or falsity of the confession in determining its voluntariness, and the trial judge did not make a preliminary determination of voluntariness before admitting the confession into evidence.38
The New York procedure is constitutionally defective under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissented from the reversal of Jackson's conviction.40 In his view the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession is constitutionally adequate.41 The jury was instructed that it must find the confession voluntary before it could consider it, and the jury is presumed to have followed that instruction.42
The New York Court of Appeals has held that the trial judge must exclude the confession if he finds it involuntary as a matter of law, and that the jury must be instructed that it cannot consider the confession if it finds it involuntary.43 This procedure satisfies the requirements of due process.44 Justice Black would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.45
Joined by Justice Harlan
Justice Clark dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Rogers v. Richmond and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart in this case.46 The trial judge had no opportunity to pass upon the statements because no objection was raised and no hearing was requested.47
The charge to the jury amply protected Jackson from the possibility that the jury might have confused the question of voluntariness with the question of truth.48
Joined by Justice Clark And Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Rogers v. Richmond.49 He argued that the States are free to allocate functions as between judge and jury as they see fit.50 The New York rule had been directly considered and explicitly approved by this Court in Stein just seven years before Jackson was tried.51
The Court's distrust of the jury system in this area of criminal law stands in curious contrast to the many pages in its reports in which the right to trial by jury has been extolled.52
Joined by Justice Clark And Justice Harlan In Part
Justice Stewart dissented in part, agreeing that the New York procedure is constitutionally defective insofar as it permits the jury to consider the truth or falsity of the confession in determining its voluntariness.53 He disagreed that the procedure is defective because it does not provide for a separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness before the confession is admitted into evidence.54 In his view the Constitution does not require such a separate hearing in every case.55
He would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a determination of whether the admission of the confession was harmless error.56
Whether the instructions to the jury in this case were proper?57
The constitutional issue of voluntariness is a separate issue from the issue of guilt or innocence, and the jury cannot be permitted to determine the constitutional issue by reference to the truth or falsity of the confession.58
No. The instructions given to the jury in Jackson's trial told the jury that if it found the confession voluntary it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. This thereby required the jury to consider the truth or falsity of the confession in determining its voluntariness.59
The instructions to the jury were constitutionally defective.60
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Clark And Justice Harlan In Part
Justice Stewart agreed that the New York procedure is constitutionally defective insofar as it permits the jury to consider the truth or falsity of the confession in determining its voluntariness. He did not agree that the procedure is defective because it does not provide for a separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness before the confession is admitted into evidence. In his view the Constitution does not require such a separate hearing in every case.
He would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a determination of whether the admission of the confession was harmless error.
Whether Jackson is entitled to a new trial rather than a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession?61
If at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing in the state court on the coercion issue it is determined that the confession was voluntarily given, admissible in evidence, and properly to be considered by the jury, there is no constitutional necessity for proceeding with a new trial because Jackson has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty.62
No. Jackson is entitled to a reliable resolution of the evidentiary conflicts concerning voluntariness through a hearing in the state courts.63 If the confession is found voluntary after such a hearing no new trial is constitutionally required because Jackson has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty.64
A hearing in state court rather than a new trial satisfies constitutional requirements if the confession is found voluntary.65