419 U.S. 345 (1974)
Catherine Jackson, a resident of York, Pennsylvania, received electric service from Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately owned Pennsylvania corporation that held a certificate of public convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission authorizing it to deliver electricity in the York area.1 The company operated under an agreement and a general tariff filed with the Commission that reserved the right to discontinue service on reasonable notice for nonpayment of bills.2 Until September 1970 Jackson maintained an account in her own name; after that account was terminated for asserted delinquency, a new account was opened in the name of James Dodson, another occupant of the residence, and service resumed.3
In August 1971 Dodson left the residence and no further payments were made.4 On October 6, 1971, Metropolitan employees visited the home to inquire about Dodson's address.5 The next day another employee informed Jackson that the meter had been tampered with and she disclaimed knowledge of the tampering while requesting that the account be transferred to the name of her twelve-year-old son, Robert Jackson.6 Four days later, on October 11, 1971, without additional notice, Metropolitan employees disconnected service to the residence.7
Jackson filed suit against Metropolitan in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 She sought damages and an injunction requiring continued service until she received notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due, alleging that the termination without those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
The District Court granted Metropolitan's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the termination did not constitute state action.10 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that judgment.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.12
Whether the termination of electric service by a privately owned and heavily regulated utility company constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations by the State, not private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.14 State action is present only if there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.15
No. The termination was performed by Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately owned corporation, pursuant to its own tariff provision, without any order or specific approval by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission for this particular termination.16 The Commission merely approved the general tariff after notice filing, and the company made the decision to terminate based on nonpayment.17 The facts show that Jackson's service was disconnected by Metropolitan employees on October 11, 1971, after the meter tampering inquiry, without the State directing the action.18
The termination of electric service by Metropolitan Edison Co. did not constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.19
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Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the aggregate of factors, including the monopoly status, essential service, and state regulation, compels a finding of state responsibility.20 He emphasized that the State allows the utility to exploit its monopoly in violation of its tariff and that the regulatory regime fits § 1983 like a glove.21
Justice Marshall dissented, finding state action because the State has granted the company a monopoly in an essential service, imposes extensive regulations, and has approved the termination mode, making the State a joint participant in the challenged activity.22
Whether a state public utility commission's approval of a tariff permitting termination of service for nonpayment after reasonable notice constitutes state action?23
No. The tariff was filed by Metropolitan and became effective upon the Commission's lack of disapproval after 60 days, without a hearing on the termination provision.26 The Commission never considered the reinsertion of this provision in the newly filed general tariff and the provision became effective when not disapproved.27
The Commission's approval of the tariff did not constitute state action.28
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Justice Brennan would have vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of a justiciable controversy, concluding that petitioner had no basis for the claimed entitlement under state law because she had ceased being a customer when her prior account was terminated.29
Whether the monopoly status or performance of an essential public service by a privately owned utility transforms its termination actions into state action?30
The performance of a public function does not make the actions of a private entity state action unless it is a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.31 Monopoly status is not determinative in considering whether the termination was state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.32
No. The supplying of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State, as Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty.33 The State has not granted or guaranteed Metropolitan a monopoly, and the company faces some competition within portions of its service area.34
The monopoly status or performance of an essential public service did not transform the termination into state action.35
Whether the state's extensive regulation of a utility company creates a sufficiently close nexus to make the company's service termination fairly attributable to the state?36
The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action so that the action may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.37
No. Although Metropolitan is subject to extensive regulation by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, the State has not put its weight on the side of the particular practice of termination without hearing, and the company elected to terminate service to Jackson in a manner the Commission found permissible under state law.38 The regulation is typical of utility regulation throughout the country and does not foster or encourage the specific termination practice.39
The state's extensive regulation did not create a sufficiently close nexus to make the termination fairly attributable to the state.40
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Justice Marshall dissented on this point as well, arguing that the pattern of cooperation between the company and the State has led to significant state involvement in virtually every phase of the company's business and that the State has given its approval to the termination procedures by approving the tariff provision.41