990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998)
Paula Corbin Jones, a citizen of California, filed this lawsuit on May 6, 1994, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against William Jefferson Clinton, then President of the United States and former Governor of Arkansas, and Danny Ferguson, an Arkansas State Trooper assigned to the Governor's security detail.1 Jones alleges that on May 8, 1991, while she was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, Ferguson escorted her to a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock where Governor Clinton was staying after delivering a speech at an AIDC conference.2
She claims Clinton made unwanted sexual advances, touched her leg, exposed himself, and requested oral sex, all of which she rejected before leaving the suite.3 Jones continued working at the AIDC until February 20, 1993, when she resigned to move to California with her husband.4
On the day of the alleged incident she reported it to coworker Pamela Blackard, describing herself as upset and shaking.5 Later that day she told friend Debra Ballentine.6 Within the next two days she also told her sisters Charlotte Corbin Brown and Lydia Corbin Cathey.7 She alleges subsequent encounters with Ferguson in June 1991 and after her maternity leave, as well as one encounter with Clinton in the state capitol rotunda. Jones never missed work, filed a formal complaint, or sought medical or psychological treatment as a result of the events.
In January 1994 Jones learned of an article in The American Spectator magazine that referenced the incident and incorrectly suggested she had engaged in sexual relations with the Governor. On February 11, 1994, at a media event she publicly asked Clinton to acknowledge the incident and apologize.8 After his press spokespersons denied that the incident occurred or that he had ever met her, she filed suit on May 6, 1994, seeking damages for alleged violations of her federal civil rights and state law tort claims.9 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones that the lawsuit could proceed while Clinton was in office, this Court permitted limited discovery including the depositions of the President and Monica Lewinsky.10 The discovery process concluded and the President and Ferguson both moved for summary judgment.11
Whether the alleged conduct, even if true, constitutes a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause or substantive due process?12
To establish an equal protection claim based on sexual harassment, plaintiff must show that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment that was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and that the harassment was based on her sex.13 To establish a substantive due process claim for deprivation of liberty interest in bodily integrity, plaintiff must show that the conduct shocks the conscience.14
No. The facts establish that the alleged incident lasted no more than a few minutes, involved no physical touching, and Jones continued to work at her state job for almost two more years without ever complaining about the incident to her superiors.15 Jones has produced no evidence that she suffered any tangible job detriment as a result of the alleged incident.16 Under these circumstances, the alleged conduct does not rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment under the Equal Protection Clause.17 The conduct also does not shock the conscience, as it was a single incident without forcible compulsion or threats of physical injury.18
Therefore, the federal claims fail as a matter of law because the alleged conduct, even if true, does not constitute a violation of any constitutional right.19
The alleged conduct does not constitute a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights.20
Whether the alleged conduct was committed under color of state law for purposes of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?21
To establish that the President acted under color of state law, plaintiff must show that the President exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.22
No. The facts show that the alleged incident occurred in a private hotel suite, not in the Governor's office.23 The alleged conduct was not related in any way to the performance of any official state duty.24 The fact that the President was the Governor at the time does not mean that every act he took was under color of state law.25 The alleged conduct was not made possible because the President was clothed with the authority of state law.26
The alleged conduct was not committed under color of state law.27
Whether plaintiff produced evidence of any agreement or conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to deprive her of civil rights?28
A § 1985(3) claim requires proof of a conspiracy, and a conspiracy is not proved by the mere fact that two or more persons acted in concert to achieve an unlawful objective.29
No. The facts establish that Jones has produced no evidence of any agreement or understanding between the President and Ferguson.30 The mere fact that Ferguson was a state trooper assigned to the Governor's security detail does not establish a conspiracy.31 Jones's conspiracy claim is based on nothing more than speculation and conjecture.32
Plaintiff produced no evidence of any agreement or conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).33
Whether plaintiff's state law claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy are supported by the record?34
Statements made in response to public accusations are protected by the First Amendment.35 To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arkansas law, the conduct must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. A state law conspiracy claim requires proof of an agreement or understanding between the defendants.
No. The facts show that the defamation claim is based on statements made in response to Jones's public accusations against the President, and those statements are therefore protected by the First Amendment. The outrage claim fails because the alleged conduct, even if true, does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to support an outrage claim under Arkansas law.36 The state law conspiracy claim fails for the same reason the § 1985(3) claim fails, as Jones has produced no evidence of any agreement or understanding between the defendants.37
Plaintiff's state law claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy are not supported by the record.38
Whether plaintiff suffered any tangible job detriment or was subjected to severe or pervasive conduct sufficient to support quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment claims?39
To make a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, plaintiff must show that her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in a tangible job detriment.40 To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, plaintiff must show that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment based upon her sex that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.41
No. The facts establish that Jones received every merit increase and cost-of-living allowance for which she was eligible during her nearly two-year tenure with the AIDC, her position was reclassified upward from a Grade 9 classification to a Grade 11 classification thereby increasing her salary, and she consistently received satisfactory job evaluations.42 Jones never missed a day of work following the alleged incident, continued to work at AIDC another nineteen months, and never filed a formal complaint or told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC.43 Considering the totality of the circumstances, the conduct was not so severe or pervasive that it can be said to have altered the conditions of Jones's employment and created an abusive working environment.44 Jones has not demonstrated any tangible job detriment or adverse employment action for her refusal to submit to the Governor's alleged advances.45
Plaintiff did not suffer any tangible job detriment or severe or pervasive conduct sufficient to support her sexual harassment claims.46