118 N.W. 716 (S.D. 1908)
This is an appeal by the defendant from an order overruling his demurrer to the complaint.
It is alleged in the complaint, in substance, that on or about April 1, 1907, the plaintiffs, being desirous of securing a franchise for a city railway system in the city of Sioux Falls, employed the defendant to act as an attorney for them in securing or attempting to secure an ordinance from the city council granting the plaintiffs such license. Carrying out their purpose, or attempting to carry out the same, it became necessary for the plaintiffs to make a deposit with the city treasurer, and on said day the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant the sum of $2,500 to be by him deposited with the treasurer of the city, and which money was so deposited, as appears by the receipt of the treasurer copied in the complaint.
On or about April 4 the defendant received a further sum of $130, which was to be used by the defendant for the plaintiffs in securing or attempting to secure the franchise. The franchise which plaintiffs were attempting to secure from the city was not granted, and thereupon, about April 17, the city treasurer returned to the defendant the sum of $2,500 "as money belonging to these plaintiffs and for their use and benefit." On or about the same day the defendant rendered to the plaintiffs an account of all moneys received by him for and on account of the plaintiffs, with an itemized statement of all disbursements, and in connection therewith a pretended charge for his services or fee of $1,250, and with said account was a draft drawn in favor of the plaintiffs for $1,012.25.
The pretended charge of $1,250 as shown on the account and alleged to be for services rendered by him is asserted to be unjust, unlawful, and fraudulent, and the reasonable value of the services rendered by the defendant was alleged not to exceed $250. It was alleged that of the moneys so received by the defendant for and on behalf of the plaintiffs there remained in his hands the sum of $1,000, which he refused and still refuses to pay over to the plaintiffs, although frequently requested so to do, and he "has wrongfully and fraudulently converted" to his own use the said sum of $1,000. On or about September 10, 1907, the plaintiffs demanded payment of the aforesaid sum, being "the amount wrongfully and fraudulently retained by the defendant at the time he made to the plaintiffs his accounting as aforesaid," and the defendant remitted to them by draft the sum of $1,012.25, with interest upon that sum from April 17, but the defendant refused and still refuses to pay the same or any part thereof to the plaintiffs and has wrongfully converted the same to his own use. Wherefore plaintiffs demand judgment against the defendant for $1,000 and interest thereon from April 17, 1907, for the wrongful conversion of said property and for the costs of this action. To this complaint the defendant interposed a demurrer on the ground that "said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."
It is contended by the appellant that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in trover or conversion, for the reason that the complaint nowhere alleges ownership by the plaintiffs of the property alleged to have been converted at the time the action was brought; nor does it allege ownership or possession of the property in the plaintiffs at the time it is alleged to have been converted, which is essential in that form of action. Assuming that the complaint was intended to state an action for conversion of this money by the defendant, it is clearly insufficient in not alleging that the plaintiffs, at the time the defendant is charged with having converted it, were the owners or in possession of the money so alleged to have been converted. In Irving v. Hubbard, 12 S.D. 67, 80 N.W. 156, this court, in discussing a similar question, said: "In actions for conversion the pleader must, of course, allege ownership or possession of the property in the plaintiff at the time it is alleged to have been taken." See also Smith v. Force, 31 Minn. 119, 16 N.W. 704; Sawyer v. Robertson, 11 Mont. 416, 28 Pac. 456; Kennett v. Peters, 54 Kan. 119, 37 Pac. 999, 45 Am. St. Rep. 274.
But it is somewhat difficult to determine from the complaint whether the plaintiffs intended that their action should be for a tort or one ex contractu, as the complaint seems to have been framed with a double aspect. Taking a general view of the allegations, it would seem that the pleaders intended to state a cause of action for money had and received; but looking at the complaint in another aspect, and giving effect to some of the allegations therein, it would seem that the pleaders intended it as an action in conversion, in the nature of the old action of trover.
It is contended by the respondent, in support of the ruling of the court below upon the demurrer, that the action is to recover money had and received by the plaintiffs and that the allegations of fraudulent conversion may be treated as surplusage. Such a complaint, framed with a double aspect or to unite distinct and incongruous causes of action, cannot be sustained on demurrer. While our Code has abolished forms of pleading and requires that facts shall be stated in a plain and concise manner without unnecessary repetition, the distinctions between actions as they formerly existed cannot be entirely ignored. In Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, speaking by Chief Justice Ryan, quotes with approval the language of Chief Justice Dixon in Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, as follows:
"It would certainly be a most anomalous and hitherto unknown condition of the laws of pleading, were it established that the plaintiff in a civil action could file and serve a complaint, the particular nature and object of which no one could tell, but which might and should be held good, as a statement of two or three or more different and inconsistent causes of action, as one in tort, one upon money demand on contract, and one in equity, all combined or fused and moulded into one count or declaration, so that the defendant must await the accidents and events of trial, and until the plaintiff's proofs are all in, before being informed with any certainty or definiteness what he was called upon to meet. The proposition that a complaint, or any single count of it, may be so framed with a double, treble, or any number of aspects looking to so many distinct and incongruous causes of action, in order to hit the exigencies of the plaintiff's case or any possible demands of his proofs at the trial, strikes us as something exceedingly novel in the rules of pleading. We do not think it is the law, and, unless the Legislature compels us by some new statutory regulation, shall hereafter be very slow to change this conclusion."
Golden words, which should ever be present to the mind of every pleader under the Code, which was designed to substitute a plain and concise statement of causes of action and of defenses for the intricacies of pleading at common law. All that goes to the administration of justice should be definite and certain. This is almost equally essential to the claim, the defense, and the judgment. When these become vague and loose, the administration of justice becomes vague and loose, with a tendency to rest, not so much on known and fixed rules of law, as on capricious judgment of the peculiarities of each case — on a dangerous and eccentric sense of justice, largely personal to the judges, varying as cases vary, rather than on abiding principles of right, controlling equally the judgments of courts and the rights of suitors. It is time that those who administer the Code should recur to its policy of plain and direct certainty, and rescue it from prostitution to uncertain administration, to duplicity and ambiguity, and all the juridical evils of loose and uncertain administration, more dangerous to even and uniform justice than the worst technicalities of the most intricate system. Simplicity, not uncertainty, is the object of the Code, and pleadings under it should be as certain in substance as they were before it — more certain in form, because freed from technical formality. The distinction of actions in tort and on contract is as essential under our present practice as it ever was.
It will be observed in the case at bar that the plaintiffs entrusted $2,500 to the defendant to be deposited with the city treasurer, and that, the purpose for which it was deposited not having been accomplished, the money was returned to the defendant. A statement of the account between himself and the plaintiffs was furnished them, and a draft turned over to them for the amount less the sums claimed as expended by him and the amount of his fee for services. It is then alleged that there remains in the hands of the defendant the sum of $1,000, which he has refused and still refuses to pay over to the plaintiffs, although formally requested to do so, and that he has wrongfully and fraudulently converted to his own use the said sum of $1,000; that the plaintiffs have demanded payment of the said sum, "being the amount wrongfully and fraudulently retained by the defendant at the time he made to the plaintiffs his accounting as aforesaid"; that the defendant has remitted to the plaintiffs the sum of $1,012.25, but "the defendant then and there refused and still refuses to pay the same or any part thereof to the plaintiffs, and has wrongfully converted the same to his own use"; and that the complaint concludes with a demand for judgment for the said sum of $1,000 "for the wrongful conversion of said property and for the costs of this action."
As before stated, the respondents contend that the allegations of conversion may be treated as surplusage and the complaint held good as an action in assumpsit for money had and received; but we would not be justified in holding that these allegations constitute mere surplusage and might be disregarded by the court. To so hold would introduce into the law too much uncertainty and ambiguity in pleading and would tend to mislead the courts and the opposing party. A complaint should be framed upon the theory that it is either in tort or ex contractu; the two theories cannot be combined in one action, nor can an action at law and an action in equity be combined in one count. As stated in the headnote in Supervisors of Kewaunee County v. Decker, supra: "A single count of a complaint cannot be permitted to combine several causes of action of different kinds — as one in tort, one for money demand on contract, and one in equity. On demurrer to a complaint, or any count thereof, the court must determine what cause of action such complaint or count is designed to state, and then whether it states facts sufficient to constitute such a cause of action; and, if not, the demurrer must be sustained, though facts may be stated sufficient to show that plaintiff has a cause of action of a different character."
It is further stated by the respondent's counsel in their brief that this action is brought under subdivision 2 of section 157 of the Revised Code of Civil Procedure, and is an action for money received by an attorney in the course of his employment as such, and that such money was received by the attorney when he was acting in a fiduciary capacity. Section 157 provides: "The defendant may be arrested as hereinafter prescribed in the following cases: * * * (2) In an action for a fine or penalty or on a promise to marry, or for money received or for property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied, by a public officer or by an attorney, solicitor, or counselor." In our opinion the facts stated do not bring the case within this provision. There are no allegations in the complaint that the defendant embezzled this money or misapplied the funds paid over to him. The only apparent claim is that the defendant charged more for his services as attorney than he was entitled to charge, and for that reason was indebted to the plaintiffs in an amount in excess of $250, which the plaintiffs admitted the defendant was entitled to charge. The real controversy between the parties would seem to be over the value of the defendant's services while acting as attorney for the plaintiffs. The allegation that he charged in excess of $250, which was unlawful and fraudulent, cannot be treated as equivalent to an allegation that he embezzled or misapplied the plaintiffs' money. This claim cannot be sustained.
We have examined with care the decisions cited by the appellant's counsel from the courts of New York, but in our view those cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
The order of the circuit court overruling the demurrer is reversed.