367 P.3d 1006 (Utah 2016)
After partially redacted versions of her nude pre-operative and post-operative photographs were aired on the evening news, Conilyn Judge filed suit against Saltz Plastic Surgery, P.C., and Renato Saltz, M.D. (collectively, Saltz), and against Fox News. The claims against Fox News were dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement. Ms. Judge alleged five causes of action against Saltz: publication of private facts, false light, intrusion upon seclusion, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent employment and supervision. Saltz moved for and was granted summary judgment on all five claims, and the Utah Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the grant of summary judgment on each claim.
We granted certiorari on two issues concerning the claim for publication of private facts: (1) whether this Court should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D(b) requirement that plaintiffs show that “the matter publicized . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public,” and (2) whether the court of appeals erred in concluding, based on that provision, that disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment. We also granted review on whether the court of appeals erred in holding that disputed issues of material fact concerning the scope and meaning of a consent form precluded summary judgment on the claim for intrusion on seclusion.
For reasons explained below, we adopt the Restatement’s legitimate public concern element for claims for publication of private facts, and we affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of the grant of summary judgment on the claims for publication of private facts and intrusion on seclusion.
In October 2006 Dr. Saltz performed an abdominoplasty and a breast augmentation on Ms. Judge. Prior to surgery, Ms. Judge signed two consent forms entitled “Consent for Surgery/Procedure or Treatment.” One form included the following language (the other used functionally identical language): “I consent to be photographed or televised before, during, and after the operation(s) or procedure(s) to be performed, including appropriate portions of my body, for medical, scientific or educational purposes, provided my identity is not revealed by the pictures.”
In 2007 Fox News decided to produce a two-part news story about the risks and benefits of plastic surgery and how to select a reputable and qualified plastic surgeon. For the story, a Fox News reporter interviewed a woman who experienced serious medical complications following plastic surgery. To counterbalance that example, the reporter contacted Saltz’s office to ask whether Dr. Saltz had a patient with a positive surgical outcome who would be willing to be interviewed. Saltz invited Ms. Judge to be interviewed, and because of her interest in women’s health issues and desire to help others make informed decisions, Ms. Judge agreed to participate because she felt it would be an educational piece for the public.
Ms. Judge was interviewed by the Fox News reporter on January 11, 2008, at Saltz’s office. She openly discussed her surgery and described being “really pleased” with the results. The interview included Dr. Saltz conducting a mock medical examination of Ms. Judge, filmed for background footage. Ms. Judge wore a paper examination gown for the mock examination and expressed concern about camera angles, wanting no cleavage or thigh shown. After the mock examination, Ms. Judge posed for post-operative photographs showing the results of her surgery.2
While Ms. Judge was changing back into her street clothes after the mock examination, the reporter asked Saltz’s office manager for before-and-after pictures of Ms. Judge and other patients. Saltz contends that, in the presence of the reporter and Dr. Saltz, the office manager asked Ms. Judge for consent to release the clinical photographs for the news story and that Ms. Judge consented. The reporter denied that account; Ms. Judge avers she did not consent to release the photographs. Later that day Saltz’s office manager emailed Ms. Judge’s unredacted nude pre- and post-operative photographs to the reporter, identifying them in one email as “Here are Coni’s before pictures” and in another as “[H]ere are Coni’s after pictures.” Saltz placed no restrictions on Fox News’ use of Ms. Judge’s clinical photographs in those emails.3
Fox News selected two of Ms. Judge’s photographs for use in the news story and redacted them by placing black bars across Ms. Judge’s bust and pelvis. The photographs were taken from the neck down and did not show Ms. Judge’s face, but showed her body from neck to upper thigh. Fox News used the redacted photographs in the January 31, 2008 news story about plastic surgery, identifying them by saying, “this is Coni before; this is Coni after.”
Once Ms. Judge discovered that her clinical photographs had been used in the story, she contacted Fox News and Saltz. The Fox News reporter told Ms. Judge she obtained the photographs from Saltz. The broadcast, titled “Nip, Tuck and Nightmare,” had already aired on the evening news and had been posted on the Fox News website. Ms. Judge demanded removal; Fox News removed the photographs, re-edited the story, and kept the re-edited version on the website.
On January 12, 2009, Ms. Judge filed suit against Fox News and Saltz. The claims against Fox News were dismissed via settlement. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Saltz on all five claims. Saltz filed a petition for certiorari, and we granted review on the publication-of-private-facts and intrusion-on-seclusion issues identified above. We adopt the Restatement’s legitimate public concern element for publication-of-private-facts claims and affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of the grant of summary judgment for publication of private facts and for intrusion on seclusion.
On certiorari we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the district court, and apply the same standards of review used by that court, reviewing for correctness and giving no deference to the court of appeals. Because this case concerns a summary judgment ruling, the court of appeals viewed the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and reviewed the court’s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness. We likewise review the court of appeals’ decision for correctness.1
Saltz contends the court of appeals correctly concluded that a plaintiff alleging public disclosure of private facts must demonstrate that the public has no legitimate interest in the private fact, but that the court of appeals erred in defining and applying that provision to find disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Saltz also contends the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment on the intrusion-on-seclusion claim by holding there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the scope and meaning of the consent forms Ms. Judge signed.
We first consider and adopt the requirement in section 652D(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that, for publication-of-private-facts claims, the plaintiff must show that “the matter publicized . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Next, we determine the court of appeals correctly defined and applied that provision to conclude that disputed issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the publication-of-private-facts claim. Finally, we determine the court of appeals correctly reversed summary judgment on the intrusion-on-seclusion claim based on disputed issues of material fact concerning the scope and meaning of the consent forms.
This is the first case in which we address whether to adopt the Restatement’s § 652D(b) requirement that “the matter publicized . . . is not of legitimate concern to the public” as a fourth element of a claim for publication of private facts. In Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp. we set forth three elements for such claims: (1) the disclosure must be public rather than private; (2) the facts disclosed must be private facts, not public ones; and (3) the matter made public must be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. In Shattuck-Owen we noted the Restatement contains another element requiring that the matter made public not be of legitimate concern to the public, but declined then to decide whether to adopt that element. Today we adopt this element as a fourth element for publication-of-private-facts claims.4
In adopting this fourth element, we provide guidance regarding its application but do not fully develop all contours because this is our first case addressing it and we expect the doctrine to be refined in future cases. The Restatement explains that the common law has long recognized the public’s proper interest in learning about many matters. To determine whether a matter is of legitimate public concern, courts evaluate newsworthiness, considering the customs and conventions of the community. That inquiry may present a jury question, but sometimes can be resolved as a matter of law.
Legitimate public interest has been equated with newsworthiness. The concept of “news” has essentially been defined by traditional publishers and broadcasters in accordance with community mores and includes topics such as crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes, deaths from narcotics, rare diseases, unusual births, reappearances of presumed-dead persons, and other matters of genuine popular appeal. The scope of legitimate public concern is not limited to reports of current events; it also extends to the use of names, likenesses, or facts in giving information to the public for education, amusement, or enlightenment when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest.
But the authority to make public private facts is not unlimited. In assessing legitimate public concern, courts consider whether there is a logical nexus between the information and a matter of legitimate public interest, the degree of intrusiveness, and community customs and conventions. For example, the California Supreme Court in Shulman found the information disclosed about a private person involuntarily caught up in events of public interest was of legitimate public concern where those facts bore a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject and were not unduly intrusive in relation to their relevance. Other courts have similarly required a logical nexus and consideration of community mores.5
In certain clear cases a court may determine as a matter of law that the matter is of legitimate public concern and grant summary judgment. For example, in Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, LLC there was no dispute that a model’s murder was a legitimate matter of public interest, and the court held there was no legitimate public interest in gratuitously publishing nude photographs that were unrelated to the incident of public concern. Where reasonable minds could differ about newsworthiness, however, the issue is for the jury and summary judgment is inappropriate.
The court of appeals correctly held summary judgment on the publication-of-private-facts claim was inappropriate because disputed issues of material fact existed. The district court had concluded the public had a legitimate interest in Ms. Judge’s redacted photographs because she voluntarily placed these facts before the public by appearing on television to discuss choosing a cosmetic surgeon and by making representations about her surgical results. But there is a dispute whether there was a legitimate public interest in the photographs based on Ms. Judge’s participation in the broadcast or whether the inclusion of the photographs was gratuitous or overly intrusive; that dispute made summary judgment inappropriate.
Saltz argues Ms. Judge’s voluntary participation in the interview gave rise to a legitimate public interest in seeing her surgical results and that the photographs were used to show the good outcome Ms. Judge discussed. Ms. Judge counters that consenting to answer questions about her procedures did not render every aspect of her life, and certainly not her confidential medical photographs, subject to public disclosure. She maintains there is nothing newsworthy about her particular results and that publication of her photographs did not strengthen the impact or credibility of the presentation or otherwise enhance public awareness of the issues concerning plastic surgery. As the court of appeals observed, reasonable minds could differ on whether appearing on television to discuss cosmetic surgery gives rise to a legitimate public interest in viewing explicit photographic documentation of the interviewee’s surgery; because reasonable minds could differ, summary judgment was inappropriate.
In addition to legitimate public interest issues, the court of appeals addressed the requirement that a plaintiff prove the private fact was disclosed publicly. Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, PC, 2014 UT App 144, ¶ 24, 330 P.3d 126. The court correctly identified the key question as whether the communication was made in such a way that it was substantially certain the fact would become public. Id. A factfinder could reasonably conclude that giving photographs to a reporter, at the reporter’s request and knowing the reporter was preparing a story on the topic, made it substantially certain the photographs would be published. Add Saltz’s knowledge that the reporter was interviewing Ms. Judge at Saltz’s office and that Dr. Saltz conducted a filmed mock examination, plus the reporter’s specific request for before-and-after pictures, and a reasonable factfinder could conclude the photographs were substantially certain to be published. See supra ¶¶ 4–6.6
The court of appeals also correctly held that disputed issues of material fact concerning the scope and meaning of the pre-surgery consent forms precluded summary judgment on the intrusion-on-seclusion claim. Ms. Judge signed two consent forms titled “Consent for Surgery/Procedure or Treatment.” One form included the language at issue: “I consent to be photographed or televised before, during, and after the operation(s) or procedure(s) to be performed, including appropriate portions of my body, for medical, scientific or educational purposes, provided my identity is not revealed by the pictures.” The parties agree the other form is functionally identical.7
One issue is the existence of a Limited Consent Form used by Saltz, which Ms. Judge did not sign; that form reads, “By signing below I give Saltz Plastic Surgery/Renato Saltz permission to use my pictures for office presentations, company website, and book/media publications.” If the pre-surgery consent forms permit use of clinical photographs in book and media publications, the Limited Consent Form would be redundant, and Saltz has conceded as much if its interpretation of the pre-surgery forms is correct.
The parties dispute the plain meaning of the pre-surgery language. They disagree whether it authorizes release of the photographs to third parties or authorizes interoffice use only, and they dispute the scope and meaning of “educational purposes” and “my identity is not revealed by the pictures.” The district court apparently found no ambiguity and granted summary judgment for Saltz; the court of appeals found ambiguity and questions of fact and reversed. Whether a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law; a term is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings or other facial deficiencies. If there is no ambiguity, the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law; if there is ambiguity, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact and summary judgment is inappropriate.8
Whether the forms authorize release of photographs is ambiguous. Saltz maintains that a person cannot be televised without release of the images to third parties and that photographs would serve no educational purpose unless shown to third parties. Ms. Judge insists she did not consent to the release of anything and that the forms still have meaning absent authorization to release photographs because photographs could be used for legitimate interoffice uses, such as evaluating surgical results and training staff. Because the language is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation regarding authorization of release, the forms are facially ambiguous.
The scope and meaning of “educational purposes” in the forms is likewise ambiguous. Saltz and Ms. Judge both considered the news story educational and both point to that fact. But the relevant inquiry is not whether the underlying news story was educational; it is whether releasing Ms. Judge’s photographs to the reporter promoted an educational purpose within the meaning of the consent form. The parties have presented contrary, tenable interpretations of “educational purposes,” so the phrase is ambiguous such that intentions cannot be determined by the plain language of the agreement.
The parties also disagree about the provision that Ms. Judge’s identity would “not [be] revealed by the pictures.” Saltz emphasizes the phrase “by the pictures,” arguing the photographs did not show Ms. Judge’s face or reveal her identity. Saltz argues the provision would be rendered meaningless if it precluded disclosing Ms. Judge’s name in conjunction with the pictures. The district court agreed with Saltz, finding no violation because there was no notation on any photo that would identify Ms. Judge. The court of appeals, however, correctly noted a question of fact about whether the form forbids depicting Ms. Judge’s face or forbids providing identifying information with the photographs.
Saltz argues it was Ms. Judge’s participation in the news story, not the emails with her pictures attached, that revealed her identity. But the emails specifically stated “Here are Coni’s before pictures” and “[H]ere are Coni’s after pictures,” and the claim that such emails did not reveal identity strains credulity. Under Saltz’s interpretation, Saltz could identify any patient by name whenever it uses photographs simply by providing identifying information with the photographs rather than the photographs themselves revealing identity. That interpretation is unreasonable and we reject it. Nonetheless, we cannot adopt Ms. Judge’s interpretation as correct as a matter of law on this record, so for purposes of this appeal we conclude the provision is ambiguous.
In conclusion, the consent forms are ambiguous and disputed issues of fact remain regarding the meaning of the pre-surgery forms in the context of the Limited Consent Form and regarding the scope and meaning of “educational purposes” and “my identity is not revealed by the pictures.” Because ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties is a question of fact and extrinsic evidence must be considered to determine the parties’ intentions. Therefore, the court of appeals correctly held that these disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the intrusion-on-seclusion claim.9
We adopt the Restatement’s legitimate public concern element for claims for publication of private facts. We hold the court of appeals correctly applied that element to Ms. Judge’s publication-of-private-facts claim and correctly found disputed issues of material fact regarding that element. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the publication-of-private-facts claim. We also affirm the court of appeals’ reversal of summary judgment on the intrusion-on-seclusion claim because disputed issues of material fact remain regarding the meaning of the consent forms Ms. Judge signed.
Because I disagree with the court's analysis in Part III, I write separately to explain my views on the role of appellate review of the contract at issue in this case. The majority opinion concludes that the court of appeals correctly determined that there were "disputed issues of material fact" concerning the scope and meaning of the pre-surgery consent forms signed by Ms. Judge. I am not persuaded that there are any such material facts in dispute; the court of appeals was asked to interpret specific contractual language, and I do not believe that Saltz has offered any plausible interpretations of that language, let alone any extrinsic evidence that could constitute a "fact" capable of being disputed, that render it ambiguous. Absent ambiguity, it falls to the appellate courts to construe the language. Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 24, 367 P.3d 994. And courts decide as a matter of law whether a contractual provision is ambiguous, Keith v. Mountain Resorts Dev., L.L.C., 2014 UT 32, ¶ 17, 337 P.3d 213.
The language in question deals with the use of photographs taken of Ms. Judge, as follows:
CONSENT FOR SURGERY/PROCEDURE OR TREATMENT
[[Image here]]
I consent to be photographed or televised before, during, and after the operation(s) or procedure(s) to be performed, including appropriate portions of my body, for medical, scientific, or educational purposes, provided my identity is not revealed by the pictures.
For purposes of advancing medical education, I consent to the admittance of observers to the operating room.
As the majority opinion points out, Saltz's view of this language renders a second form with identical language used by his office, called a Limited Consent Form — which Ms. Judge did not sign — redundant. Furthermore, Saltz's construction of the foregoing language — that it reflects Ms. Judge's agreement that her medical photographs could be released with identifying information to the commercial media — is in my view entirely inconsistent with the consent form's plain language. While the term "educational," outside of the context of this particular form, might be susceptible to a meaning as broad as Saltz claims here, when read in conjunction with the use of the term "medical education" in paragraph 6, it seems clear to me that the scope of the term must be limited to the context of medical treatment and related medical and scientific education. This reading is bolstered by the nature of the document itself. The form is labeled a "CONSENT FOR SURGERY/PROCEDURE OR TREATMENT." It is entirely focused on Ms. Judge's medical treatment, including use of tissue, risks, fees for services, use of anesthesia, etc. The notion that it covers the release of treatment-related documents for Saltz's publicity-related purposes is antithetical to the idea of a consent to treatment.
I also conclude that this court must construe the plain meaning of the language "provided my identity is not revealed by the pictures." The majority opinion itself observes that "Saltz's interpretation of this provision is clearly unreasonable, and we reject that interpretation." Nevertheless, the majority appears to consider the provision ambiguous and declines to interpret it. I cannot agree — the only remaining reasonable interpretation of the language, once Saltz's theory has been rejected, is that "revealed by the pictures" encompasses the release of photographs accompanied by explicit identifying labels, as happened here. Once again, I do not see any disputed evidence in this record that would support the notion of ambiguity in the language. It is true that Ms. Judge did not request summary judgment below and we are not in a position to grant her such relief on appeal, but that procedural circumstance does not require a remand for consideration of "ambiguities" or factual disputes that do not exist in the record. We have been asked to construe the language of the consent form, and I see no ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence thereof on remand.
Even if one of the consent form provisions were ambiguous, this court still must interpret the form as a matter of law because the parties have not presented any valid extrinsic evidence that would create a dispute of material fact. A contractual ambiguity is a prerequisite to the admission of extrinsic evidence purporting to resolve the ambiguity, Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 751. If, however, the parties do not present extrinsic evidence, courts must resolve the ambiguity by using the usual interpretative tools. No doubt in many cases parties do not present extrinsic evidence that is relevant to an ambiguous term — either because they elect not to or because there is simply no valid extrinsic evidence to be had. In such cases, courts are required to say what even an ambiguous contractual provision means in order to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the agreement.
In this case, Saltz argued in the trial court that the signed consent form authorized him to release Ms. Judge's pictures to the news media with accompanying identifying information. Ms. Judge responded by arguing that the consent form did not give Saltz this authority and produced an affidavit in which she declared that she "never understood 'medical, scientific or educational purposes' to mean that I was consenting to have my nude photographs released to the media." But Ms. Judge's personal understanding of the meaning of the consent form's terms is not valid extrinsic evidence that the district court could consider. Cf. Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 42 (latent ambiguities are objectively verifiable and ordinarily cannot be proven based on the parties' subjective understanding of contractual terms; affidavits and other evidence that fail to identify a collateral matter are not relevant to showing a latent ambiguity).
Thus there was no valid extrinsic evidence relevant to the interpretation of the consent form for the district court to consider during the summary judgment proceeding. For this reason, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "disputed issues of fact clearly remain regarding the meaning of the pre-surgery consent forms." In the absence of any extrinsic evidence, the only question before the district court (and this court) is what the phrases "educational purposes" and "provided my identity is not revealed by the pictures" mean within the context of the consent form. Regardless of whether these phrases are deemed ambiguous, in the absence of valid extrinsic evidence presented by the parties, this is a legal question to be resolved by a court, not a factual question to be resolved by a jury.
I therefore agree with the majority's conclusion that Saltz was not entitled to summary judgment on the intrusion on seclusion claim. But I reach that conclusion because I have determined as a matter of law that the consent form does not mean what Saltz says it means. I see no disputed issues of fact to be resolved on remand regarding the proper interpretation of the consent form.