575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990)
The Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Jacobs v. Klawans in 1961, establishing that under a lease with a silent consent clause prohibiting subletting or assignment without the landlord's consent, the landlord could withhold consent arbitrarily.1 In 1983, the court in Citizens Bank & Trust v. Barlow Corp. observed that the question of reconsidering that rule had not been preserved for review.2
Douglas Julian and William J. Gilleland, III, the tenants, purchased a tavern and restaurant business and rented the premises from landlord Guy D. Christopher.3 The lease included clause ten, which stated that the premises could not be assigned or sublet without the prior written consent of the landlord.4 After occupancy, the tenants sought the landlord's written permission to sublease the upstairs apartment.5 The landlord declined without inquiring about the proposed sublessee and conditioned consent on the tenants paying an additional $150 per month in rent.6
Upon allowing the sublessee to take possession, the landlord initiated repossession proceedings in the District Court of Maryland in Baltimore City.7 During the district court trial, the tenants offered testimony that the landlord had explained clause ten was meant only to prevent subletting to a damaging tenant, but the judge refused to consider evidence outside the lease's four corners.8 The District Court ruled for the landlord, as did the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on appeal.9
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to address whether the holding in Klawans should be modified given developments since that decision.10
Whether the common law rule applied in Jacobs v. Klawans should be changed?11
The common law rule from Jacobs v. Klawans permitted landlords to withhold consent arbitrarily under silent consent clauses in leases.12 This approach treated the landlord's discretion as absolute even when the lease did not spell out any standard for decision.13 Over time the rule's foundations eroded as courts and commentators recognized that such clauses should be interpreted to require reasonableness absent an express provision granting absolute discretion.14
Public policy against restraints on alienation and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract now support the modern view.15 When a lease gives the landlord discretion to consent, that discretion must be exercised reasonably rather than capriciously.16 Interpreting a silent consent clause to permit arbitrary refusal would effectively nullify the tenant's right to assign or sublet.17
Yes. The court recognized that since the Klawans case was decided in 1961 the foundations for that holding have been substantially eroded.18 In the present case Douglas Julian and William J. Gilleland III rented premises from Guy D. Christopher under a lease containing clause ten, a silent consent provision.19 The landlord refused consent to sublease the upstairs apartment solely to obtain an additional $150 per month in rent without inquiring about the proposed sublessee.20 Such a refusal unrelated to the transferee's suitability or the use of the property is unreasonable under the new standard.21
The Restatement (Second) of Property and decisions from numerous other jurisdictions now require landlords to act reasonably when withholding consent.22 The court therefore modified the Klawans rule to impose a reasonableness standard on the landlord's decision.23
The common law rule applied in Jacobs v. Klawans should be changed to require that a landlord act reasonably when withholding consent under a silent consent clause.24
Whether any modification of the Klawans rule should apply only prospectively to leases executed after the decision in this case?25
Decisions that change common law contract rules ordinarily apply prospectively to protect parties who relied on existing law when forming their agreements.26 Overruling precedent retroactively could upset settled expectations and prove grossly unfair in the contractual setting.27 Courts therefore limit the new interpretation to leases executed after the mandate while applying the change to the litigants who successfully challenged the old rule.28
Yes. The court held that for leases entered into before the mandate in this case the Klawans interpretation continues to govern.29 For leases executed after the mandate a silent consent clause will be read to require reasonable withholding of consent.30 This prospective application safeguards landlords who may have relied on the prior rule when drafting and signing leases.31 The court emphasized that contracts should be interpreted according to the law in effect at the time of execution.32
The modification of the Klawans rule applies only prospectively to leases executed after the decision in this case.33
Whether the tenants in the present case should receive the benefit of any new interpretation of silent consent clauses?34
Even when a new rule is given prospective effect the litigants who successfully challenged the old doctrine receive its benefit.35 This practice avoids turning the announcement into mere dictum and preserves the incentive for parties to expend effort and expense in seeking reversal of unsound precedent.36 Fairness to the successful challenger outweighs the concern that other similarly situated parties will not receive the same benefit.37
Yes. The tenants Douglas Julian and William J. Gilleland III persuasively argued for the change and therefore receive the benefit of the new interpretation.38 The court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with instructions to vacate the District Court judgment and remand for a new trial.39
At that trial the landlord bears the burden of proving that applying the reasonableness standard would be unfair because he relied on the Klawans rule when the lease was executed.40
The tenants in the present case should receive the benefit of the new interpretation of silent consent clauses.41